Disaster response and adaptation to climate change in Fiji and Tonga : remote island perspectives by Johnston, IC
  
 
 
 
Disaster response and adaptation to climate change  
in Fiji and Tonga: remote island perspectives 
 
By 
Ingrid Christina Johnston 
Bachelor of Arts (Psychology, Sociology), Australian National University 
Masters of Criminology, University of Sydney 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
March 2015 
School of Social Sciences,  
University of Tasmania 
  
  ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Only after they disappear will the islands become the absolute truth of 
the urgency of climate change, and thus act as a prompt towards saving the 
rest of the planet”(Farbotko, 2010, p47-48).  
 
 “What kind of society creates the conditions that result in one population 
with the means to escape suffering and another population without the means 
to escape suffering?” (Nickel and Eikenberry, 2007, p.538).  
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Abstract 
 In the South Pacific, an area prone to disasters of many kinds, tropical 
cyclones are predicted to increase in strength, track length and lifespan due to 
climate change. Small island developing states are going to need to adapt their 
disaster response accordingly. This is particularly the case for those 
communities on outer islands of these states, the remote islands within remote 
countries, where vulnerability is already especially high. These communities 
are out of reach of many aid organisations, and are required to be more self-
reliant and resilient than most. 
 This thesis investigates how the responses to disasters on remote islands 
need to change and the factors affecting the capacity for this to happen. The 
research focuses on remote islands in Fiji and Tonga, from the perspectives of 
the communities, aid organisations and governments. It examines issues of the 
growth of aid, the expectations it creates, the governance of the aid system, and 
how remoteness impacts on disaster planning and response. 
 The research involved fieldwork in Fiji and Tonga, with stays on one 
remote island in each country. Both of these islands have a history of cyclones, 
including recent experience. This was followed by time in the regional and 
national capitals interviewing representatives of aid organisations and 
government. Included in the thesis is a reflection on the experience of doing 
cross-cultural research and the importance of giving voice to communities that 
are often left out of this kind of research.  
 The research found that a number of variables – such as remoteness, the 
highly gendered structures of decision-making, differential use of traditional 
knowledge, and contradictory aid expectations – directly and indirectly affect 
the preparedness and adequacy of remote island responses to natural disasters 
such as cyclones. This has a number of significant ramifications in the light of 
predicted transformations associated with climate change.  
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Introduction 
     This thesis looks at the experience, expectations and perceptions of remote 
outer island communities in Fiji and Tonga, regarding disaster aid and climate 
change adaptation. It asks how similar or different these may be to the main 
islands, and the disaster management literature more generally, and aims to 
investigate how disaster responses on remote islands in Fiji and Tonga need to 
and are able to adapt to a changing climate. The main research questions are to 
identify how tropical cyclones are presently responded to in Fiji and Tonga by 
remote communities, aid organisations and government and; how responses 
might need to change into the future as climate change intensifies these events, 
and combines with other climate change impacts such as rising sea levels. 
     Climate change is bringing with it an increase in severity of natural 
disasters, particularly affecting small island developing states (Nurse, McLean, 
Agard et al., 2014; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2012; 
Deo, Ganer and Nair, 2011; Terry, 2007; Mimura, Nurse, McLean et al., 2007). 
This increases the need to ensure and enhance the effectiveness of responses to 
these disasters from all involved - governments, aid organisations, and the 
affected communities. While debates around the causes of climate change 
continue despite the strength of scientific evidence (IPCC, 2013), the impacts 
are not waiting for the final verdict from the politicians and policy makers. 
Climate change is here, and we must deal with the effects.  
     The costs of extreme weather events are increasing worldwide, both in 
terms of lives lost, and economic losses (IPCC, 2011). Sufficient evidence 
exists to be able to presume that disasters will increase in intensity and perhaps 
in frequency, over the coming years, as climate change effects such as 
warming ocean surface temperatures take hold (Mimura et al., 2007). Ten of 
the 15 most extreme weather events have occurred in the last 15 years, and 
disasters since 1950 have become more intense (Bettencourt, Croad, Freeman 
et al., 2006). Coupled with this, is the observation that natural disasters such as 
cyclones/hurricanes seem to be changing location and moving outside their 
traditional ‘zones’ (Oxfam International, 2007). 
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     While the concrete scientific link between climate change and individual 
disaster events is controversial and difficult to establish for extreme weather 
events that occur relatively infrequently and therefore have less data available 
in relation to them, the overall trends are becoming clear (IPCC, 2012; 
Anderson, 2006). Sea level rise is being measured and documented, and is 
making storms more hazardous as waves and storm surges come further inland. 
The effects of severe weather events are being felt already, and thus, there is a 
need to take action now. With one in five people in the world currently living 
in coastal areas that are and will be affected by rising sea levels and natural 
disasters (McAdam, 2010), this will be a significant issue for the future. The 
humanitarian consequences of climate change are poorly understood and this 
has been identified as an area of need for research (Moriniere, Taylor, Hamza 
and Dowling, 2009).  
     Disasters used to be thought of simply in terms of the actual physical event. 
An extreme weather event or hazard, such as a tropical cyclone, which reaches 
landfall only on uninhabited islands, or an inhabited coastline but without 
doing any damage to infrastructure or life remains a hazard, but in what sense 
can the impact be considered a disaster? In more recent thinking, disasters have 
been defined in terms of the interaction between the event and pre-existing 
vulnerabilities: 
Severe alterations in the normal functioning of a 
community or a society due to hazardous physical events 
interacting with vulnerable social conditions, leading to 
widespread adverse human, material, economic or 
environmental effects that require immediate emergency 
response to satisfy critical human needs and that may 
require external support for recovery (IPCC, 2012, 
p558). 
     An extreme weather event becomes a ‘natural disaster’ when the 
consequences it triggers overwhelm the capacity of the local response and 
seriously affect the social and economic development of a region (Ferris and 
Petz, 2011). If the same tropical cyclone as in the example above struck 
elsewhere in the world causing widespread damage beyond the capabilities of 
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the local authorities to respond, then that hazard is considered to have become 
a disaster.  
    A hazard is: 
The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced 
physical event that may cause loss of life, injury, or other 
health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, 
infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, and 
environmental resources (IPCC, 2012, p560).  
The hazard then, is the physical event that holds the potential to cause severe 
negative impacts, thus becoming a disaster. The extent to which those negative 
impacts will occur depends on the interaction of the hazard with existing 
vulnerabilities of the society or community in which the hazard occurs. Where 
the cyclone referred to above meets strong, robust, well-designed and 
constructed buildings, the results will almost certainly differ from if that 
cyclone meets already weak and flimsy shacks in a community that lacks 
sound infrastructure. Similarly, where the people in an affected area have 
somewhere strong, safe and accessible to shelter, the results will be different 
compared to an area where there is no safe place to be during the storm or 
hazard event. These differences are contained in the concept of vulnerability, 
which may take many forms, including that which is economic, social and 
political. Vulnerability is defined as:  
The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. 
Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts including 
sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to 
cope and adapt (IPCC 2014b, p.28).  
    Placing the definition within the context of hazards, vulnerability is “the 
characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their 
capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impacts of natural 
hazards” (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon and Davis, 2004, p.11).  
     This refined definition of a disaster is critical, since it means that preventing 
disasters, or reducing the risk associated with them, becomes possible. Rather 
than focusing on the actual hazard event, the focus is on the underlying 
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vulnerabilities. This reflects the view that disasters are social, not just natural 
phenomena, with humans being able to act and take decisions to reduce the 
likelihood of disaster or reduce the impacts (Lavell and Ginnetti, 2014). 
     Natural disasters may be viewed as having three phases - the evolution of 
vulnerability through social processes preceding the disaster, the actual disaster 
occurrence itself, and the response/recovery (Mutter and Barnard, 2010). For 
example, the construction of new dwellings on a flood plain represents the 
evolution of vulnerability through the social processes that led to the dwelling 
being constructed in a risky location. The hazard, in this case the flood, then 
occurs some time later, with the vulnerability meaning that for the residents the 
flood event may become a disaster. The final phase of the disaster is the 
response/recovery to the event.  
     This disaster response may be further divided, in temporal sequence, into 
emergency relief, recovery and reconstruction. Aid is provided with immediate 
humanitarian aid first, which may take the form of for example food, water and 
temporary shelter. This is followed later by recovery of livelihoods through for 
example the re-planting of crops, and finally the reconstruction phase that may 
involve the reconstruction of dwellings. The loop is complete with the next 
phase of the evolution of vulnerability, which may be more, less or different to 
the vulnerability that existed prior to the hazard event. This circular sequence 
of events is often referred to as the disaster management cycle - event, 
response, recovery, mitigation, preparedness, event (O'Brien, O'Keefe, Gadema 
and Swords, 2010).  
     The responses to climate change are often divided into two baskets - 
mitigation to reduce human-induced climate change, and adaptation to adjust to 
climate change. Of particular relevance to this study, adaptation in this context 
is defined as: 
The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate 
and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to 
moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In 
natural systems, human intervention may facilitate 
adjustment to expected climate and its effects. 
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Incremental adaptation: Adaptation actions where the 
central aim is to maintain the essence and integrity of a 
system or a process at a given scale. 
Transformational adaptation: Adaptation that changes the 
fundamental attributes of a system in response to climate 
and its effects (IPCC 2014b, pp. 1-2). 
     There is a growing realisation of the connections between development and 
sustainability, and that one essential element will be to better align disaster risk 
reduction and climate change adaptation efforts, so as to lessen the likelihood 
that hazards or extreme weather events become disasters in the first place. 
Across the South Pacific, momentum is building for this alignment in policy 
(Bijay, Filho and Shulte, 2013). Alongside this shift though, there is the long 
held recognition that increases in expectations and dependence on disaster and 
development aid lead to a weakening, rather than a strengthening of resilience 
and self-reliance (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Secretariat (UNCTAD Secretariat) and United Nations Disaster Relief 
Organization (UNDRO), 1983). Studies in indigenous communities including 
on small Pacific islands have shown the negative impact of disaster relief on 
self-reliance to be long lasting (Lewis, 2009).  
     Two possible and opposing effects of aid on disaster risk reduction have 
been proposed at a national level. There may be either: 
• a preventive effect whereby the aid directly or indirectly improves 
preparedness,  
• or a so-called ‘crowding-out effect’ with expectations of reliable aid 
leading to a neglect of risk reduction responsibilities (Raschky and 
Schwindt, 2009).  
     A study in Bangladesh following a cyclone in 1991 brought that concept to 
a community level showing that aid can lead to disaster victims losing interest 
in risk reduction measures (Haider, Rahman and Huq, 2006).  
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     Fiji is experiencing an expansion of actors in its disaster aid arena, 
increasing the provision of aid and challenging co-ordination and governance 
(Fletcher, Thiessen, Willetts et al., 2013). This adds to what is already a 
complex disaster risk management system in a country with a noted 
problematic culture of dependence (Becker, 2012; Méheux, Dominey-Howes 
and Lloyd, 2010; Benson, 1997). Tonga does not have the same proliferation of 
people and organisations involved in disaster response, but also experiences 
difficulties with co-ordination and governance of the disaster response and aid 
systems, structures and bureaucracies. As the expansion moves Fiji towards 
what has been termed ‘competitive humanitarianism’, the interests of donors 
and aid organisations become increasingly important (Stirrat, 2006).  
     A civil society is a “non-governmental and non-profit entity that seeks to 
bring about positive social and environmental change…can be ‘multi-national’ 
and international in nature, or small grass-roots groups” (United Nations, 
2010). The integration of disaster risk management and climate change 
adaptation strategies in the Pacific are experiencing similar difficulties with a 
large number of organisations involved (Gero, Méheux, and Dominey-Howes, 
2010).  
     Bottom-up approaches, coming from the community instead of being 
imposed upon them, have been called for in relation to policy and disaster risk 
reduction, but remain uncommon (O'Brien, Bhatt, Saunders et al., 2012). This 
has been noted as an issue in Fiji in particular (Becker, 2012), and it is not 
clear to what extent these strategies filter through to remote communities. 
Remoteness is the product of physical distance, natural features, social 
processes, history, economic, politics and sociology (Gillis, 2001). Some 
previous studies have looked at disaster response and aid dependency in Pacific 
islands (Campbell, 1984) and specifically in remote island communities (e.g. 
Méheux et al., 2010; Campbell, 1990; McLean, Bayliss-Smith, Brookfield and 
Campbell 1977). Other more recent studies have addressed climate change 
adaptation issues, including disaster risk management in Pacific islands (Bijay 
et al., 2013; Barnett, 2001).  
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     Few studies, however, bring these together to provide the perspectives of 
the remote island communities on issues they are at the forefront of - natural 
disasters and climate change. Outside of massive events such as the 2004 
tsunami or Hurricane Katrina, communities are often left out of research on 
disaster response and climate change adaptation, and where included, they are 
rarely from outer, remote islands (Alam and Collins, 2010). This means that 
the experiences and coping strategies of those communities located furthest 
from aid organisation responses are often missing from research.  
     Coping is:  
the manner in which people act within the limits of 
existing resources and range of expectations to achieve 
various ends. In general this involves no more than 
‘managing resources’ but usually means how it is done in 
unusual, abnormal and adverse situations (Wisner et al., 
2004, p113). 
 Researchers have previously found particular resilience and coping strategies 
in remote places - “…the remotest parts of the north cope with floods and 
cyclones that in more developed parts of Australia would constitute a natural 
hazard or become a disaster” (King, 2007, p661). Nissology, or island studies, 
suggests that islands may be a good comparison point for mainlands, because 
they tend to enhance and exacerbate the processes and dynamics in place 
(Baldacchino, 2004).  
     This thesis explores how disaster responses need to and are able to adapt to 
the changing climate, asking in what ways adaptation may occur, and how it 
can meet the needs of the communities affected by the disasters. Disaster 
responses here, refers to the phases of relief, recovery and reconstruction. The 
research is set in the South Pacific, a region at the forefront of change, with 
high exposure to natural disasters, and high risk small island developing 
nations. Case studies from Fiji and Tonga are compared and contrasted, as 
examples informing climate change adaptation and disaster risk management 
generally.  
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Thesis overview 
     In 12 chapters, the thesis describes the affected communities and their 
relationships with cyclones, the aid provided, how that aid system operates, the 
issue of expectations and dependence created by the aid, how remoteness 
impacts, and perceptions of what needs to change in the future. It examines 
how the adaptive capacity of remote islands is affected by current practices, 
and how, if at all, the governance of disaster prevention and relief is adapting 
to the challenges of climate change: 
     Chapter 1 outlines the background to the issues of cyclones, specifically in 
the Pacific, and the policy responses, including the linkages between disaster 
risk management and climate change policies at a regional and country level. 
     Chapter 2 provides the contextual setting for the research with the key 
research themes and conceptual framework. 
     Chapter 3 details the methodology used in this study, and discusses 
methodological issues. This includes issues relevant to the qualitative 
ethnographical methods, and issues relating to the cross-cultural nature of this 
study. 
     Chapters 4-10 present the results from the fieldwork in Fiji and Tonga. The 
perspectives of the study communities, governments and aid organisations on 
cyclones, disaster response, climate change, what is working well and what 
needs to change are presented. The degree of alignment of perspectives is 
discussed.  
• Chapter 4 details the experiences of cyclones and other natural disasters 
in the fieldwork locations, including normalising disasters, preparation, 
finding a safe place, and the immediate aftermath. This chapter is 
designed to set the scene of the communities in the fieldwork locations, 
describing the roles cyclones play in their lives, and diversity within the 
community, through looking at gender and faith. 
• Chapter 5 discusses in detail the traditional knowledge of these remote 
island communities, focusing on natural warning signs of cyclones.  
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The chapter provides detailed descriptions of particular signs, and notes 
similarities between the countries, and others in the Pacific. 
• Chapter 6 focuses on experiences of disaster aid and relief, and how the 
system works in each country, including issues of equity and fairness. 
Examples are given of the types of disaster aid received for different 
events over time, and the ways in which inequalities and corruption 
manifest themselves. 
• Chapter 7 looks at governance issues and co-ordination between 
government and aid organisations. The types and role of various 
organisations involved in disaster aid are discussed, along with how the 
disaster management and response systems operate, and some of the 
practicalities involved. 
• Chapter 8 looks at the expectations of aid, and dependency on aid, and 
the relationships between them are explored. 
• Chapter 9 looks at issues of remoteness including the ways in which 
each of the islands in the study is remote, and how that impacts, both 
positively and negatively on their experiences of disasters and disaster 
aid, and their adaptive capacity. 
• Chapter 10 focuses on perceptions of how the disaster response system 
needs to change to adapt to climate change. Impacts of climate change, 
adaptation to those impacts, and options for future adaptation are 
discussed.  
     Chapter 11 discusses the similarities and differences between the case 
studies and between Fiji and Tonga, recent and forthcoming policy changes 
in these areas, and the relevance of this study for disaster response and 
recovery and climate change adaptation more broadly. The ways in which 
the perspectives of the participant groups (governments, aid organisations 
and communities) align and do not align, and what that means for adaptation 
and adaptive capacity is analysed. The chapter looks at how the disaster 
response system can adapt and how the needs of remote communities fit. 
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     Chapter 12 concludes with a reflection on the study and poses questions for 
future research. 
     This thesis will investigate the important issue of the adaptation of disaster 
responses to a climate changed future, focusing on remote island communities 
at the forefront of those disasters. It is critical to look at the adaptive capacity 
of the system and the responses of all involved - the communities, the aid 
organisations and the governments. 
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Chapter 1 - Cyclones and the policy responses 
     This chapter presents the background information to the problem at hand - 
how the responses to disasters, particularly on remote islands, can adapt to 
climate change. There is a focus on cyclones and the likely impacts of climate 
change on those cyclones in the South Pacific. This chapter locates the research 
sites to the broader context - the villages within the societies; the particular 
disasters relevant to each site within the experiences of disasters for that area 
and country. Following this is an outline of the key policy responses within 
relevant national and regional frameworks. In order to interpret the fieldwork 
results, the relational role of the sites within larger systems is important (Fife, 
2005) and this is discussed. The chapter also provides contextual information 
regarding the integration of the disaster risk management and climate change 
adaptation policies and practices in the Pacific, including regional and national 
agreements and frameworks.  
1.1 Tropical cyclones in the South Pacific 
     A cyclone is known by different names according to where on the globe it 
has formed. In the western North Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean they are 
known as hurricanes, in the western North Pacific Ocean and China Sea they 
are known as typhoons, and in the western South Pacific Ocean and the Indian 
Ocean, they are called tropical cyclones (Terry, 2007). Whatever the 
terminology, a cyclone is at its most basic level a huge storm with associated 
strong winds and rains. They require a sea surface temperature of at least 270 
Celsius to form (Deo et al., 2011) and are categorised according to the 
maximum sustained force of the winds by the Saffir-Simpson scale (see Table 
1.1 below). Cyclones will also typically have wind gusts that are stronger than 
the maximum sustained wind strength used in the categorisation method. 
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Table 1.1: Saffir-Simpson scale for categories of cyclone strength 
Saffir-Simpson Category Maximum sustained wind speed in km/hr 
1 119-153 
2 154-177 
3 178-209 
4 210-249 
5 >=250 
 
     A cyclone forms in a circular motion with an ‘eye’ somewhere towards the 
middle of the storm in which there is little to no wind or rain at all. Another 
feature that often accompanies cyclones is a ‘storm surge’. This is where 
violent winds and low atmospheric pressure combine to form large swells at 
sea. The winds increase the level of both the water and the wave height, and 
these swells then drive massive waves towards the shoreline, effectively piling 
up the sea against the shore. This leads to a temporary but rapid rise in the local 
sea level that typically takes about one hour to peak and another hour to fall. 
Near the middle of the cyclone, a storm surge can create a dome of water up to 
50km across and two to five metres higher than the predicted tide height 
(Terry, 2007). The effects of cyclones are therefore connected with other 
climate change issues such as rising sea levels, as one will exacerbate the other, 
with higher storm surges leading to larger and more prolonged flooding, and 
salinsation of ground water resources. 
     Cyclones will usually weaken when they reach land and this is thought to be 
because they lose their supply of energy from the warm moist air on the sea 
surface. However, sometimes when the land they hit is small (such as an island 
in the South Pacific), they will ‘survive’, and be able to traverse the entire land 
mass without significantly weakening (Terry, 2007). In this way, a single 
tropical cyclone in the South Pacific will often affect more than one country in 
the region. 
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The projected impacts of climate change on tropical cyclones 
     It is not useful to attempt to establish a relationship between a single 
weather event and climatic change. However, trends over time may be 
discerned, and predictions made based on past knowledge of how cyclones 
work. In the South Pacific region, climate change is likely to lead to higher 
temperatures, and stronger and more persistent El Nino events (Mimura et al., 
2007). Some likely impacts of this on tropical cyclones are (Terry, 2007): 
• changes to the pattern of cyclone origins, with less spatial clustering and more 
spreading to the east than at present 
• little change in the total cyclone numbers of frequency but generally more 
storminess east of 1800 longitude 
• increased tropical cyclone intensities, with lower central pressure and greater 
maximum wind speeds 
• longer cyclone lifespans 
• track directions tending more southerly 
• extended track length and farther poleward travel before cyclone decay. 
     This means that while there might not be an increase in the numbers of 
tropical cyclones forming in the region, they may be stronger. The latest 
projections from the IPCC provide some support for this, in their special report 
on extreme weather events and disasters (IPCC, 2012). This report finds that it 
is likely that tropical cyclone tracks have shifted towards the poles, that the 
average maximum wind speed will increase, that sea level rise has resulted in 
increased extremely high water levels in coastal areas, and that the frequency 
of cyclones globally will remain the same or possibly decrease.  
     This special IPCC report also directly links social and economic 
vulnerability to the severity of impact of an event, with higher fatality rates and 
relative economic losses in developing countries than developed countries. It 
finds that development practice, policy and outcomes are critical to disaster 
risk, and that international efforts do not necessarily lead to improvements at 
the local level, because of a lack of local level data (IPCC, 2012).  
     The importance of integrating traditional knowledge with scientific and 
technical knowledge is recognised as being required to improve disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA) (IPCC, 2011). 
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Evidence and projections in the South Pacific region 
     With longer lifespans and extended track lengths, each event may impact on 
more islands. Both Tonga and the eastern islands in Fiji lie east of 1800 
longitude, where increased storm activity is expected. 
     Technology advances over time have increased the accuracy and reporting 
of tropical cyclone events. For this reason, increased trends in cyclone activity 
are sometimes attributed to these improvements rather than representing a true 
increase. In an attempt to address this, Deo and colleagues examined cyclones 
from 1977-2006, a period that is entirely post the development of satellite 
technology. This study found in the South West Pacific Ocean a statistically 
significant increase in intense cyclones and storm days in the period 1992-2006 
compared with 1977-1991, and an increase in the maximum annual wind 
intensity over the entire period (Deo et al., 2011). This increase in the most 
intense cyclones in the South Pacific has been supported by other, similar 
studies (Diamond, Lorrey and Renwick, 2013; Kossin, Olander and Knapp 
2013) and for projections accounting for climate change (Gleixner, Keenlyside, 
Hodges et al., 2014).  
     One of the factors influencing cyclone formation is the El Niño Southern 
Oscillation of variation on the air pressure and water surface temperatures in 
the Pacific. The El Niño phase is characterised by warm oceans and high air 
surface pressure, while the La Niña phase sees the opposite occurring, with 
cooler oceans and lower air surface pressure (Trenberth, Jones, Ambenje et al., 
2007). In two studies concentrating on the Fiji-Samoa-Tonga region, Chand 
and Walsh found that in the period 1970-2006 there was an average of 4.64 
cyclones per El Niño year, 2.94 per neutral year and 2.67 per La Niña year in 
the region (Chand and Walsh, 2009). Using the Accumulated Cyclone Energy 
(ACE) rating which is the square of the maximum sustained wind speed 
summed over the lifetime of the cyclone (a more conservative measure than the 
Saffir-Simpson categories), they examined cyclones in the region during El 
Niño and La Niña years. They found that in Fiji and Tonga, the ACE is above 
average during La Niña years when cyclones retain their strength for a longer 
period of time, compared with El Niño years (Chand and Walsh, 2011). So for 
  15 
Fiji and Tonga, climate change may mean more frequent cyclones during 
longer El Niño events, with cyclones of increased intensity during the ‘quieter’ 
La Niña years. 
     Countries in the South Pacific are feeling the effects of climate change and 
taking notice. For example, the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change 
in Tonga has documented the effects of climate change in Tonga: El Niño 
weather patterns align well with the occurrence of droughts in Tonga, there has 
been an increase in annual mean temperature of 0.4-0.90C since the 1970s, 
coral bleaching is ‘becoming common’, sea levels have risen 6.4mm per year 
since records began in 1993, and coastal erosion means that now some low 
lying coastal villages are inundated with tidal flooding (Ministry of 
Environment and Climate Change (MECC) and National Emergency 
Management Office (NEMO) Tonga, 2010).  
     The effects of cyclones in the region will be further intensified when 
combined with the effects of sea level rise. The average global sea level rise for 
the period 1962-1990 was about 1.5mm per year, but since 1990 it has been 
3.2mm per year, with the increase mainly due to increases in the tropical and 
southern oceans (Merrifield, Merrifield and Mitchum, 2009). However, in the 
Pacific, the increase is far greater, with 6mm per year in Fiji and more than 
6mm per year in Tonga since 1993 (Australian Bureau of Meteorology and 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), 
2011). Estimates for Tonga are as high as 14mm per year since 1993 
(Jayavanth, Takai and Akau'ola, 2009). In the Pacific, sea levels have been 
rising for over 100 years, so the effects are already evident, including 
inundation and erosion, and the salinisation of inland groundwater (Nunn, 
2007a). Increases now being experienced in the rate of sea level rise will 
consequently exacerbate these and other effects. 
     Pacific island countries need to adapt now - faster than wealthier developed 
nations, but location specific predictions do not exist, nor do many solutions 
that have been tested elsewhere (IPCC, 2014c; Barnett, 2001). The uncertainty 
inherent in some aspects of climate change is exacerbated for the places 
experiencing the effects first. Small island developing states may be seen as 
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barometers of how development issues such as climate change will impact 
communities and how to deal with those impacts (Kelman, 2011). 
1.2 Fiji and Tonga 
     The South Pacific region is divided into Micronesia in the north west, 
Melanesia in the south west and Polynesia in the east. Micronesia includes the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau; Melanesia 
includes Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu; and Polynesia 
includes Tonga, the Cook Islands, Samoa, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Nauru (Lal, 
Singh and Holland, 2009). The accompanying map (Figure 1) shows parts of 
both Melanesia and Polynesia, including both Fiji and Tonga, and their 
geographical relationship to each other and to Australia. Fiji and Tonga are 
neighbouring countries, with Tonga lying to the southeast of Fiji. 
 
Figure 1.1: Map showing Fiji and Tonga within the South Pacific region.1 
  
                                                            
1 Source: 
http://www.geographic.org/maps/new2/south_pacific_ocean_maps.html 
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     Fiji is a republic of less than one million people, at 18000’S latitude and 
175000’E longitude in the Melanesian area of the South Pacific. The more than 
320 islands that make up Fiji cover a land mass of over 18,000 km!, and are a 
mixture of mountainous and volcanic terrain. The largest two islands, Viti 
Levu and Vanua Levu, are inhabited, along with about 100 of the smaller 
islands, leaving a population density of about 46 people per km!. 
     Tonga is a small Kingdom in the Polynesian area of the South Pacific, at 
21012‘S latitude and 175012‘W longitude, with a population of just over 
100,000 people. There are 172 named islands in Tonga of which 36 are 
inhabited, making up an area of 649km!. The islands are clustered - Tongatapu 
and ‘Eua in the South, Ha’apai in the middle, Vava’u in the north and 
Niuafo’ou and Niua Toputapu in the far north (MECC and NEMO Tonga, 
2010). About half the population lives on the main island, Tongatapu, and 25% 
of the population live in urban areas (World Bank, 2011). All the atoll islands, 
and the main island which is limestone, are flat with an average altitude of two 
to five metres, while Vava’u, Ha’apai and the Niuas that together represent 
about one quarter of the population, also have some high volcanic islands. 
Even with the smaller population, the small land mass area of the inhabited 
islands in Tonga results in a far higher population density than in Fiji, at 144 
per km!. 
     The South Pacific is one of the most vulnerable regions in the world due to 
a range of factors including the geographical location and socio-economic 
factors resulting in a high likelihood of extreme events becoming disasters (e.g. 
poverty, high dependence on agriculture and traditional subsistence farming, 
developing nations, population increase, migration within countries to peri-
urban areas and places at high risk from extreme weather). There are three 
South Pacific countries among the World Bank’s list of the top 12 countries 
worldwide in terms of vulnerability to storms (Samoa-8th, Tonga-9th, Fiji-
12th) (World Bank, 2009). About 11% of the world’s total of around 80 
cyclones annually, form in the South Pacific region and the average number of 
cyclones per year in this region from 1970-2006 was 9, with 27% occurring in 
the month of February (Terry, 2007). It has been estimated that 13,000 people 
are at risk of being displaced because of disasters in the South Pacific each 
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year, including 1,716 in Tonga (from storms/cyclones) and 4,604 in Fiji (from 
storms/cyclones and flooding) (Lavell and Ginnetti, 2014).  
Natural disasters in Fiji  
     Fiji has a high level of exposure to natural disasters, being positioned in 
both the ‘Ring of Fire’, in which most of the world’s most devastating 
earthquakes, volcanic activities and tsunamis occur, and the Pacific cyclone 
belt. The United Nations University produced a World Risk Index, which in 
2011 ranked Fiji 19th out of 173 countries for risk of natural disasters. This 
index combines the components of exposure to natural hazards such as storms, 
floods, earthquakes, droughts and sea level rise; susceptibility in terms of the 
likelihood of suffering harm through public infrastructure, nutrition and 
general economic conditions; capacities arising from governance, medical 
services, social and economic security to reduce negative consequences; and 
capacities for long-term adaptation to future events and climate change (United 
Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU), 
2011). An average of 10% of the Fijian population is directly affected by 
disasters each year, and in the 37 years to 2009, there were 124 natural 
disasters. Half of these were tropical cyclones, one-third floods, and 8% 
earthquakes. Tropical Cyclone Bebe in 1972 left more than 20% of the 
population of Fiji homeless (Lal et al., 2009).  
     There are two main sources of information for natural disasters in the South 
Pacific: EM-DAT2 and the Pacific Disaster Net. EM-DAT is the International 
Disaster Database maintained by the World Health Organization Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), which has statistics on 
disasters worldwide since 1950. The South Pacific Applied Geoscience 
Commission database, Pacific Disaster Net, has statistics on disasters within 
the South Pacific since 1994 that are more complete than EM-DAT. EM-DAT 
lists events if there are more than 10 people killed, or 100 people affected, or a 
call for international assistance or a state of emergency is declared. Cyclones 
listed in EM-DAT for Fiji have resulted in the deaths of over 500 people, and 
                                                            
2 EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – 
www.emdat.be – Université catholique de Louvain – Brussels – Belgium. 
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affected almost 830,000 people. Table 1.2 below combines data from both 
sources, plus some from the Fiji Meteorological Service, which is the regional 
cyclone monitoring service (cited in Terry, 2007). The date may be an 
approximation in some instances when the cyclone lasted for several days 
and/or the date of impact with Fiji is unclear. The latest cyclone was the 
category four Cyclone Evan, on 16 December 2012, with an estimated 1,555 
houses either destroyed or damaged (Government of Fiji, 2013). 
Table 1.2: Tropical cyclones in Fiji, 1980-June 2014 
Named Tropical Cyclone (category) Date Effects 
Evan (4) 12-17 Dec 2012 2 deaths 
8,400 people affected 
USD8.4 million in damages 
Daphne 3/4/2012 Unlisted 
Bune (2) 24/3/2011 Unlisted 
Wilma (4) 23/1/2011 USD 1.9 million in damages 
Tomas (4) 12/3/2010 2 deaths 
39,101 people affected 
USD 39 million in damages 
Mick  14/12/2009 4 deaths 
3.845 people affected 
FJD 26 million in damages 
Gene 28/1/2008 7 deaths 
Daman 5/12/2007 69 people affected 
USD 0.7 million in damages 
Cliff 5/4/2007 1 death 
Landslides and mudslides associated 
Vaianu 11/2/2006 Unlisted 
Jim 29/1/2006 168 people affected 
 8/4/2004 16 deaths 
5,000 people affected 
USD 4 million in damages 
Ami 14/1/2003 17 deaths 
30,000 people affected 
USD 30 million in damages 
Paula 1/2/2001 1 death 
7,000 people affected 
Iris 7/1/2000 Unlisted 
Dani 19/1/1999 9 deaths 
1,772 people affected 
USD 3.5 million in damages 
Cora 23/12/1998 Unlisted 
Susan 3/1/1998 Unlisted 
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Hina 12/3/1997 Unlisted 
Gavin 10/3/1997 25 deaths 
3,500 people affected 
USD 27 million in damages 
June  1996 Unlisted 
Tomas  20/3/1994 Unlisted 
Thomas 1/3/1994 Unlisted 
Kina 2/1/1993 21 deaths 
160,003 people affected 
USD 100 million in damages 
Joni 11/12/1992 1 death 
2,000 people affected 
USD 1.6 million in damages 
Fran 5/3/1992 Unlisted 
Sina 28/11/1990 6,000 people affected 
USD 10 million in damages 
 1/1/1987 1 death 
3,369 people affected 
USD 25 million in damages 
Rajah 28/12/86 1 death 
3,000 people affected 
USD 20 million in damages 
Martin 10/4/1986 Unlisted 
Hina 11/3/1985 Unlisted 
 7/3/85 1 death 
20,000 people affected 
USD 3 million in damages 
Gavin 5/3/85 3 deaths 
2,000 people affected 
Eric, Nigel, Odette 17/1/85 - 19/1/85 28 deaths 
100,000 people affected 
USD 73 million in damages 
Sarah 25/3/83 11,132 people affected 
USD 1 million in damages 
Oscar 1/3/83 9 deaths 
200,014 people affected 
USD 50 million in damages 
Hettie 24/1/1983 Unlisted 
Arthur 15/1/81 4,700 people affected 
Wally 24/3/80 18 deaths 
35,250 people affected 
USD 2 million in damages 
Peni 2/1/80 Unlisted 
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Natural disasters in Tonga 
     Similarly to Fiji, Tonga is located within the Pacific cyclone belt and the 
Ring of Fire, and is ranked second in the UN’s 2011 World Risk Report with a 
score of 29% (UNU, 2011). Major events can be catastrophic in this small 
country. During a typical disaster year, over 40% of the population is affected, 
and losses average about 14% of GDP (Weir and Virani, 2010). Tonga has an 
average of one tropical cyclone per year (Jayavanth et al., 2009). Since the 
1960s there have been five severe cyclones - Cyclone Flora in March 1961 
affecting Vava’u and Ha’apai, Cyclone Isaac in March 1982 affecting Ha’apai 
and Tongatapu, Cyclone Waka in December 2001 in Niua, and Cyclone Rene 
in 2010 in Tongatapu, Vava’u and Ha’apai (MECC and NEMO Tonga, 2010), 
and Cyclone Ian in 2014 in Ha’apai.  
     Isaac destroyed 20% of all housing in Tonga, 90% of banana crops and all 
the breadfruit crops (UNCTAD Secretariat and UNDRO, 1983). Isaac 
however, was eclipsed by Ian, which made landfall across Ha’apai on 11 
January 2014 as a Category 5 cyclone, and left two people dead and an 
estimated two-thirds of all buildings in Ha’apai destroyed or severely damaged, 
with losses totalling around USD49.5 million or 11% of gross domestic 
product (World Bank, 2014). Even the largest island, Tongatapu, is small and 
flat enough that the sea spray can be felt across the entire island, so there is 
literally nowhere inland to evacuate to when a cyclone is approaching. 
     Table 1.3 below lists the recorded cyclones that have occurred in Tonga 
from 1980- June 2014, using combined data from EM-DAT, the Pacific 
Disaster Net plus the Fiji Meteorological Service (cited in Terry, 2007). The 
date may be an approximation in some instances when the cyclone lasted for 
several days and the date of impact with Tonga is unclear.  
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Table 1.3: Tropical cyclones in Tonga, 1980-June 2014 
Named Tropical Cyclone (category) Date Effects 
Kofi 1/3/14 Unlisted 
Ian (5) 6-13 Jan 2014 1 death 
14 injured 
4,000 people affected 
USD48-50 million in damages 
Wilma 26/1/2011 USD3 million in damages 
Rene 16/2/2010 Unlisted 
Lin 5/4/2009 Unlisted 
Vaianu 11/2/2006 Unlisted 
Heta 6/1/2004 1200 people affected 
TOP950,000 in damages 
Eseta 11/3/2004 15,000 people affected 
TOP1.9 million in damages 
Ami 12/1/2003 Unlisted 
Waka 31/12/2001 16,500 people affected 
USD 51,300 in damages 
Paula 26/2/2001 Unlisted 
Mona 8/3/2000 65,000 people affected 
TOP4.2 million in damages 
Iris 7/10/2000 Unlisted 
Cora 26/12/1998 77,000 people affected 
TOP19.6 million 
Ron 7/1/1998 500 people affected 
USD1 million in damages 
Keli 7/6/1997 Unlisted 
Hina 16/3/1997 3,000 people affected 
USD15.2 million in damages 
Yasi 1/1996 Unlisted 
Kina 1/1/1993 Unlisted 
Nina 29/12/1992 Unlisted 
Joni 5/12/1992 Unlisted 
Sina 24/11/1990 USD18.5 million in damages 
Ofa 4/2/1990 1 death 
3,103 people affected 
USD2.5 million in damages 
Martin 10/4/1986 Unlisted 
Eric 14/1/1985 Unlisted 
 30/5/1982 1 death  
USD1.1 million in damages 
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Isaac 3/3/1982 6 deaths 
146,512 people affected 
USD21.2 million in damages 
Cliff 8/2/1981 Unlisted 
Tia 3/1980 4 deaths 
5,000 people affected 
 
1.3 Policy responses and regional frameworks 
     There are many similarities and consistencies between the disaster risk 
management (DRM) and climate change adaptation (CCA) fields that make the 
convergence of them logical. Both recognise the importance of poverty 
reduction, sustainable resource management and livelihood security; both are 
linked with development processes; and both use risk, vulnerability and 
resilience approaches (Lei and Wang, 2014; Thomalla, Downing, Spanger-
Siegfried et al., 2006). The potential benefits of closer integration of the sectors 
have been recognised by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 
their Special Report on extreme events and disasters (IPCC, 2012). Historically 
though, there have been some key differences that have separated these fields. 
Disasters tend to be thought of as short term, and local or national in scale; 
whereas climate change is more global and long term (Birkmann and 
Teichman, 2010; Schipper and Pelling, 2006).  
     To link them successfully requires the adoption of a cross-sectoral, multi-
scale integrative approach, with flexible funding schemes shifting from short-
term project-oriented financing towards long-term sustainability, and the 
viewing of disasters as ‘windows of opportunity’ to allow for change and 
process with a longer-term perspective (Birkmann and Teichman, 2010). 
Disasters attract media and policy attention, but typically that is translated into 
immediate humanitarian response rather than acting as a catalyst for positive 
change (Schipper and Pelling, 2006).  
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     Increasing the focus on risk reduction and prevention rather than response 
to disasters, and recognition of the local and national nature of much climate 
change adaptation helps to bring the sectors closer together and pave the way 
for joint action. The local and bottom-up approaches often seen in the disaster 
risk management field may enable the promotion of early adaptation strategies, 
while the top-down elements common to climate change adaptation may 
promote systemic change (Lei and Wang, 2014).  
     There is growing recognition in the policy world of these connections 
between climate change and natural disasters. The United Nations’ Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the resilience of nations and 
communities to disasters outlines priorities for action in reducing risk, 
strengthening preparation and building resilience. The responses of the South 
Pacific countries to the Hyogo Framework and their commitments to it are 
clearly seen in the region’s Pacific Island Framework for Action on Climate 
Change 2006-2015 (PIFACC), co-ordinated by the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP). Tonga was the first country in 
the region to develop a Joint National Action Plan on Climate Change 
Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management (JNAP). 
     Particularly in a region such as the South Pacific, with its many small island 
developing states, the strength and importance of regional frameworks and 
agreements such as these is clear. The South Pacific is looking to formalise the 
relationships between disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation 
through a joint framework: 
DRR and CCA are increasingly recognised as having a 
shared aim of reducing the vulnerability of communities 
and contributing to sustainable development by 
improving the ability to better anticipate, resist, prepare 
for, respond to and recover from the impacts of hazards 
(United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR), 2013, p2).  
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     Tonga has led the way in the South Pacific, officially bringing the fields 
together in a policy plan in 2010. The JNAP, as it is known, was developed to 
comply with the existing regional frameworks.  
There are six priority goals (MECC and NEMO Tonga, 2010): 
1. Improved good governance for climate change adaptation and disaster 
risk management; 
2. Enhanced technical knowledge base, information, education and 
understanding of climate change adaptation and effective disaster risk 
management; 
3. Analysis and assessments of vulnerability to climate change impacts 
and disaster risks; 
4. Enhanced community preparedness and resilience to impacts of all 
disasters; 
5. Technically reliable, economically affordable and environmentally 
sound energy to support the sustainable development of the Kingdom; 
6. Strong partnerships, cooperation and collaboration within government 
agencies and with civil society organisations (CSOs), non-government 
organisations (NGOs) and private sector. 
     The JNAP includes suggested adaptation measures against increased 
tropical cyclones and storm surges, including village preparedness plans and 
relocation to higher ground. 
     Tonga’s JNAP is ambitious, being the first in the region. However, while 
the two sectors merged for the purposes of writing the JNAP, there are few 
explicit statements within the document about actually integrating the two 
systems on a continuing basis. The document does effectively bring together 
the CCA and DRM polices into one document, but not necessarily into one 
practice. The plan calls for joint meetings of the National Environment and 
Coordinating Committee and the National Emergency Management Committee 
once every six months, with the Chair to rotate. This does not imply full 
integration, but something closer to mutual consultation. It may be indicative 
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of power struggles between the two committees, with neither wanting to cede 
ground in a truly integrated set up.  
     Despite the existence of the JNAP in Tonga, the Committees responsible for 
CCA and DRM remain separated, along with their respective responsible 
Ministries. This was explained to me by the DRM side of the government as 
being a deliberate decision for largely logistical reasons; to ensure that DRM 
remains in the same Ministry as the emergency services and resources required 
during disaster responses. However, the CCA side of government sees more 
value in combining the two areas, especially for the purposes of funding 
application and project management. 
     Other countries in the region, including Fiji, are following suit, with JNAPs 
currently being drafted. The existing climate change policy in Fiji that was 
written to align with the existing regional climate change framework mentions 
disaster risk reduction (Government of the Republic of Fiji, 2012): 
• Objective 1: Mainstreaming - Strategy 6 - ensure all sectors coordinate 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction efforts to enhance 
aid effectiveness and streamline implementation; 
• Objective 5: Adaptation - reduce the vulnerability and enhance the 
resilience of Fiji’s communities to the impacts of climate change and 
disasters: 
⁃ Strategy 1 - integrate related disaster risk reduction and climate 
change adaptation strategies and actions into national and 
sectoral planning to streamline responses; 
⁃ Strategy 5 - support the ecosystem-based approach throughout 
Fiji, recognising that ecosystem services, such as food security, 
natural hazard mitigation and physical coastal buffer zones, 
increase resilience; 
⁃ Strategy 8 - improve disaster response capacity and access to 
public health facilities, emergency services, communication 
services and evacuation centres; 
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⁃ Strategy 12 - strengthen early warning systems to ensure 
effective and timely communication to the public, with 
particular attention paid to isolated, hazard-prone and 
disadvantaged areas; 
⁃ Strategy 14 - undertake national research to identify effective 
adaptation measures to support sector-specific adaptation and 
disaster risk reduction response. 
     In a report looking at the economics of climate change in the Pacific, the 
Asian Development Bank recommended a risk-based approach to DRM and 
CCA, to prioritise climate actions and increase cost-efficiency of adaptation 
measures, and for strong co-operation and co-ordination with regional partners 
in the Pacific and beyond (Asian Development Bank, 2013). 
     The Strategy for Disaster and Climate Resilient Development in the Pacific 
(SRDP), currently being drafted, will replace the Pacific Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Disaster Management Framework for Action (2005-2015) and 
Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change (2006-2015). 
Recognising the commonalities between these areas, the strategy will focus on 
capacity for implementation, identifying the transformations required to bring 
the previously separate sectors together. With goals, performance indicators 
and priority actions for national and local governments and administrations, 
civil society organisations, private sector organisations, regional organisations, 
other development partners, and communities, the strategy has a vision of: 
“Pacific people, their socio-economic development, and the region’s natural 
resources and environments, are resilient to all hazards, and to the adverse 
consequences of climate change, variability and extremes” (UNISDR, 2014, 
p15). 
     Within the February 2014 draft strategy, eight key opportunities for disaster 
and climate resilient development have been identified: 
1. Move from the current focus on disaster response to sustainable 
development-centred disaster and climate risk management pathways; 
2. Faith-based organisations can play even greater roles in advocacy and 
education for building more resilient societies; 
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3. Management of natural and other relevant hazards should have 
meaningful priority on political and economic agendas; 
4. Efficiencies can be achieved through improved co-ordination, reducing 
duplication and taking advantage of synergies that arise when climate 
and disaster resilient development initiatives are jointly implemented; 
5. Improved place-based understandings of how hazards, vulnerability and 
exposure interact with development processes is the cornerstone to 
effectively allocating and utilising resources that deliver more resilient 
development outcomes; 
6. Refinement and increased use of the tools needed to make compelling 
economic cases for adopting proactive, systematic and integrated risk 
management measures; 
7. Strengthened capacity to anticipate, resist, plan and prepare for, 
respond to and recover from the consequences of disasters and from 
climate variability, extremes and change; 
8. Increased ability to manage new and emerging disaster and climate 
risks in an effective and efficient manner. 
     There are several positive signs from the drafting of this strategy. Firstly, 
while the draft is similar to the previous frameworks in its focus on risk (from 
the disaster framework), development (from the climate change framework), 
working in partnerships and political agendas, the emphasis on economic 
agendas and funding represents a departure from the previous frameworks, and 
recognition of the difficulties involved in having needs, political agendas and 
funding match up. 
     Secondly, the drafting of this strategy is in marked contrast to recent 
findings of the World Bank that while integration of disaster and climate 
change areas is happening on the ground, there is resistance at institutional 
levels both nationally and internationally (World Bank, 2013). This may be 
reflective of the history of small island developing states generally and the 
Pacific specifically, being particularly proactive in the area of climate change. 
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     Finally, there is the issue of capacity. With the best of intentions highlighted 
in the enacting of frameworks and agreements such as these, there is often a 
gap between that and actual implementation (Barnett and Campbell, 2010). 
Sometimes progress gets as far as assessments and plans for action, but then 
stalls for a variety of reasons such as governance arrangements, lack of or self-
interested leadership, competing planning agendas and lack of institutional co-
ordination, insufficient financial and human capital, lack of information and 
data, and path dependency (future pathways being contingent upon historical 
pathways) (Wise, Fazey, Stafford Smith et al., 2014). The focus on capacity for 
implementation in the current draft of the SRDP is a positive and constructive 
recognition of this problem. 
1.4 Conclusion 
     Cyclones are already a significant issue for the South Pacific countries, 
including Fiji and Tonga. They are located geographically in areas at high risk 
of a number of hazards, including cyclones, earthquakes and flooding. Being 
small island developing states, they are highly vulnerable to those hazards. 
This vulnerability will be discussed in more detail in chapter two. Climate 
change is likely to worsen the situation, with more hazards including stronger 
and longer lasting cyclones. In response to this, the Pacific is being proactive in 
bringing together the climate change adaptation and disaster risk management 
areas in their policies and regional frameworks. This integration is happening 
at least on paper, although putting this policy shift into practice is less 
straightforward, with many issues involved. 
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Chapter 2 - Key research themes and conceptual 
framework 
     This chapter discusses some of the issues involved in adapting to climate 
change in terms of disaster response, and outlines the conceptual framework 
and key research questions. These issues of adaptation centre around elements 
of resilience, relevant to both the disaster management system and the people. 
The practical responses of the disaster management system and the adaptive 
capacity of that system are intricately linked with the resilience of the 
communities. The links are investigated using certain elements of resilience - 
expectations, governance and remoteness. These themes are introduced, along 
with the key stakeholders of the communities, governments and aid 
organisations. 
     A conceptual framework is a system of concepts, assumptions, beliefs and 
theories that support and inform a study (Miles and Huberman, 1994). At its 
most basic level, it is an analytical tool to organise ideas, and provide a context 
for interpreting findings. It is a scaffold for the research, providing connections 
between theory, research design, fieldwork and significance of the results. The 
conceptual framework for this project is designed to show how expectations, 
dependence and remoteness interact for the communities, governments and aid 
organisations, influence each other at each stage of the disaster management 
cycle, and how in turn, this affects resilience and the adaptability of the 
systems, to a future of more severe extreme weather events.  
2.1 Resilience and adaptive capacity 
   The disaster response system is going to have to adapt to the changes that are 
occurring, both in terms of the climate and hazards, and the policy responses. 
Critical to this, is the resilience and adaptive capacity of the system as it tries to 
make these adjustments. The IPCC defines adaptive capacity as “(t)he ability 
of systems, institutions, humans and other organisms to adjust to potential 
damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to consequences” 
(IPCC 2014a, p. 2). 
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   Socio-ecological resilience is the ability to absorb disturbance, reorganise, 
and retain essential functions, processes, structures and feedbacks (Walker and 
Salt, 2006; Holling, 1973). Resilient socio-ecological systems are characterised 
by having, among other things, in-depth local knowledge, flexible and 
polycentric governance, diversity, modularity, openness, reserves, feedbacks, 
monitoring, leadership and trust (Lauer, Albert, Aswani et al., 2013; Carpenter, 
Arrow, Barrett et al., 2012). In this way, the systems are able to adjust or 
exhibit resilience. 
   There are elements that are immediately important arising from this such as 
governance and the people involved. Other important elements of resilience 
and adaptive capacity particularly relevant to this context are identified through 
an understanding of the existing underlying vulnerabilities, historical responses 
and their impacts. This helps to find the starting point from which the 
adaptation needs to occur. 
Vulnerability of the South Pacific region 
   Poverty and disasters work in a cycle, with disasters increasing poverty in 
developing countries such as Fiji, which in turn makes the disaster outcomes 
more severe (Lal et al., 2009). As a proportion of gross national product, 
climate hazards have been found to have 20-30 times the impact in poor as in 
wealthy countries (UNCTAD Secretariat and UNDRO, 1983). The predicted 
increase in intensity of tropical storms and depressions has been highlighted as 
the most critical danger from climate change for South Pacific nations as a 
decreased amount of time between events (return time) decreases the nations’ 
ability to recover (Barnett and Campbell, 2010). The poverty in the South 
Pacific developing nations may require a pro-poor vulnerability analysis with 
the voices of local populations in their understanding of who is at risk, the 
problems at-risk groups face and possible solutions (Ribot, 2010). 
   As outlined in Section 1.1, the combined effects of climate change in this 
region are likely to mean more intense tropical cyclones, involving stronger 
winds, increased rain, more damaging storm surges and flooding resulting from 
increased sea-surface temperatures and sea-level rises. These more intense 
events will occur in a changing Pacific islands area.  
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   The influence of western ideas has meant a shift away from traditional 
housing that was readily repaired and an increase in reconstruction timeframes. 
Houses on Pacific islands were traditionally constructed from natural materials 
found in the local environment. Westernised houses, using materials such as 
corrugated iron, timber or concrete have almost completely overtaken 
traditional housing. This means that damaged houses can no longer be repaired 
quickly from the surrounding environment, but require construction materials 
such as nails. Colonisation in many countries, and the move away from largely 
subsistence lifestyles have also changed inter-island relationships and led to a 
loss of traditional coping strategies. Increasing coastal habitation, increasing 
populations, and increasing urbanisation mean that the harms associated with 
climate change effects such as tropical cyclones, may be outside the traditional 
experience of these communities. 
Traditional coping mechanisms and increasing aid 
   Exposure to extreme weather events is not new for the South Pacific, and 
there have been traditional strategies and mechanisms to cope and adapt. Such 
strategies in rural indigenous communities have included land use planning, 
building methods, food resilience, social resilience and environmental 
resilience responding to changes in the climate and environment (Mercer, 
Dominey-Howes, Kelman et al., 2007). Traditional coping strategies such as 
these have been found to help reduce vulnerability to natural disasters (Paul 
and Routray, 2010).  
   With colonisation and demographic changes from increasing populations 
however, some of this traditional knowledge has been lost and some strategies 
may be becoming increasingly unavailable (Mercer et al., 2007). Economic and 
political incentives have altered practices and changed the focus of decision 
making around such issues as the construction of housing, and location of 
villages. Inter-island trade traditionally fostered strong and supportive inter-
island relationships, which were then called upon during disasters. These 
relationships have changed since colonisation, as inter-island trade has 
diminished in favour of broader international trade (Barnett, 2001).  
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   One traditional method for coping during a natural disaster was internal 
migration, where people move within customary land boundaries either 
temporarily or permanently (Hugo, 2010). With increases in population, and as 
more and more of the land becomes at risk as climate change impacts are felt, 
the availability of this as a solution may diminish, while simultaneously also 
becoming more necessary.  
   South Pacific nations are relatively young populations and the presence of 
children in the household has been found to increase distress for adults during 
disasters (Ronan and Johnston, 2005). Would such an increase in distress 
enhance or diminish self-help and coping strategies during and after the 
events? In Bangladesh, instinctive survival strategies in keeping safe and 
securing belongings and intra-community co-operation have been found to 
improve coping after a cyclone (Alam and Collins, 2010). Human responses at 
individual, community and institutional levels may serve to mitigate or 
enhance the harms associated with the disaster. It is important to consider what 
strategies can be put in place at each of these levels to maximise the mitigation 
and minimise the enhancement of the harms.  
   There may also be a difference between knowledge of traditional practices, 
and the application of them, particularly in a changing climate. The efficacy of 
traditional coping strategies on small islands is likely to be substantially 
reduced in the future due to changes in the climate (IPCC, 2014c). The 
strategies and practices will need to adjust accordingly. The need for 
documenting traditional knowledge and integrating it with more scientific 
understandings has been recognised by both governments in the South Pacific 
and researchers in this field (Government of the Republic of Vanuatu, 2006; 
Mercer, Kelman, Taranis et al., 2010). The usage of traditional knowledge 
leads to practical strategies that are accepted by local cultures and are therefore 
more likely to be implemented and sustained (Hodgson, 2010). The ways in 
which this local knowledge combines with external knowledge and improvised 
responses in the Pacific have been noted (Lauer, 2012), highlighting the 
dynamic rather than static nature of local knowledge.  
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   The documentation and use of traditional knowledge is specifically 
mentioned in some regional frameworks including the Pacific Islands 
Framework for Action on Climate Change (2006-2015) (SPREP, 2011) and the 
Hyogo Framework for Action on Disaster Risk Reduction (2005-2015) 
(UNISDR, 2005). The Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster 
Management Framework for Action 2005-2015 lists as one of the expected 
outcomes by 2015 having traditional knowledge incorporated into effective 
disaster warnings, alongside technology (Applied Geoscience and Technology 
Division of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SOPAC), 2005).  
     The 2011 Fiji national report regarding progress against the Hyogo 
framework underscored difficulties in achieving goals such as this, noting the: 
 …need to document and share traditional knowledge on 
early warning systems and disaster preparedness, and to 
look at the relevance and applicability of this to the 
changing hazard characteristics. Preserving and 
transferring local knowledge from older to younger 
generations is a major challenge (National Disaster 
Management Office (NDMO) Fiji, 2011, p16). 
   Over the last 40-50 years, the receipt of international disaster aid has added 
significant complications. While vital at the time of a disaster, in the long term, 
it may provide perverse incentives to the island-nation governments, especially 
when the aid has no conditions attached regarding risk minimisation and 
adaptation measures. It has been found that South Pacific communities are 
increasingly relying on aid in the aftermath of disasters (Mercer et al., 2007; 
Benson, 1997), and that this culture of dependence may be constraining their 
own responses (Mercer et al., 2007). However, the arrival of aid may not 
necessarily be directly related to the severity of the disaster, with aid 
organisations clustering in particular locations for reasons such as logistics and 
finances (Koch, Dreher, Nunnenkamp et al., 2009).  
   Aid organisations will sometimes be constrained in their response by 
conditions placed on their funding for certain events or projects. The amount of 
aid varies from disaster to disaster, not in proportion to the number of people 
affected or the amount of damage (Ferris and Petz, 2011). With aid also comes 
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issues of equitable and timely distribution, and it has been shown to foster 
conflict where corruption and preferential treatment are perceived (de Silva, 
2009).  
   The methods and systems used for distribution and allocation of aid are 
important in issues of equity, timeliness and fairness. It has been suggested that 
in Fiji, there is scope for better targeting of natural disaster relief through the 
existing informal village institutions (Takasaki, 2011). In a study examining 
aid distribution during the 12 months following a cyclone in Fiji, differences in 
the equitable distribution and sharing of scarce food aid resources, according to 
whether the leaders involved were traditional (hereditary and related to the clan 
structure) or non-traditional leaders (community group leaders and turaga ni 
koro - government ‘gatekeepers’ or liaison agents). Traditional leaders were 
found to be more likely to share aid than non-traditional leaders whose status 
was not related to kin/clan (Takasaki, 2011).  
   The allocation and distribution of aid is complex, particularly in this region 
of small islands. There are questions around the extent to which aid is 
distributed fairly and equitably (as alluded to above). However, there are also 
higher-level questions concerning the ‘what’ and ‘when’ of aid, and whose 
needs are being met through its provision. Does the aid address the post-
disaster needs and concerns of the affected communities for food, shelter and 
livelihood? Or does it more adequately address the concerns of the aid 
organisations or the government to be seen to be delivering aid - and quickly? 
These issues are likely to be complex, without easy answers. 
   The difference between aid for disaster response and aid for disaster 
prevention is important here. Disaster response aid is short-term, with 
immediate benefits to the recipients and providers, and clear justification for 
the donors. Disaster prevention aid and strategies are closely linked with 
climate change adaptation strategies (see section 1.3), and by nature longer 
term, with less immediate benefits to the recipients and providers, and a more 
difficult cost-benefit analysis for donors. Competing priorities are much more 
likely to win over risk reduction and prevention work which may be seen as 
optional, when compared to humanitarian response in the face of images of 
disaster gaining the attention of international media. 
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Temporary dislocation and permanent resettlement or migration 
   Following a major sudden-onset natural disaster, there will be people who are 
displaced and need to be relocated whilst repairs and rebuilding are underway 
in their villages. Often the only roads and major transport routes on islands are 
along the coast, and these are likely to be damaged. Crop damage may mean 
not only a reliance on emergency food stocks or aid, but decreased food 
production for months or even years. The salinisation of water supplies through 
storm surges and flooding may lead to problems with fresh water supply. 
Damage to buildings, such as churches and schools, will disrupt the 
functioning of communities even for those whose homes are intact. Currently 
there exists little data on the numbers or situations of those people who have 
been displaced by natural disasters and their human rights concerns (Takasaki, 
2011). In one of the first attempts to quantify the problem, it was estimated that 
20 million people worldwide were displaced by sudden-onset climate related 
disasters during 2008 (Kalin, 2010). A 2011 Conference on Internally 
Displaced People and Climate Change in the South Pacific called for this data 
gap to be filled, with systematic collection of data and sustained monitoring of 
situations of internal displacement and recovery, as well as knowledge on who 
is displaced or at risk of displacement, and their likely needs for assistance and 
protection. 
   Both quantitative and qualitative research has been called for, with country 
specific data considering regional and national contexts of demographics and 
vulnerabilities (Yonetani, 2011): 
• quantitative research to establish a baseline of information to test and
analyse global patterns and trends in displacement over a longer time;
• qualitative research to understand the evolution of displacement situations
over time, specific protection issues and needs of disaster-displaced
people, barriers to their achievement of durable solutions to their
displacement.
   After a disaster, people have the right to expect access to or be provided with 
essential food and water, basic shelter and housing, and appropriate clothing 
(Mutter and Barnard, 2010). Where displacement continues into the medium to 
long term though, this becomes more difficult. Policies and guidelines for 
displaced people have been developed by the United Nations - Guiding 
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Principles on Internal Displacement, Framework for Durable Solutions, and 
Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural 
Disasters (Mutter and Barnard, 2010). However, it is not clear what difference, 
if any, these will make for the affected communities at the time. The translation 
of policies and guidelines into practice is not straightforward. Particularly for 
people in remote communities - to what extent their reality reflects such 
principles, while beyond the scope of this project, is an area for investigation. 
   Where people are displaced as a result of a natural disaster, there can be flow 
on effects for communities outside the immediate area. For example, a 
community in North Queensland, in Australia, where flooding is an annual 
occurrence, reported tensions arising between the community evacuated and 
the ‘host’ community that finds itself with a large group of people camped on 
the local sporting oval for weeks at a time. The host community blamed the 
evacuees for any negative event, and the evacuees found their usual capacity 
for resilience impeded by being away from home (Cottrell, 2008). These 
tensions sow the seeds of conflict between the communities. 
   Not everyone from an affected community will return - for some the outcome 
may be migration. One mechanism for coping with increasing disasters and 
climate change may be migration as an adaptation strategy. Empirical studies 
on how perceptions of climate change have influenced migration decisions 
made by individuals, households and communities have been identified as an 
area where current knowledge is lacking (Boncour and Burson, 2010).  
   Typically in the South Pacific, community relocation is over short distances, 
and as distance increases, and boundaries (both of land tenure as well as 
international borders) are crossed, the costs and problems associated with the 
relocation increase (Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy, 2005). Migration may 
help reduce population pressures on diminishing resources, and to provide 
remittances to those who stay behind (Campbell, 2010). However, it has also 
been recognised that those who will be able to choose to cross international 
borders will be the well off, and that those who are left behind will be the most 
vulnerable (Barnett and Chamberlain, 2010).  
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   Raleigh and Jordan (2010) have called for research on varying thresholds 
(points at which everyone is affected by a disaster, regardless of their initial 
situation), the long- and short-term actions of people from a region that is past 
its threshold, and the socioeconomic conditions that influence thresholds. This 
would provide an indication of the adaptive capacity of individuals and 
communities with respect to migration as an adaptation strategy. 
Conceptual framework 
   The elements affecting resilience and adaptive capacity that contribute to the 
conceptual framework for this study are outlined in Figure 2.1 below. The key 
stakeholder groups are the communities, aid organisations and governments. 
The interactions and integration of these groups affects and is affected by 
expectations of aid, governance of the system and issues of remoteness. These 
then impact at each stage of the disaster management cycle - the hazard 
(becoming a disaster or not), the response, recovery, mitigation or prevention 
and preparedness for the next hazard. 
Figure 2.1: Elements affecting resilience and adaptive capacity of the disaster 
response system 
   These elements and the ways they fit together will be discussed in detail in 
the remaining sections of this chapter. 
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2.2 Stakeholders and relationships 
     There are three key groups of participants in each country: 
• communities - a remote outer island was identified that had multiple 
experiences with cyclones, including recent experience, and the 
community level participants were members of that community in each 
country;  
• aid organisations - local, national and regional/international civil 
society and other non-government organisations such as faith-based 
organisations, involved in both the funding and delivery of disaster aid 
and climate change adaptation, including international donors; 
• governments - representatives from government departments involved 
in disaster response and climate change adaptation, including from the 
local government of the region in which the islands are located, and 
national governments.  
     The research seeks to understand the interactions and alignment between the 
perspectives of these three groups, and the extent to which this will facilitate 
adaptation of disaster response to climate change. The groups are integrated 
and interlinked, as shown in Figure 2.2, rather than being completely separate 
groups operating in isolation and without impact upon each other. The nature 
of collaborations, and areas of convergence and contrast are a focus. 
 
     Figure 2.2: Key stakeholders and participant groups 
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      The extent to which organisations and agencies are able to operate in 
atypical environments with demands exceeding their usual capacities, is an 
essential predictor of resilience, or the capacity of a society to recover, in this 
instance from a disaster (Paton and Gow, 2008). A crucial element of this is 
that the agencies and organisations are in both circumstances and relationships 
that are unfamiliar, sudden and urgent. Representatives from the three groups 
must quickly develop relationships that are co-operative and constructive. Aid 
in these times must complement existing methods and structures (Cottrell, 
2008).  
Social responses and issues of gender and faith 
     Central to the interactions of government and aid organisations with society, 
will be the social responses to the disaster. Previous research has found that 
national policies have little or no influence over how decisions are made about 
the environment in rural Pacific islands, with tradition more likely to determine 
how problems are brought to the community’s attention, how they are 
discussed and by whom, and how solutions are identified and implemented 
(Nunn, Aalbersberg, Lala et al., 2014; Nunn, 2007b). Thus it is essential to 
understand the interactions between both formal policy and informal policy 
and human responses in the context of disaster response and recovery. Disaster 
risk reduction plans and activities can attempt to anticipate and mitigate the 
effects through such means as ‘cyclone-proof’ building techniques and 
evacuation plans and centres. However, no matter what strategies are put in 
place prior to an event, the social responses at the time will be vital in 
determining the outcomes.  
     Evacuation plans and centres are only helpful if people use them - if they 
have the information available, make the decision at the right time, and are 
physically able to put the plan into action. Rescue, recovery and aid efforts 
require co-ordination, co-operation and equity. The determination of priorities 
and distribution of aid, the nexus between self-help and reliance on others, and 
the human element in both the giving and receiving of aid are crucial factors in 
the aftermath of a disaster.  
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     The acknowledgement of and respect for local traditions and 
understandings, combined with relationships between the community and 
local, state and national bodies were found to be essential to the success of 
evacuating a remote island community in northern Australia from Cyclone 
Monica in April 2006 (Veland, Howitt and Dominey-Howes, 2010). When 
formal systems do not meet expectations, it increases a sense of helplessness, 
disappointment, resentment and anger (Citraningtyas, 2010). The extent to 
which formal systems and policies are visible and relevant to the affected 
populations throughout the country is important, and similarly, the extent to 
which agencies feel able to reach across sectors and governmental levels to the 
communities.  
Gender3 
     
3 This section was published in another form as Heckenberg, D and Johnston, I 
(2012) Climate change, gender and natural disasters: Social differences and 
environment-related victimisation. In R. White (Ed.) Climate change from a 
criminological perspective. Routledge Press: London. 
This section has been 
removed for
copyright or 
proprietary reasons.
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Faith 
     Faith represents another aspect of the diversity of the community, and plays 
an important role in the Pacific. Religion has been defined as “a system of 
symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods 
and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that 
the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz, 1993, p90). 
While the literature on religion, climate change and disasters is not well 
developed, there are logical connections between them. Specifically, there are 
multiple references to disasters in religion, including reference to the religious 
duty to help those in need; while religious communities often attribute 
disasters to 
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God’s will, and faith-based organisations (FBOs) are increasingly involved in 
relief operations (Kemkens, 2013).  
     At both global and national levels, mitigation and adaptation action on 
climate change has been frustrated by unresolved political debate. Engaging 
with religion in the climate change debate makes sense given that new sources 
of motivation are needed to break political deadlocks, and consumerist 
worldviews, incongruent with many religions, are barriers to adaptation 
(Haluza-DeLay, 2014). As the emphasis of disaster studies moves from the 
physical trigger event to the vulnerability and social constructs, an increased 
emphasis on the role of religion fits (Chester and Duncan, 2010). Religion can 
serve many functions after a disaster, including assisting with psycho-social 
recovery, providing meaning for how to interpret the event, a social support 
network and a sense of control (Kemkens, 2013).  
     Belief in divine will, however, is said to be a barrier to climate change 
adaptation in the Pacific (Nunn et al., 2014; Lata and Nunn, 2011), and so-
called ‘political-religious disaster opportunism’ may exist, whereby 
governments take advantage of belief in divine will to deflect their own 
responsibility for vulnerabilities within their communities (Kemkens, 2013). 
God’s covenant with Noah never to flood the earth again has been cited as 
justification for not believing in dangerous sea level rise (Mortreux and 
Barnett, 2009).  
     This issue has been directly addressed by the Pacific Council of Churches in 
their 2004 Otin Taai declaration statement and recommendations from 
consultations on climate change: 
The sea level is rising and threatening Pacific Islands with 
flooding from high tides and storm surges. This is not an 
act of God. It is a result of human economic and consumer 
activities that pollute the atmosphere and lead to climate 
change. Most of these polluting emissions come from 
highly-industrialized counties. Our response to God’s 
covenant with Noah should be to act in love toward God’s 
creation and to reduce the pollution that is contributing to 
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climate change. By placing us on the earth, God has given 
us both the right to use it and the responsibility to do so 
with care (Pacific Council of Churches, 2004). 
     The cultural context may be important, with fatalistic attitudes sometimes 
representing a positive coping mechanism, allowing people to move on 
(Gaillard and Texier, 2010). Parallel practices, which may at first seem 
inconsistent, coexist in many non-western parts of the world, such that 
religious practice is just one of many protective behaviours (Chester and 
Duncan, 2010). The idea of disasters being God’s retribution or punishment for 
sinfulness is losing prominence. The focus may shift to structural or societal 
rather than individual sinfulness, linking back to unequal distribution of power, 
wealth and vulnerabilities (Chester and Duncan, 2010).  
     Both Fiji and Tonga are predominately Christian countries, and many of the 
civil society organisations (CSOs) represented there are church-based. 
Churches are very well connected with communities throughout the countries, 
and this existing structure represents one of the best methods of 
communicating with villagers, especially in rural and remote locations 
(UNISDR, 2014; Nunn, 2007b). Governments have recognised that the 
churches and FBOs have community connections that are more comprehensive 
than their own (Thornton, Sakai and Hassall, 2012). This, along with the high 
levels of trust for churches among communities (Gaillard and Texier, 2010) is 
an advantage also for FBOs in terms of aid projects.  
   Potential disadvantages include operating outside the conditions of 
humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality, with preferential 
treatment; humanitarianism being used as a cover for missionary activities; and 
limitations to professionalism where aid is not part of the core business of the 
organisation (Kemkens, 2013).  
2.3 Contexts and interactions 
   The elements of governance, expectations and remoteness interact with the 
participant groups discussed above, and with each other in affecting resilience 
and adaptive capacity of the disaster response system. Each of the elements 
interacts with the other two elements in a dynamic way, affecting resilience 
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and adaptive capacity. Similar to the participant groups, these elements are 
interlinked as shown in Figure 2.3, with both areas of convergence and contrast 
of interest in this study. 
Figure 2.3: Contexts and interactions affecting the disaster management 
cycle 
Governance 
   As the implications of the projections for climate change start to take shape, 
there is increasing interest in the links between climate change, sustainable 
development and disaster risk management. Disaster risk governance is the 
“way in which the public authorities, civil servants, media, private sector, and 
civil society coordinate at community, national and regional levels in order to 
manage and reduce disaster risk and climate related risks” (United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), 2013, p1). 
   Earth Systems Governance (ESG) combines the areas of governance and 
earth systems analysis in examining the integrated formal and informal systems 
at all levels of society, that are designed to cope with environmental change 
and ‘earth system transformation’, within the context of sustainable 
development (Biermann, Betsill, Gupta et al., 2010). The inclusion of multiple 
levels and systems echoes Ostrom’s notion that multi-level, polycentric 
governance systems involving the capacity to initiate or veto action at multiple 
scales are most appropriate for adaptation and resilience of socio-ecological 
48 
systems (Ostrom and Janssen, 2004). This allows for changes to occur at many 
places and levels within the systems, rather than a rigid system that can only be 
changed at certain inflexible points.  
   One of the analytical problems on which ESG concentrates is that of 
adaptation of the governance mechanisms and processes. This field of work 
includes such questions as the politics of adaptiveness - who benefits and why, 
which governance processes foster adaptiveness and what attributes of 
governance systems enhance the capacity to adapt (Biermann et al., 2010). 
Adaptive governance involves collaboration, social learning, flexibility, 
polycentrism and subsidiarity (Wyborn and Dovers, 2014). During times of 
rapid change it connects individuals, organisations, agencies and institutions at 
multiple organisational levels (Folke, Hahn, Olsson et al., 2005).  
   It remains to be seen what form these changes will take, with continuing 
uncertainty around the severity and timing of many climate change impacts, 
and future vulnerability, exposure and responses of interlinked human and 
natural systems (IPCC, 2014a). However, uncertainty exists in planning for any 
future, with only the degree of uncertainty changing (Barnett, 2001), and not 
all uncertainty is equally problematic (Stafford Smith, Horrocks, Harvey et al., 
2011). How the uncertainty is recognised and dealt with in the adaptation will 
be important. 
   This project fits well within this area of ESG work, examining the adaptive 
capacity of disaster response systems in Fiji and Tonga. The perspectives of 
different levels of society are included, and the integration of formal and 
informal systems examined. The project questions to what extent formal 
government policies are represented within the reality of the informal on-the-
ground responses, and vice-versa. Informal responses are often enacted well 
before the formal responses are felt, especially in rural or remote areas. In 
examining the need for and capacity of the systems to adapt, this project looks 
at the integration of these formal and informal systems, and of the views of 
future need. 
   These ideas are put into a context directly relevant to this project in a model 
of disaster management. It suggests that there are nested and increasingly 
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complex levels of organisation - from the individual and family, community, 
state, through to the global level. The interactions of these levels determine 
disaster risk management outcomes: 1) planning, 2) preparedness, 3) response 
and 4) recovery, with each of these occurring in parallel at each level of the 
model (Beaton, Bridges, Salazar et al., 2008). Analysis of these interactions is 
fundamental in this project, through the inclusion of the government, aid 
organisation and community levels of participation. It is the interactions of 
these levels that influence the integration of the formal and informal systems.  
Expectations 
   Drawing on role theory (Katz and Kahn, 1978), overlaying the analysis of 
these interactions is the concept of expectation. According to this theory, roles 
are behavioural expectations that are associated with status and its 
accompanying rights and duties, within a larger social structure. Expectations 
are beliefs about the future, and are influenced by informal and formal rules 
(Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2010; Ostrom, 2005). These expectations include 
beliefs and attitudes and in turn, drive behaviour. Where expectations are 
unclear or conflicting, interpersonal conflict and distress are likely.  
   In this project, it is the expectations and behaviours of the community, aid 
organisations and governments around disaster response, and the interactions 
between them, which are in question. Where there is ambiguity or conflict 
within these expectations and behaviours, less effective and adaptable 
responses are likely. The status, rights and duties of each may differ according 
to whether it is the formal or informal systems at play, leading to changes in 
expectations. The integration and alignment of these systems and the 
accompanying behavioural expectations will be analysed in the context of the 
adaptive capacity of disaster response systems. The need and capacity for 
adaptation of the informal and formal systems may differ, and such adaptations 
may then increase or decrease the integration of the systems, according to the 
expectations of the various participants. The foundations for either enhanced 
and more effective responses, or ineffective responses and increased conflict, 
are then in place. 
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   Bringing the idea of expectations into the context of disaster management, 
the role that community expectations of government response plays in shaping 
that community’s own actions following a disaster, has been developed into 
typologies of expectations (Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2010). In this model, 
the community expectations affect their behaviour, regardless of how realistic 
they are. The typologies identified are divided into optimistic and pessimistic, 
relating to the community’s view of the government’s capabilities and 
intentions, and then link in to behaviour according to the expectations of 
whether the government is going to help and what the outcome of that is likely 
to be.  
   One element that may be added to this is what the expectations are of what 
type of assistance is likely to be provided. This will to some extent moderate 
the translation of expectations into behaviour. For example, if the assistance 
you are expecting the government will be able to provide is a tent, this will 
lead to different behaviour than if the likely outcome is the money to replace 
your home. This links into the idea of disaster response as meeting needs.  
   Smart (2012) suggested that there are four elements of disaster management - 
reduce vulnerability and build resilience by mitigating known risks; planning 
response and ensuring sufficient capabilities are in place; respond effectively 
by providing basic human needs; and recovery from disasters including 
building resilience against future disasters. Given the emphasis in the response 
on the provision of basic human needs, what follows then, may be the question 
of what ‘basic human needs’ are exactly. The easy initial answer would 
perhaps be that from a humanitarian perspective, which is the relevant 
perspective in disaster response, basic human needs are food, shelter and 
clothing. However, looking at the question from the perspective of Maslow’s 
theory of motivation provides a more complex viewpoint.  
   Maslow defines ‘basic human needs’ more broadly and includes elements far 
beyond food, shelter and clothing (Maslow, 1943). According to Maslow’s 
theory, basic human needs are categorised as physiological, safety, love or 
belonging, esteem, and self-actualisation. These needs are hierarchical and 
decreasing in pre-potency, such that physiological needs must be satisfied 
before safety needs can be considered and so forth. Once one need is satisfied, 
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it opens the way for the next level of needs to emerge into importance. This 
hierarchy should be understood in the context that behaviour is seen as having 
multiple motivations and determinants, so that the hierarchy is about 
unconscious needs, rather than conscious superficial needs, wants or 
behaviours. Importantly, the hierarchy is not rigid, such that it is possible for 
higher levels to be accessed before some lower levels have been met, and that 
there may be degrees of relative satisfaction, decreasing as you go up the 
hierarchy (Maslow, 1943).  
   While there has been much discussion and controversy around Maslow’s 
theory in the years since it emerged, there has been no conclusion reached as 
yet (Wahba and Bridwell, 1976), and the theory is still widely used and 
discussed today (e.g.Walsh, 2011; Koltko-Rivera, 2006). The context for the 
theory, as outlined in the original 1943 paper, with the hierarchy relating to 
unconscious motivations, and being flexible with degrees of relative 
satisfaction, makes the theory difficult to empirically test. 
   Using Maslow’s hierarchy to look at quality of life, it has been suggested that 
more developed societies are more focussed on higher order needs (social, 
esteem and self-actualisation), while less developed societies are more 
focussed on lower order needs (biological and safety) (Sirgy, 1986). In the 
context of disaster response and the impacts of aid and expectations of aid on 
community preparation and resilience, it may be that in some situations, 
communities in less developed societies are shifting focus to higher order 
needs by the impact of the disaster aid industry. At the community rather than 
individual level, some are being raised to higher order needs without the lower 
order needs of everyone being fulfilled first. While in developed societies, this 
may be a question of some people for example receiving housing assistance 
from the government while others rely on their insurance (sufficient or not), in 
less developed societies, and especially in remote places, it is more likely to be 
about whether or not there is assistance of any kind. As climate change 
increases the frequency and intensity of disasters, this inequality will become 
untenable, and a way to return to the core humanitarian role of consistently 
fulfilling the lower order needs must be found.  
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Remoteness 
   Issues of governance, expectations and dependence in disaster management 
take on another layer of complexity in remote places. On the face of it, 
remoteness may seem a simple construct - somewhere that is far away. 
However, there are layers of complexity to remoteness that impact disaster risk 
management (DRM) and climate change adaptation (CCA). Remoteness at one 
level is a simple geographical idea, defining a community by its inaccessibility 
(being difficult to access or a long distance or both). However, this reflects an 
urban-centric deficit view of geographical remoteness (Stewart and Abbott-
Chapman, 2011). But it is also cultural, and while the geography of a remote 
place often has negative connotations, the cultural aspects are often positive, 
such as self-sufficiency, self-reliance, independence and a strong sense of 
community (White, Wall and Kristjanson, 2004).  
   These ideas are put into the context of DRM and CCA by Kelman and Khan 
(2013) who describe islands being viewed as either isolated, fragile and 
vulnerable communities needing help; or as actively contributing and 
participating in DRM and CAA efforts globally. The geographical and cultural 
aspects of remoteness, referred to here as issues of ‘islandness’, are related to 
both vulnerability and resilience, and interact with other issues for small 
islands such as governance, interconnectedness, migration, alliances and 
knowledge forms (Kelman and Khan, 2013). Islands have huge diversity 
however, even though they are often thought of as a single category 
(Ronström, 2012). The concept of remoteness is taken further here by 
concentrating on remote islands within small island developing states. “Even in 
island countries, outer islands can suffer from remoteness to the power centre” 
(Kelman and Khan, 2013, p 1133).  
   Colonisation introduced a different idea of remoteness than when inter-island 
relationships were stronger, and the oceans were considered less of a barrier 
(Hau'ofa, 1994). Strong inter-island networks traditionally in the Pacific 
islands have served many purposes, including social, political, economic and 
environmental (Campbell, 2006). The weakening of these inter-island 
relationships primarily since colonisation, has impacted on disaster 
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management, since those connections are seen as less reliable in times of need. 
Disaster aid, relief and rehabilitation assistance have also been shown to 
weaken traditional disaster risk reduction techniques (Campbell, 2006), and a 
lack of maintenance of and trust in traditional knowledge may increase 
dependence on that aid (Kelman, Mercer and Gaillard, 2012). 
2.4 Key research questions 
     Bringing together the key research themes, this thesis aims to investigate 
how disaster responses on remote islands in Fiji and Tonga need to and are 
able to adapt to a changing climate, and to identify: 
• how tropical cyclones are presently responded to in Fiji and Tonga
by remote communities, aid organisations and government and;
• how responses might need to change into the future as climate
change intensifies these events, and combines with other climate
change impacts such as rising sea levels.
Within these broad questions, arising from the key research themes and 
conceptual framework, are a number of specific research questions about how 
expectations, governance and remoteness impact on the responses of each of 
the participant groups, and on the other parts of the disaster management cycle. 
They are: 
Do the social responses to these events help or hinder? 
o the communities - self-help, expectations of aid, survival strategies and
responses adopted, influence of gender and faith;
o the aid organisations - co-ordination with government, provision and
distribution of aid, conditions placed on provision of aid;
o the governments at all levels- distribution of aid, disaster management
procedures and policies.
 Are the allocations of aid between disaster response and disaster 
prevention in the right proportions? 
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Sub-questions 
 What expectations do the communities, aid organisations and 
government have of themselves and of each other in terms of disaster 
management? 
 In what ways have 'development' and 'progress' in these countries helped 
or hindered responses? 
How does remoteness impact on responses of the three groups? 
 How well-aligned are the perspectives of the communities, aid 
organisations and governments on the changes to the disaster response 
system needed to cope with future events? 
Is migration or relocation a realistic option? 
How is traditional knowledge used? 
     Some of these questions are more directly relevant to one participant group 
than others (for example traditional knowledge being highly relevant to remote 
communities). There are, however, interactions among both the participant 
groups and the research questions, given the breadth and complexity of this 
area. 
2.5 Conclusion 
     This thesis as a whole looks at the resilience and adaptive capacity of the 
disaster response systems in Fiji and Tonga in the context of climate change, 
and the elements affecting that resilience and adaptive capacity. This chapter 
has outlined the key research themes and conceptual framework, from which 
arise the research questions. The underlying vulnerabilities of the countries as 
small island developing states at high risk of extreme weather events, and the 
increase in humanitarian aid following disasters, have changed the responses. 
Traditional strategies and responses have been weakened with colonisation and 
increasing aid. Climate change is solidifying the place of migration in the 
disaster management cycle in a new and urgent way.  
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     The interactions, diversity and integration of the key stakeholders 
(communities, aid organisations and government), in this context are affected 
by elements of resilience - governance, expectations and remoteness. These, in 
turn impact upon each stage of the disaster management cycle, from immediate 
response, to longer-term recovery, prevention and preparation. These 
interactions of the key stakeholder groups and elements of resilience and 
adaptive capacity form the basis for the conceptual framework for the study, 
and the research questions.  
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Chapter 3 - The study 
     This chapter describes the research design, procedure, participants and 
methods of data analysis, choice of fieldwork sites and access to them, along 
with site descriptions. Moreover, in this chapter are sections on the qualitative 
experience of, and some necessary considerations for, doing cross-cultural 
research in the Pacific, and the impacts on my research of having my family 
accompany me to the islands for the fieldwork trips are discussed.  
3.1 Research Considerations 
     This thesis started out as a segue from criminology to studies of climate 
change issues, by looking at the relationships between climate change and 
crime. This initial thought developed into a comparative study of two 
countries, and the climate change aspect focused on natural disasters. There is 
much literature detailing the criminological interest in disasters, with the post-
disaster period often providing a context for opportunistic crimes against 
victims of the disasters. Safety in evacuation centres is an issue that arises in 
many parts of the world, and there are similarities between disaster evacuation 
centres and refugee camps (Ferris and Petz, 2011). 
      Thinking about these issues and reading about disaster studies led to an 
interest in the responses to disasters - both the immediate emergency phase, 
and the reconstruction phases. What happens six months later when the 
television cameras have gone, many of the aid organisations and volunteers 
have also packed up, and the world has at best a dim memory of the event 
having occurred? These issues are particularly pertinent for developing 
countries, compared to wealthy western countries where more resources are 
available to be deployed.  
     It quickly became clear that within the Asia-Pacific region, there is much 
research being done in South East Asian countries at high risk of natural 
disasters, probably because of their high populations. However, countries in the 
South Pacific, which are equally at risk, do not have the populations to sustain 
world attention. Tuvalu and Kiribati’s attempts to focus the world’s attention 
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on climate change as an issue relevant to today and requiring immediate 
attention, rather than being an almost hypothetical future issue are a case in 
point.  
     Within the South Pacific, Fiji is an obvious choice for a research project, 
since it is the regional centre and therefore many regional and international 
organisations are based there, including the United Nations. Tonga was then 
chosen as a comparison point for Fiji because of the similarities and 
differences highlighted in Section 1.2.  
     Once Fiji and Tonga were chosen as the countries of interest, there was a 
shift away from the criminological issues for two reasons. Firstly, in the 
literature crime did not seem to be as relevant in these countries as in some 
others in the world, a view that was backed up by consultations with Australian 
researchers working in the Pacific. Secondly, within the context of countries 
that are relatively peaceful and with low crime rates, I felt that it would be 
better to give the research a more positive approach. The focus moved more 
towards the impacts of climate change and how they would affect aid and 
emergency responses to disasters, specifically tropical cyclones, which are the 
most common ‘natural disaster’ event in both Fiji and Tonga.  
     The research questions narrowed in focus to the responses and coping 
mechanisms of the communities and countries involved. As the literature 
review continued, but prior to a scoping trip to Fiji and Tonga, the research 
questions began to take shape. With the importance of the social element of 
disasters, and the cyclical nature of disaster management, the main research 
questions began to centre around the various types of responses and to what 
extent those responses are helpful; the different roles of the various participants 
in the disaster response - the affected communities, the civil society 
organisations and the governments; and the temporal spectrum of responses 
from the immediate humanitarian through to the longer term resilience and 
prevention. 
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     The concepts of actions and expectations began to recur through the above 
questions. The differences between the expectations one has of oneself and of 
others, and the actions which take place, have repercussions for everyone. The 
issues around self-help from the survivors of the event are intricately connected 
with their expectations of themselves and of aid. Differences in individual 
perceptions of the responses expected of them lead to differences in actions 
that may give rise to social tensions and conflicts. Where the responses of 
some individuals are perceptively different to the responses of others, the 
disjoint between the actions and expectations of self and others may be highly 
visible and contentious. The connections between the communities affected, 
and the governments and aid organisations providing emergency response, aid 
and assistance are complex and interdependent. The aid organisations and 
particularly the governments may be seen to have all the power in a disaster 
response situation, but without the cooperation of the communities, they will 
be hampered in their responses. This reality is reflected in the time and effort 
governments put into community education. 
3.2 Research approach and fieldwork sites 
     This study seeks to understand how communities in Fiji and Tonga will 
cope with the potentially more intense tropical cyclones in a future changed 
climate, using a broadly ethnographic approach (Fife, 2005). This includes 
both macro level research such as records and policy reviews; and micro level 
research involving fieldwork with residential stays in field site communities 
and including interviews, focus groups, and participant observation. Data were 
collected during visits to Fiji and Tonga, including a three week ‘scoping trip’ 
in April 2012, a six week fieldwork trip to Fiji in June and July 2012, a six 
week fieldwork trip to Tonga in June and July 2013, and a feedback trip prior 
to completion of the thesis, in May and June 2014. This approach recognises 
the cross-cultural nature of this research, allowing a flexible process where the 
research evolves according to knowledge gained in the local context, and 
incorporating the needs and preferences of the broad range of research 
participants, thus being most likely to elicit honest information sharing from 
participants.  
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     The sites for fieldwork were chosen in consultation with governments and 
aid organisations in-country. Once possible sites were identified, access to 
those villages was negotiated with the Village Chiefs. This process was 
essential in terms of obtaining the culturally appropriate permissions and 
authority for conducting research in villages. However, it inevitably involves 
the researcher being closely associated with whichever organisation 
(government or aid organisation) facilitates the access. It is therefore essential 
to disentangle from this association and establish the researcher’s 
independence during the initial introductory phase of the fieldwork. 
     Given the nature of the research topic (responses to cyclones), the 
geographical location and remoteness of the fieldwork sites is also highly 
relevant since more remote locations receive less aid and assistance (Red 
Cross, personal communications, 2011). Thus the experience and expectations 
of aid and assistance from government and aid organisations will be different 
for villages on islands closer to the main islands. The fieldwork sites were 
specifically chosen because of their remoteness (as well as other factors such 
as experience of cyclones), with remoteness being a key analysis variable. 
However, it is recognised that this will impact on the generalisibility of the 
results.  
3.3 Procedure 
     Data for this study came primarily from semi-structured interviews 
conducted during fieldwork in Fiji and Tonga, a review of official documents, 
as well as a literature review. Photos were also taken of both people and places, 
in order to illustrate some of the effects of the cyclones and their aftermath 
with recovery activities, as well as adaptation activities. 
     The project was subject to ethics approval by the Tasmanian Social 
Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee (Approval Number H0012313). 
The ethics approval covered the research methodology including fieldwork, 
interviews, focus groups and photos. During the course of the research, no 
incidents arose requiring modifications or amendments to that approval. Within 
both Fiji and Tonga, I was required to obtain a research permit, through the 
relevant application processes in these countries. Finally, approval was 
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required from traditional village Chiefs for access to the fieldwork sites that 
were villages on remote islands. 
Scoping trip 
     A scoping trip to Fiji and Tonga was made during April 2012. There were 
several purposes to this trip: 
1. Research permit application process 
2. Identification of a suitable village location for the fieldwork 
3. Identification of potential aid organisation and government 
interviewees 
4. Gathering of information on issues relevant to Fiji and Tonga to 
contextualise the research. 
     This trip resulted in some fine-tuning of the research questions, and also 
saw the return of some criminological issues as being relevant to the research. 
Firstly, through consultations with the Fiji Meteorological Office, which 
contains the regional cyclone centre, and disaster management professionals, I 
was able to identify villages in both countries that had been affected by 
cyclones both early and late in the decade 2000-2010. This allowed for a 
comparison between two events within each village location as well as the 
inter-country comparison. This was an important advance to the methodology, 
as having time logistically to study only one village in each country was going 
to be very restrictive in terms of the generalisability and usefulness of the 
results.  
     Secondly, the contextual issues raised in each country were very similar, 
with the organisation of disaster response being the overwhelming problem for 
each. There are several layers of government, which while necessary given the 
geography of the countries with many sparsely populated islands spread over 
large distances, result in bureaucracies that can be difficult and lengthy to 
negotiate. There are also an increasing number of aid organisations involved in 
the disaster response, that need to be coordinated, especially in Fiji.  
     Another common theme was safety issues, especially in evacuation centres. 
These issues were raised once gender was spoken of as a sub-theme to the 
research. While there is little literature on this relating to these countries, and it 
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is culturally difficult to speak about, there are genuine and common safety 
concerns, especially for women and children, post-disaster in both Fiji and 
Tonga. 
Fiji 
     Fieldwork in Fiji was conducted over seven weeks from June-August 2012. 
The first four weeks were spent on the island of Druadrua in the Northern 
Division, then one week in the capital of the Northern Division, Labasa, 
followed by two weeks in Fiji’s capital city, Suva. The fieldwork was arranged 
in this order to allow the community interviews (with villagers) to be 
conducted first. While a semi-structured interview schedule was created for 
each group (community, aid organisations and government) prior to 
commencing fieldwork, interviews were free-flowing and responses to the 
interviews with villagers informed some of the questions to the aid 
organisations and government.  
Druadrua island 
     The process of choosing Druadrua island was a collaborative one. The 
criteria for selecting a location included that it was a small, remote island 
community, with recent experience of cyclones - small enough to enable some 
level of integration within the four weeks available for that part of the research. 
The ideal population was about 200 so that it would be small enough for 
everyone to know everyone else, but large enough to provide a sample. Trust is 
an important issue in research, and especially in Pacific culture, and a small 
community provides the best chance of allowing a whole community to get to 
know a researcher and hopefully build up enough trust to tell their stories. The 
island had to be remote in terms of being far enough removed from the cities 
and major infrastructure for issues of self-reliance to be more relevant than for 
those communities on the mainland and closer to the cities. It was also 
desirable to find somewhere that was remote enough that it was not a 
particularly ‘touristy’ place, to minimise time spent overcoming 
preconceptions and assumptions about the purpose of being there. 
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     The visit to the Fiji Meteorological Office during the scoping trip identified 
the Northern Division of Fiji as the place affected by cyclones most often 
during recent years. This dispelled the idea of the Western Division, 
particularly the Yasawa Islands and Kadavu Island as likely places. In fact, 
while heavily and regularly affected by cyclones in the past, the Western 
Division has not had many during the last 10-15 years. Consultations with 
government and aid organisations during the scoping trip then narrowed down 
the search to Druadrua or Mali islands in the Northern Division, as places that 
met the criteria and were each affected by both Cyclones Ami in 2003 and 
Tomas in 2010. Finally, the recommendations were taken to the National 
Disaster Management Office (NDMO), which helped to make the necessary 
arrangements and obtain the culturally appropriate permissions for the research 
to be conducted on Druadrua Island. 
     Druadrua Island is located off the coast of Vanua Levu, the second largest 
island in Fiji. Labasa is the largest city on Vanua Levu, and the capital of the 
Northern Division. Druadrua Island is a two-three hour bus ride along a 
potholed dirt road, and then a 20 minute boat ride from Labasa. There are two 
villages on the island, Salevukoso and Delaivadra, a 20 minute walk apart 
along a bush track. There are 53 households on the island, making a total 
population of about 200 people, but the population is difficult to precisely 
enumerate since it is fluid and mobile. High school children board on one of 
the main islands, so there are few teenagers around during term time, but 
friends and relatives visiting the island may stay for weeks or even months at a 
time.  
     Infrastructure and services are few. Once on the island, walking is the only 
form of transport - there are no roads. Electricity in the form of solar panels 
arrived on the island two weeks before I did. This is enough to power lights 
and mobile phone re-chargers, but little else. So diesel generators remain for 
the few villagers who own a television. The school master owned the only 
computer I saw on the island.  
     Druadrua was considered to be among the most severely affected locations 
in Fiji from Cyclone Ami in 2003. Because of this, most people live in ‘relief 
housing’, built after Cyclones Ami and Tomas. These houses are small, simple 
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wooden structures, some with a bathroom, some without. Cooking is over a 
fire, often outside in separate, outdoor kitchens. There is no hot water, and few 
landline telephones. Communication is improved now that most villagers have 
mobile phones, but it is still far from easy as there are few places on the island 
where reception is available. Some people choose to walk to the highest point 
in the village to sit on a rock where there is reception, while others have 
devised precise ‘homes’ for their phones where they may be used - sitting in 
that corner of their house, hanging from that branch on a particular tree, or on 
the purpose built ‘phone table’ near the beach. When a phone rings, the nearest 
person goes over to answer it and then calls the owner to come to the phone to 
speak. If you move the phone from its position, the reception will be lost. Just 
like cord phones, except in far less convenient locations. A new 
telecommunications tower being constructed on Vanua Levu is expected to 
improve mobile phone reception.  
     There is limited infrastructure on the island. The island has a primary 
school, which caters for children in pre-school or kindergarten until class eight. 
This is a boarding school and children from as young as class one come from 
the neighbouring island, Kavewa to board. The school is located in 
Salevukoso, and even children from the other village, Delaivadra, sometimes 
board rather than walking home along the bush track each day. There is one 
shop on the island, in Delaivadra, which stocks basic non-perishable goods. If 
you want to purchase something from the shop, you first need to locate the 
shopkeeper to open it for you. 
     There are three churches on the island - one in Delaivadra, and two in 
Salevukoso. Religious faith is very strong on the island, and church services 
are big, community events, with almost everyone involved. 
     The family I (along with my husband and two children) stayed with were 
part of the Chiefly family, and owned the largest house in the village of 
Salevukoso. The house was right on the beach, next to the Methodist Church. 
From there, the village spread up the hill, away from the beach, with the school 
and the Christian Mission Fellowship Church at the top. 
64 
Tonga 
     Fieldwork in Tonga was conducted over a seven week period during June-
August 2013. The first four weeks were spent on the island of ‘Uiha, in the 
district of Ha’apai, in central Tonga, conducting interviews with community 
members. Following this, one week was then spent in Pangai, the capital of 
Ha’apai, with the final two weeks in the Tongan capital, Nuku’alofa. In both of 
these locations, interviews were conducted with representatives from 
government and aid organisations (including civil society organisations and 
faith based organisations).  
‘Uiha island 
     The process for choosing the Tongan community research location began in 
parallel to identifying Druadrua in Fiji. During the scoping trip, the choices 
were narrowed down to the Ha’apai region, informed by both the Fijian 
Meteorological Office and government and aid organisation representatives in 
Tonga. Ha’apai was unanimously nominated as the region in Tonga most 
vulnerable to climate change and natural hazards, and it had experienced recent 
cyclones. The criteria for the specific island were the same as for choosing in 
Fiji. Since the Fijian fieldwork was conducted first (in 2012), the 
characteristics of Druadrua provided additional criteria as I wanted to find a 
Tongan island as similar in size, location and population as possible, to 
increase comparability. ‘Uiha island was the island most similar to Druadrau, 
of those in Ha’apai that were recommended to me as options. The biggest 
dissimilarities were in having a larger overall population for the island (about 
550), and in having more connections with tourism, since yachts regularly stop 
at ‘Uiha island for the day. The Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, 
then assisted with obtaining the culturally appropriate permissions to conduct 
fieldwork on that island, and arranged accommodation. Unlike in Fiji though, 
the final step in receiving approval to conduct the research was not an official 
ceremony with the Village Chief. The village in Tonga that was chosen 
(Falemea) is a government-run rather than Chief-run village, so the formalities 
ended at local government level. 
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     ‘Uiha island is located about two hours by boat from Pangai. It has two 
villages, ‘Uiha villlage with a population of about 400, and Falemea village, 
which has about 130 residents. I chose to be based in Falemea village because 
its population was more similar to Salevukoso in Druadrua, and ‘Uiha village 
was larger than my original criterion of less than 200. The island has one 
primary school, located between the two villages, about a 10 minute walk from 
both. 
      Overall, there is more infrastructure on the island than in Druadrua. There 
are a number of fale koloa (small shops), diesel generated electricity for about 
six hours in the evenings plus Saturday mornings, and a wharf (although this 
had been destroyed in a cyclone and was unable to be easily re-built due to sea 
level rise). Most households had more ‘stuff’ than on Druadrua, with electrical 
appliances such as refrigerators, kettles and televisions being relatively 
common. There are roads on ‘Uiha island, with bicycle being the most 
common form of transport other than walking, and three motor vehicles on the 
island. Communication also has better infrastructure on ‘Uiha island than 
Druadrua island, with better (although definitely still patchy) mobile phone 
reception and landlines in many houses. 
     There are many cyclone relief houses on the island, with most having been 
built following Cyclone Isaac in 1982 that left only a few houses standing. 
There is less similarity among them than on Druadrua though, since not all 
were built by government, with churches and extended family assisting in the 
building of some.  
     There are about five different churches just in Falemea village, including 
Methodist, Free Tongan Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints (Mormons). The Mormon Church stands out with its modern, sturdy 
construction and surrounding fence. Many of the churches also have halls 
attached, and there was also a community hall in Falemea village (although it 
was destroyed in Cyclone Ian in January 2014). 
     My family and I stayed with an elderly couple whose adult son, although 
now living in Pangai, was heavily involved in the running of Falemea village, 
and represented on committees including the village disaster committee.  
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The house we stayed on was on the beach, about halfway along the long 
narrow village. 
Feedback trip 
     In May-June 2014, I conducted a final research trip to the villages in both 
countries, with three nights on ‘Uiha island first, followed by four nights on 
Druadrua island. This was initially built into the research design as an 
opportunity to provide feedback to the communities on the progress and 
outcomes of the research. The importance of this was highlighted on Druadrua 
island in Fiji where during the fieldwork there were constant questions about 
when I would return. Subsequent to the fieldwork in Tonga however, the 
Ha’apai region was devastated by Cyclone Ian in January 2014, with ‘Uiha 
island in particular affected badly. This provided another reason to return to the 
island, four and a half months after the event, to observe the response and see 
how, if at all, people’s perceptions had changed.  
3.4 Cross-cultural research: Talanoa in the Pacific4 
4 This section was published in another form as Johnston, I. (2013) Cross-
cultural research: Talanoa in the Pacific. In Walters, M. Social Research 
Methods, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
This section has 
been removed for
copyright or 
proprietary reasons.
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3.5 Participants 
     There are three participant groups in this study, in each country - 
government, aid organisations and an affected community. The results from the 
three groups will be compared and contrasted, such that having the three 
groups becomes a form of triangulation for data validity within the countries, 
as well as between countries. 
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Fiji 
     Thirty three interviews were conducted in Fiji - 17 with villagers, five in 
Labasa and 11 in Suva, plus one focus group with villagers. There were 17 
community interviews, three government and 13 civil society organisation, 
including two donor agencies. Government representatives responsible for 
disaster management were interviewed, however attempts to contact 
representatives responsible for climate change were unsuccessful. Community 
interviews included people from both villages in Druadrua. The interviews 
with government and aid organisations, as well as the focus group with 
villagers, included a task of creating a diagram of the current disaster response 
system in Fiji, and then how it should be changed into the future to cope with 
climate change. Other sources of data included policy documents, reports from 
government and aid organisations, and articles from newspapers. 
Tonga 
     Thirty five interviews were conducted in Tonga - 16 with villagers, 13 with 
civil society organisations and six with government representatives, including 
both those responsible for disaster management, and for climate change. The 
government and aid organisation interviews also included the system diagram 
task used in Fiji. 
     My original intention on ‘Uiha island was to focus exclusively on Falemea 
village, because its population was large enough to draw a reasonable number 
of participants from, and ‘Uiha village was too large to be easily tackled in the 
time available. Partway through the data collection however, this changed. One 
of my opening questions in the community interviews was, “when was the 
most recent cyclone here”, and I had evidence from newspaper articles and 
government and aid organisations reports that ‘Uiha island had experienced 
cyclones in both 2011 (Wilma) and 2010 (Rene). However, in Falemea, most 
people insisted that the most recent cyclone was Isaac in 1982. After about a 
week, and finding this being a consistent although not exclusive response, I 
asked directly about the Wilma and Rene. It was then confirmed that yes, ‘Uiha 
island had been affected by those cyclones, but primarily with wave damage 
and only in ‘Uiha village itself. Due to the topography of the island and the 
  76 
location of the two villages, the storm surge wave which came about 150m 
inland in ‘Uiha village was not felt in Falemea. Furthermore, villagers in 
Falemea were unable to provide any details of what happened in ‘Uiha village 
during those events. So while my research and preparation had correctly 
identified an island for study, I was in the wrong village. 
     My focus then turned to ‘Uiha village, however, I had only a couple of 
weeks left and although I had explored the village a little, I did not know 
anyone there, and with 400 residents I could not rely on simply having been 
noticed by way of introduction. To further complicate matters, ‘Uiha island is 
regularly visited as a stopover by tourists on yachts, who tend to anchor off 
shore, wander around the island for a couple of hours and then leave again. 
Many of these visitors are seen particularly in ‘Uiha village, because it is larger 
and has a shop clearly visible from the old wharf. So most people who saw me 
just assumed I was from a yacht. The interpreter who was assisting me in 
Falemea was not able to accompany me to ‘Uiha village, and so my host family 
arranged for some people to come to the house for me to interview. However, 
in order to interview enough people to obtain a range of views and 
demographics, I had to go to ‘Uiha village alone and try my luck, which felt 
like starting over. Without the assistance of an interpreter, the challenges were 
many. 
3.6 Doing fieldwork in Fiji with your family 
     Embarking5 on fieldwork in a country and culture that is foreign to you will 
always present challenges alongside the wonderful learning opportunities. 
Bringing your family along for the ride increases both sides of that equation.  
Setting things up 
     My fieldwork during 2012, involved a one month stay in a village on a 
remote island in Fiji, followed by time in a regional centre and finally the 
capital, Suva. Organising this from my desk in Australia, was, to say the least, 
challenging. In today’s world of easy email communication, much can be 
                                                            
5 This section was published in another form as - Johnston, Ingrid (2014) Let 
them feed him biscuits: Doing fieldwork in Fiji with your family. In review at 
FQS: Forum Qualitative Research. 
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achieved from afar. If my research was being conducted in a Western country, 
I probably could have organised the whole thing over email with a few phone 
calls. But not in this part of the world.  
     In Fiji, an email from someone they do not know may not mean very much, 
and I received few responses. Referrals from a mutual contact were more 
successful, but still only to a point. Fijians respond much more to meeting you 
in person. It is when you meet them you discover that the people of Fiji are 
very kind and generous, willing and eager to assist. Fijian contacts in Australia, 
and fellow researchers who had done fieldwork there recommended a scoping 
trip, and early on it became clear that despite budgetary constraints, they were 
right. 
Negotiating Village Access 
     The timing of my scoping trip had been in some ways unfortunate. The 
topic of my research was natural disasters, and I had arrived just days after one. 
While an interesting time to be there, it did mean that several people I wanted 
to meet were simply unavailable. That included representatives from the 
government department responsible for disaster response. This was a problem 
since they were to be pivotal in the process of obtaining permission to stay in a 
village. There were however, other ways as well and I had been offered 
assistance, through an aid organisation and the Church, which is very strong 
throughout Fiji. This created a dilemma: accept the assistance of one of the less 
formal routes, or wait for the more formal government help? Fortunately for 
me, the government officials were very apologetic about being unable to meet 
me while I was in Suva, and were very attentive on both phone and email once 
I returned to Australia. However, in true Fiji style, they suggested waiting until 
two weeks before I left to begin the process of confirming and getting 
permission for the village stay. This Westerner was more than a little nervous 
about that plan!  
     Things were made more complicated (from my perspective) because I was 
taking my family with me on the fieldwork - my husband and two young 
children. In the words of one researcher with experience in doing just this: 
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Anyone who teaches or does research in a remote place 
abroad knows well the scramble to secure the money, 
gear, travel documents, inoculations and official 
permissions that are vital for a productive trip. When 
scholars choose to bring their families along, the hassles 
can increase tenfold, but the rewards - both personal and 
professional - are usually vast (Troop, 2011).  
     I was concerned about where we would all stay, since I was purposely 
looking at villages without tourist infrastructure. To the Fijians this was a 
minor detail. I was having to start to let go of my Western ways and trust in 
their relaxed approach. 
     It was indeed two weeks before we left that the village was confirmed, and 
the process for gaining permission to stay there began in earnest. The baton 
was now passed to the Divisional (state/regional) level government officials to 
finalise arrangements. The two weeks passed very quickly, and we left 
Australia clear that the government knew which village we were going to, and 
when we were coming, but not sure whether or not the village actually knew, 
let alone where we were staying. Had it been just me on the trip, I would not 
have been overly concerned, but with children in tow, simply showing up and 
“improvising on lodging was a non-option” (Starrs, Starrs, Starrs et al., 2001). 
Ah, but not if your destination is a remote island in Fiji.  
     I had arranged our itinerary with maximising the use of time in mind, and 
therefore planned to arrive in the regional city closest to the island, and travel 
to the island the same day. A Fijian colleague in Australia advised me that 
everything would fall into place once I arrived in that regional city, and to 
allow a few days there. So we changed our plans to make sure there was time 
for the last minute arrangements to happen. How right she was - the village 
found out we were coming only when we arrived in that city, just a couple of 
days before we began our month long stay with them. With my western ways, I 
was convinced that the whole thing was going to fall apart. But this is how 
things are done in Fiji. All the Fijians had told me it would be okay, and not to 
worry. I just found it difficult to let go enough to believe them. 
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In the village 
     The location for the fieldwork ended up being a small, remote island in the 
north of Fiji. The island has only two villages, a 20 minute walk apart. There is 
no tourist infrastructure on the island, and we subsequently discovered that we 
were the first White family ever to stay there. An honour indeed. We arrived 
and were greeted by the Chiefly family in whose home we were staying for the 
next month. Despite finding out only two days before our arrival that we were 
coming, they opened their home and their hearts to us without any apparent 
hesitation, for which we will be forever grateful.  
Talanoa Research 
     As a Westerner trying to engage in talanoa research (see section 3.4), it 
meant giving more time, and more of myself than I was used to from previous 
research endeavours. It was not unusual for interviews, both in the village and 
the cities, to take more than two hours. Two hours of talking, that is. Plus the 
waiting time. ‘Fiji time’ means that an interview scheduled with one person in 
the morning, may well take place with someone completely different, and in 
the afternoon. You become very good at waiting around and just taking it all 
in. The result was that even in the village where I was a maximum 20 minute 
walk from any interviewee, I could do only two interviews on a typical day. 
Respecting The Language And Oral Traditions In Fiji  
     Upon arrival on the island, we participated in the sevusevu ceremony, which 
offers a gift to the Chief (traditionally a gift of yaqona (kava)), and formally 
seeks permission to enter the village. This ceremony is an important part of 
traditional Fijian culture, and an essential first step. Over the next couple of 
days, we met and spoke to a number of people in the village, and so the reasons 
for our staying on the island began to filter through this small community. But 
before beginning interviews and data collection in earnest, I thought it was 
important to ensure that I introduced myself and explained the purpose of my 
research and its confidentiality principles in person to the entire community. 
The opportunity for this presented itself at a Church service the first Sunday, 
which was a joint service of the two denominations on the island, held 
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specially to welcome us. With the help of the head of the family we stayed 
with (our host father), I wrote a speech that I gave in the local Fijian dialect. 
The shock, amazement and amusement on the faces of the audience was worth 
the embarrassment endured during my delivery of that speech. I definitely 
provided some light entertainment, as did the wonderful ladies closest to me, 
who every so often, quietly gave me corrections along the way. Regardless of 
my appalling accent and pronunciation, I am told I was understood, and the 
speech provided an important entry to my formal research beginning.  
     After spending a few days getting to know the people and island a little, this 
speech was intended as a mark of respect for both their local language and the 
importance of oral traditions in the Fijian culture. I had an information sheet 
prepared for handing out at the beginning of interviews anyway, but I felt that 
the speech was a more appropriate way in that community and culture, to 
formally introduce myself and my family and explain our presence on their 
island. Just as bringing my family to stay in their homes, eat their food and 
attend their school showed my trust in their community, speaking in their 
Church, in their dialect showed my respect for them and their culture, and my 
appreciation of their efforts in speaking English to us.  
Having my family with me on the fieldwork 
Being the primary parent of a young child or children 
comes into play during every phase of the research, from 
conceptualising the project, to entering the field and 
gaining access to participants, to writing up the results 
(Brown and De Casanova, 2009, p54).  
     The decision to bring my family with me to Fiji shaped each stage of my 
research, though none more so than during our time in the village. In the 
research literature, certain roles have been identified for children of 
fieldworkers. Children, just by ‘being there’ help their parents to occupy an 
understandable role in the social structure of the community; they improve 
access to information and build rapport between the researcher and the 
community who are also the informants; and provide the common denominator 
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of ‘parents’ thereby helping to reduce other potential hierarchies in 
relationships (Levy, 2009).  
Ice Breaker 
      Just as at home, everyday life with children is different to life without 
them. You go to different places, talk to different people and do things at a 
different pace.  
The researcher’s look at society is much closer with 
family - you cannot escape groceries, hardware stores, 
schools, clothing shops, movie theatres...with family are 
opened companion worlds of information that aren’t 
available, or at least often explored, by men or women 
when alone, a point whose significance I can’t emphasise 
strongly enough (Starrs et al., 2001, p77).  
     My children were a reason for going places and an excuse to talk with 
people. They meant that we spent time at the school and with the teachers, and 
were the reason for walking through the village sometimes looking for them. 
Walking through the village is always good – it makes you visible and allows 
the opportunity to see and greet people.  
Complete, Whole Person  
     In ethnographical research, the characteristics of the researcher make a 
difference to the whole experience of researching - what you are allowed to 
see, what you are told, and what you notice and conclude (Townsend, 1999). 
Seeing me as a wife and mother and not just a researcher helped to make me a 
whole person. This is particularly important in Fijian culture with talanoa 
research where people want to know something about you and learn to trust 
you before they will open up and speak to you. Having the children around and 
just doing the everyday things you need to do as a parent meant that people 
knew something about me before I had even spoken to them, and had seen me 
around the village. When I first spoke to people, especially the mothers and 
fathers of young children, we had stories to share of what our children had 
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been doing together. It made me less strange, less of an outsider. I was a fellow 
school mum. 
Evidence Of Our Trust In The Community  
     Bringing our children to the village to live for the month and attend school 
there showed that we trusted the community to care for them. This was very 
evident to them and I believe, greatly appreciated. I think that helped in my 
interviews since the people had some initial degree of respect and trust in me 
that I would otherwise have had to earn. 
Educational Experience For The Children  
     As a mother, I can see that the fieldwork was an incredible and educational 
experience for my children. They were able to attend school and become 
immersed in a completely different culture, as the first and only foreigners to 
do so. This placed them in a privileged position, which they do not understand 
right now, but I hope will come to appreciate as they grow older. The village 
way of life is so completely different from ours, and living it has taught them a 
lot.  
     The freedom and independence that come with living in a small, car free, 
tight-knit village community gave them the confidence to explore and 
experience the people and places on their own. It took a week or so (especially 
for my husband and myself), but once we all felt comfortable, my then six and 
four year old children would leave the house after breakfast, and return by 
sunset. There would be visits throughout the day, but essentially they were free 
and welcome to play all day long with their new friends. I remember my four 
year old son coming back to the house early one afternoon. I was concerned 
that he had missed out on lunch - “no Mum, I had lunch with my friends up at 
that house over there”.  
Better Focus On My Research  
     As a mother, if I had tried to do this fieldtrip without my family, I would 
have been very distracted and detached the whole time, as a large part of me 
would have been at home with them. With the security and comfort of having 
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my family with me, I was able to focus on the task and immerse myself in the 
work. 
Excuse For Cultural Faux Pas 
     In a Fijian community, it is considered rude not to accept invitations and be 
part of community events. This included drinking kava (yaqona). The cultural 
significance of this is not lost on me, and I wanted to participate, but it is really 
not my favourite drink, and I wanted to have a polite one and then depart. 
Timed to perfection, my daughter became upset with having both of her 
parents away from her in the dark, and so I was able to leave the kava drinking 
duties to my wonderful, understanding (and not unwilling) husband. 
Disadvantages 
     Having your children in the field does have downsides too. “It is not hard to 
imagine that children frequently take their parents out of fieldwork contexts, 
closing as many windows as they can open” (Levy, 2009 p318). While it is 
undoubtedly true that having children to take care of detracts from the time and 
energy available for the task at hand, and that some potential opportunities are 
less easily accepted when there are children to consider, I think all of the 
situations may be viewed as ‘glass half empty versus glass half full’.  
Distraction.  
     Naturally, at times my children were a distraction from my research. For 
example, small things such as wanting to be at the house when they came home 
from school for lunch. There were days when someone was sick and I had to 
step up to the role of mother instead of doing an interview. The time-
consuming facts of parenting in this situation were only made possible by 
having my husband with me, who was able to undertake these duties most of 
the time.  
Walking the line between parenting and cultural respect.  
     My four year old son is aptly described as a fussy eater. So trying new foods 
was always going to be difficult for him, and we knew that our nightly 
negotiations at home over eating his dinner would transfer in some form to the 
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village. What we had not realised is that the battle would end up being between 
us and our hosts. In Fiji, it is very insulting to say that you were at someone’s 
house but did not eat well or there was not enough food. After a few evening 
meals of predictable debate and us trying to keep the heated discussions to a 
minimum so as not to cause a fuss, our host father approached the topic head 
on. He said - even though we understand that as parents you want him to eat 
well, you must understand that it is important for us as your hosts that he eats a 
lot and easily. We had to give in to this and try not to think about it as our son 
ate chocolate biscuits for breakfast and did not consume a single vegetable for 
a whole month. Cultural respect one, parenting nil. But it did not hurt him, and 
was very important to them. 
Not understanding cultural situations can be more stressful.  
     On our final night in the village, we were invited to the Pastor’s house, 
where the Chief and elders of the village were gathered for a farewell for us. At 
the same time, a separate farewell was organised for our children. We were in a 
less familiar part of the village, in the dark evening, and did not really know 
what was happening when, or for how long. My daughter particularly, was 
uncomfortable about this and wanted to be with us, becoming more and more 
upset, until I had to leave the function with her. The lack of both understanding 
and control over the situation was very difficult with children. Without 
children we would have been able to focus more clearly on the honour we were 
being presented with. 
Increases the consequences of communication breakdowns through language 
barriers.  
     One day, a group of us planned to go out on the boat to the main island for 
the day. My family and I did not know all the detailed arrangements, but then 
we spent so much of our time not really knowing what was going on that we 
did not think too much about it. On this occasion this resulted in our young 
children ending up on a boat trip to the other side of our island without us. The 
teenagers in charge of the boat were perfectly capable, and our children were 
safe the whole time. The adults around us knew this, and so it was 
understandable that they thought it would be fun for our kids to go on their 
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own. For us though, all the other factors loomed large. We were far away from 
home, using an unfamiliar form of transport, there were no lifejackets, and we 
knew that our children did not know what was going on and would be too 
scared to ask. An unremarkable event turned into a frightening one, because of 
a simple communication breakdown - a few seconds of not thinking about the 
language barrier.  
After My Family Had Gone Home 
     Leaving the village also meant leaving my family for the last two weeks of 
my trip, as they had to return home to Australia. I fully expected that the final 
two weeks of my trip, in Suva, would consist of me trying to stay as busy as I 
could to distract myself from missing them. Even after five weeks in Fiji, I had 
managed to underestimate Fijians’ kindness and generosity of spirit once again.  
     While the two weeks were very busy for me with trying to finish my data 
collection, I need not have worried that the evenings and weekends would be 
spent feeling lonely, and missing my family. Instead, I spent much of those 
times with the Suva part of my new family. Just as I started longing for the 
fabulous food on the island in place of microwave meals in my hotel, I found 
myself at family gatherings and being given precious leftovers of the 
wonderful home cooked Fijian food. The Suva branch of the family was just as 
generous and friendly as we had experienced on the island, and I remain very 
grateful for it. 
Lessons learned 
     Many of the incidents referred to above did not happen while I was trying to 
do an interview, or conduct a focus group. You could say that therefore they 
did not affect my research. However, in this kind of fieldwork, it seems that 
everything impacts the research. These incidents changed my perceptions of 
the people and places we were in, and similarly, would have changed the 
villagers’ perceptions of me. Some of those changes were undoubtedly 
positive, as they helped to make me a whole person, not a strange researcher to 
the Fijians. Other changes were probably not so positive. The incident on the 
boat trip must have come across as though we did not trust the two boys 
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driving the boat, which may have been offensive or rude. Trusting them was 
not the point, but explaining the subtle differences was difficult with the 
language barrier. 
     Other researchers have recommended taking your family and children with 
you on fieldwork trips: “...if you’re married and/or have children, do try to 
bring them along. Again, as a family, you may enter the culture more 
completely” (Veeck, 2001, p39). I would definitely take my children with me 
again on a research field trip. It was an invaluable experience for them and us, 
to be immersed in a foreign culture and place, and become part of another 
family.  
     The fact that Fijians are relaxed about things and so friendly and welcoming 
makes it a wonderful place to do fieldwork. Even in the capital, where kai 
valagis (foreigners) are a common sight, people in the street will say bula 
(hello) to you and go out of their way to walk you to your destination sharing 
their umbrella when it is raining. My family and I had an amazing time, and it 
was a privilege to be able to experience it. Relaxing into it yourself can be 
difficult, but well worth it. It will take longer than you expect, and will not be 
until the last minute, but things will get done - just turn up and ask. 
3.7 Method of data analysis 
     The choice of qualitative analysis method involves several important 
considerations. These include type of data, the number of cases, 
epistemological leanings, underlying theories, and the expected outcome of the 
analysis in terms of what type of results are needed. For this study, the 
elements of the data are: 
• Semi-structured interviews, translated or with participants with limited 
English language; 
• Relatively large number of participants for a qualitative study, with 30-
35 participants in each of two sites; 
• Inductive-type method to answer research questions; 
• Two case studies (research sites) with three groups of participants in 
each; 
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• Results to include within case study comparison of groups, and 
contrasting between case studies; 
• Focus on the perceptions and experiences of the participants, rather 
than trying to get at one particular ‘truth’. 
     A review of various types of qualitative data analysis led me towards 
thematic coding using template or framework type analysis. Following is an 
explanation of how this method was chosen, and why others were rejected as 
being less appropriate. 
     In the sociological tradition of qualitative research, text is analysed as a 
proxy for experience, with the research participant’s perceptions, feelings, 
knowledge and behaviour represented in text that has been generated from our 
interactions with them, for example in an interview (Tesch, 1990). Within this, 
there is a distinction between analysis of the actual words, and analysis using 
themes and codes (Guest, MacQueen and Namey, 2011). An analysis of the 
actual words used, concentrating on the linguistics, phrasing, pauses and such 
would be problematic with the data in this study, since English was a second 
(or third) language for all participants and translators. Therefore, analysis 
methods such as discourse analysis, or phenomenological analysis (Biggerstaff 
and Thompson, 2008) were discounted as being inappropriate if strictly 
adhered to. However, the focus of interpretive phenomenological analysis in 
looking at the subjective experiences of the participants, and the 
acknowledgement of the interpretive role of the researcher are relevant and 
useful to the current study, and so a method inclusive of these broad elements 
was sought. 
     Another distinction between types of analysis is along epistemological lines, 
with interpretivism and positivism. Interpretivism is less structured, and seeks 
to interpret deeper meanings and understand multiple realities, rather than one 
objective reality. Positivism on the other hand is closer to the scientific method 
and is more systematic and structured, less subjective and looks towards an 
objective reality (Guest et al., 2011). The desired analysis method for this study 
comes somewhere in between these extremes.  
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     There are elements of interpretivism in that it is the perceptions and 
experiences of the participants that is the focus, rather than trying to get at an 
objective ‘truth’. However, the structure and evidence base of a more positivist 
approach is attractive in adding rigour to the research findings. An approach 
was sought which effectively adds some structure to a method that allows for 
inductive reasoning and interpretation. 
     A general inductive approach that effectively forms the basis for inductive 
methods upon which different structures are built was outlined by Thomas 
(2003). The main purpose of this approach is to summarise the text, identify 
links between this summary and the research objectives, and then develop a 
theory about the underlying experience or processes. Categories or themes 
evident in the data are coded, and the codes refined until there are about three 
to eight summary or main categories. The higher level codes are derived from 
the research questions, with lower level codes coming from the reading of the 
data. The research questions and theory related to them are thus involved from 
the outset, making this approach slightly more structured than grounded theory. 
To maintain an analytical rather than purely descriptive approach, continual 
reflection back to the research objectives is required. Some general principles 
for this are three reflexive questions from Patton (2002): 1) Self-reflexivity - 
what do I know and how do I know what I know? 2) Reflexivity about those 
studied - how do those studied know what they know? 3) Reflexivity about the 
audience - how do those who receive my findings make sense of what I give 
them? 
     Using these reflexive questions as a basis, a practical iterative framework 
for analysis was developed, which involved constantly asking three similar 
questions: 1) What are the data telling me? - To clarify the lenses through 
which the data are viewed. 2) What is it I want to know? To connect the 
identified lenses with the research objectives. 3) What is the dialectical 
relationship between the - what the data are telling me - and what I want to 
know? Insights and analytical focus are continually refined through identifying 
gaps in the understandings (Srivastava and Hopwood, 2009).  
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     While this iterative framework constitutes a method in of itself, it also 
provides a useful set of questions to guide analysis, suitable for a number of 
inductive methods. Another element of my required ingredients is the 
comparison between the groups of participants in my study - the villagers, the 
aid organisations and the governments. Qualitative comparative methods are 
often suited to smaller data sets than in this study, and often focus on a 
comparison of individuals rather than groups, as required in my study (Rihoux, 
2006). So-called “fuzzy sets” are used for larger data sets without the 
individual case focus, however, this approach tends more towards quantitative 
analysis than I would like. This type of comparative analysis is looking at 
causality, which is not a strong focus in the current study. 
     A different type of analytical comparison was described by Hennie Boeije, 
labelled as ‘constant comparison’ (Boeije, 2002). This approach is well suited 
to comparison of groups, and outlines comparative steps: -  
1) Comparison within a single interview - of different applications of the 
same code, looking for similarities, differences, contradictions. 
Produces - summary of the transcript, list of provisional codes, 
conceptual profile using the codes, memos describing the analysis 
process; 
2) Comparison between interviews within the same group - themes as 
criteria for systematic comparison of interviews, clusters of interviews 
with similar codes, combinations of codes, criteria on which some 
interviews differ from others. Produces - typology based on the criteria, 
completion of new codes; 
3) Comparison of interviews from different groups - becomes part of data 
triangulation with comparison of groups to confirm and validate 
typologies. Looks at view of different groups on the same themes, and 
themes appearing in one group and not another. 
     The iterative framework provides a set of questions to aid the analytical 
process in linking findings with the research aims and questions. The constant 
comparison method provides logical steps for comparison between and within 
groups to identify similarities and differences. These elements were used with 
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the framework approach, as developed by social policy researchers at the 
National Centre for Social Research in the United Kingdom (Smith and Firth, 
2011). This approach is more structured than general inductive methods, with 
interconnected states for systematic analysis. It is well suited to cross-sectional 
descriptive data, where different aspects of the phenomenon under 
investigation are captured (Ritchie, Spencer and O'Connor, 2003).  
Having the three different perspectives from my three groups may be seen as 
cross-sectional. My two case study sites of Fiji and Tonga add complexity to 
this cross-sectional element of the research design. The stages, as described by 
Ritchie and Lewis are: 
⁃ Data management - reading and re-reading the data, identifying initial 
themes and categories, developing a coding matrix and assigning data 
to themes and categories in the coding matrix; 
⁃ Descriptive accounts - refining initial themes and categories to 
summarise the range and diversity of coded data, identifying 
associations between themes with a ‘whole picture’ emerging and 
developing more abstract concepts; 
⁃ Explanatory accounts - develop associations or patterns within concepts 
and themes, reflecting back to the original data to ensure accurate 
representation, interpreting and finding meaning in the concepts and 
themes, and seeking a wider application of concepts and themes 
(Ritchie et al., 2003). 
     In this approach, there will only be a small number of concepts at the end, 
each of which has a small number of themes within it. Each theme may have 
multiple categories. 
     My method of analysis for these data employs a framework approach as a 
structured inductive method of thematic content analysis. Interviews were 
audio recorded and then transcribed with the assistance of Transcriva software. 
Codes were applied to the data, with themes emerging from the data, using 
HyperResearch software. These themes and codes were then be refined, with 
associations between themes leading to the development of more abstract 
concepts, and patterns in the concepts and themes then being used to interpret 
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the data and develop explanatory accounts. Within this approach, the questions 
in the iterative framework approach were used to guide and focus the analysis 
and development of concepts. The constant comparison method was the basis 
of the logical sequence of analysis within and between groups of participants. 
3.8 Methodological issues 
     There are two methodological issues that may affect the interpretation of the 
results of this study. The first concerns the participants and fieldwork locations. 
The two islands chosen for this study are deliberately remote, outer islands, 
with as many similarities between them as possible from the available options. 
The results of the study are observations from these remote islands, and 
contrasts and comparisons between them. Ideally fieldwork would also have 
been undertaken at a regional or urban centre in each country, to allow for 
comparisons between the remote and urban settings. This was not possible due 
to time and resource constraints, which meant that differences between those 
settings could not be tested in this study. Therefore, where assertions are made 
in this regard, they remain assertions to be further tested in future research. 
     The second methodological issue concerns the use of interpreters. 
Resources did not allow for trained interpreters to be hired for the fieldwork, 
and time did not allow me to learn both anything more than rudimentary Fijian 
and Tongan languages. The fieldwork therefore relied upon a combination of 
interviewees being able to speak English, and local community members being 
willing to act as interpreters. This had different outcomes in the two countries. 
In Fiji, two local community members acted as interpreters for interviews. 
Both displayed fluent knowledge of English, and were willing to repeatedly 
assist. However, one was the outspoken daughter of the village Chief. When 
interview questions and conversations steered towards possible criticism of the 
Chief, cultural norms dictated that it was unlikely to proceed very far in that 
direction in her presence.  
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     In Tonga a greater number of people assisted with interpreting, but most for 
only one or two interviews. There were varying levels of English amongst 
these volunteers, meaning that overall it was more difficult to have in-depth 
conversations during the Tongan than the Fijian fieldwork. The turnover of 
interpreters in Tonga also meant that the translation was inconsistent, and no 
individual was trained and more at ease with the role through the experience of 
multiple interviews. 
3.9 Conclusion 
     This chapter provided details of the methods chosen for this study, and the 
ways in which the method and procedure evolved with the project as 
circumstances dictated. The cross-cultural nature of the research was both 
challenging and rewarding. It added layers of complexity to the task, with 
identifying and observing culturally appropriate approaches and behaviours, 
and the practicalities involved in overcoming the language barrier. However, 
the rich primary data gathered from the experience cannot be gleaned from the 
safe confines of desktop research. 
     The fieldwork in Tonga was, in many ways, less successful than in Fiji. 
There was a less welcoming and inclusive atmosphere, and the need to change 
focus to the larger and less familiar village part-way through the stay hampered 
efforts both to foster good relationships and trust in the communities, and to 
find interviewees. Nevertheless, the fieldwork locations were similar in many 
important aspects - relative remoteness, population size in one of the villages, 
and recent experience with cyclones. Despite the challenges encountered in 
Tonga, a similar number of interviews were conducted in both countries, and 
the consistency in many of the results suggests good comparability. The 
opportunity to re-visit the island in Tonga following their most severe cyclone 
was valuable and provided important follow-up information, and contrast for 
those whose focus had been on cyclones and responses more than 20 years ago. 
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Chapter 4 - Experiences of disasters 
     This chapter is designed to introduce the people on the islands and their 
experiences of cyclones - how and when they think of them, what they do 
when one is approaching, and how they cope afterwards. The villagers have 
extensive experience of cyclones, such that in Fiji, no-one could recall an exact 
number of cyclones they had been in. Most guessed either five to ten or more 
than 10, but few confidently put a number to their response. In Tonga most 
people had experienced fewer cyclones and counted somewhere between five 
and ten. 
     Included in this chapter is an exploration of issues of diversity - gender and 
religion, both of which are recognised as being factors relevant to disaster 
response and recovery. 
4.1 Thinking about cyclones 
     For most community members interviewed in both Fiji and Tonga, cyclones 
and thoughts about them were very much aligned with the cyclone season, 
which was agreed to be November to April. It was usual to think of cyclones 
only during this time, and not at all outside this season, and it was agreed that 
the communities rarely talk about cyclones or natural disasters outside the 
season. Within this, there was then a group who thought about them only when 
there was a warning sign, and others who felt they had to be prepared 
throughout the entire season, thinking about cyclones every day and preparing 
regardless of warning signs. There were just two community members (elders) 
in each of Fiji and Tonga who said that they think about cyclones all the time, 
either because they have seen the cyclone seasons change, and now believe that 
cyclones can come at any time, or because preparation goes throughout the 
year, as it includes which crops to plant when.  
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      While statistically it is true that most cyclones occur during the nominated 
‘cyclone season’, there are documented events outside this November-April 
timeframe. A report from the New Zealand Meteorological Service from 1971, 
listed tropical storms in Fiji from 1840-1970, with about two to four per year 
and included 10 events occurring in May, June, August, September and 
October (New Zealand Meteorological Service, 1971). Notably, the majority of 
the listed events had occurred since 1950s. There is much reliance on the 
cyclone season concept in both countries, from all participants - communities, 
aid organisations and governments. One community member in Tonga even 
nominated a precise date - 16th April - as being the end of the cyclone season, 
and a number talked about March and April as being the worst months for 
cyclones. With climate change potentially affecting the reliability and timing of 
seasons, the definition of the ‘cyclone season’ may need to be re-considered. 
     Some community members in both countries talked about a relationship 
between the frequency of cyclones and their strength. In Fiji, elders used to say 
that there would be a really big cyclone about every 10 years. In Tonga, a few 
people said that having regular strong wind was better than having a year or 
two without any, because then when the winds returned, they would be 
stronger and more destructive. These are interesting observations, which 
happen to tie in well with climate change predictions for cyclones in this region 
- that there may be fewer of them, but when they happen, they will be stronger 
and last longer. 
4.2 Food preparation 
     In preparing for a cyclone and in coping with the aftermath, traditional 
methods for preserving food were mentioned far less often than traditional 
warning signs. This was consistent across both case study sites. Preparation for 
an oncoming cyclone was firmly focussed on securing housing, such as tying 
down the roof, and boarding up windows. Food preservation discussed was 
generally more about damage reduction measures than preservation after the 
event, and was limited to cutting leaves off cassava/manioc plants, and cutting 
banana leaves in half, as protection from the wind. Shopping for food was 
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mentioned as often as these methods. Only a couple of people talked about 
collecting and storing food such as coconuts and root crops. 
     Some traditional methods of preserving food were discussed, but there was 
a recognition that these are rarely used now, because people only need to 
survive for as long as it takes rations to arrive. In Tonga particularly, there was 
recognition that the traditional methods are not well known by young people 
because they ‘haven’t experienced the need’. This was quickly qualified with 
‘but they might’. In Fiji, it was observed that although the preservation 
methods used in the past meant that food was still edible for longer, it does not 
taste or smell good, adding to the reasons younger people are not interested in 
learning about them. 
     Methods for preserving food included burying cassava/manioc, softening 
cassava/manioc and breadfruit by soaking in water for four days, and grating 
and drying out cassava/manioc to make a type of flour. These preservation 
methods were said to make these foods last for up to one month, depending on 
the food and the method. Yams and kumala were mentioned as being food not 
requiring preservation, and there is a reliance on root crops during cyclone 
times.  
4.3 Safe place to go 
     In large western countries that experience cyclones, once a warning has 
been issued that there is a cyclone approaching the coast, then at the most basic 
level, if you want to escape, most people could simply get in a car or on a bus 
and drive out of the way. As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, in reality it does 
not always work that way, however, on a small island, that option is not even 
available. Instead there has to be somewhere safe to go, so evacuation centres 
are important.  
     Evacuation centres in Fiji are usually schools, community halls or churches. 
However, both government and aid organisation representatives confirmed that 
there is no standard policy or building code to be applied in labelling a building 
an evacuation centre, so the quality and standards are variable. Often, the 
biggest building on high ground is chosen, regardless of the quality of 
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construction. There is some donor interest in upgrading evacuation centres, but 
without a national policy, such work will be piecemeal and inconsistent.  
     Many evacuation centres are located in schools, which are seen as having 
advantages of being located within communities, being large enough to hold 
lots of people, and having the ready logistical infrastructure of the education 
department for operationalising them as evacuation centres when required. 
Extended stays in evacuation centres though are a cause of extended disruption 
to schooling, which is important for children’s education and stability, in 
assisting recovery post-disaster. Some aid organisations and government 
representatives mentioned wanting to move away from the policy of having 
schools being evacuation centres, but there is no equivalent alternative at the 
moment.  
     The community members interviewed in Fiji all agreed that the school was 
their evacuation centre, and that they had been advised this by government. 
However, most people thought that it was still not safe. There was a common 
view that the school would withstand small cyclones, but perhaps not a bigger 
one, and that rain still comes in, so people are getting wet while trying to 
shelter from the cyclone. A number of people said that there is no really safe 
place to go, but the school is the best they have. “It is safe because there is no 
other choice” (Fiji, female villager, aged 35-45 years). A number of 
community members spoke of preferring bures (traditional thatched huts), 
which they considered to be stronger than modern houses. Older villagers said 
that bures shake and rock in the wind, giving warning of collapse while it is 
still safe to evacuate slowly to some other place, whereas the modern houses it 
seems, do not provide any warning before tin roofs fly off right in the strongest 
part of the cyclone, when evacuating would be most dangerous. “She said she 
needs, she’s been telling them she wanted a bure for her evacuation centre” 
(Fiji, female villager, aged 60+, through an interpreter). 
     The situation in Tonga was broadly similar. An aid organisation 
representative said that almost every community raises the problem of needing 
an evacuation centre. The most common place used throughout Tonga for an 
evacuation centre is the local church hall of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints (LDS), which are used everywhere they are located. The 
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LDS church is generally considered to be the church with the best financial 
resources in Tonga, and they build their churches specifically to be able to 
withstand winds of approximately 200 km/h. Most community members 
interviewed in Tonga felt that the LDS church was a safe place to be during a 
cyclone. Similar to in Fiji, many spoke of their preference for a traditional 
Tongan fale as an evacuation centre, with some people suggesting that every 
family should build one. During cyclones, Tongans would knock down the 
walls of their fale, and then shelter under the roof at ground level: 
The Tongan houses, the parents and all of the families, 
they hid there. But not inside the house, they break down 
the walls, only the top of the house, they just put it down 
and hide inside. That’s the safest place (Tonga, female 
villager, aged 46-59). 
     The absence of the tin roof common to more modern Tongan (and Fijian) 
houses is another key factor in the safety preference for traditional houses. 
Indeed it was a flying tin roof that killed the victim of Cyclone Ian that hit 
Ha’apai in January 2014 (Morrah, 2014). It has been said that in some 
instances, Pacific islanders living in more modern homes for comfort and 
status reasons is an example of a failure of traditional knowledge (Kelman et 
al., 2012). Particularly in the Fijian village, there was much better knowledge 
around how to make bures safe for cyclones, than for the modern houses in 
which most people now live. The Fijian disaster relief houses are designed as a 
starting point, with further additions required to increase their safety, however, 
many villagers did not know this, or specifically what to do. 
     Not having an evacuation centre, or not getting there early enough, is 
certainly a risky proposition. In Falemea village during Cyclone Ian, one 
family ran from building to building as each in turn had its roof ripped off, and 
the walls collapsed. With options fast running out, they used an axe to smash a 
hole in their concrete water tank, and sheltered inside it for the remainder of 
the four hour storm front, climbing inside before the water had even 
completely drained (Photo 4.1 Makeshift evacuation centre). 
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     Photo 4.1: Makeshift evacuation centre  
     In both Fiji and Tonga, community members mentioned building their own 
evacuation centre. In Fiji, one of the villages had started a communal savings 
plan for this purpose. However, with the cost of such a construction high for 
incomes in this community, and a lack of clarity around government policies 
and procedures to assist community action of this kind, it is likely to be a very 
long term project. 
4.4 Preparation and complacency 
     In Fiji, both aid organisations and community members spoke of a lack of 
preparation for disasters as being about the normalisation of these events, 
rather than deliberate complacency. There is a perception that cyclones are 
normal - “We are fine, that’s the usual cyclone and it’s been here forever since 
I was born, so after this we will recover. That’s a village perspective” (Fiji, aid 
organisation representative). The community interviews supported this 
perception, with people saying that cyclones do not really change people’s 
behaviour, but that things return to normal and people do not think about it 
afterwards. Some people thanked me for coming to their village to talk to them 
about the issue: 
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…you wake me up again. Because we know the cyclone, 
so sometimes we don't bother, last year or this year. But 
when you came here to do your researching about the 
climate, so you wake me up to be prepared, like that 
(Fiji, male villager, aged 60+). 
     There was general agreement that people both within the community and 
within Fiji as a whole, do not really talk about cyclones and other disasters 
much outside of the disaster season. An aid organisation representative said - 
“Now one of the things is that if you listen to all the radio stations that are on 
right now, nobody talks about the disasters, until they happen” (Fiji, aid 
organisation representative). One villager’s summary was simply “After the 
cyclone they are ready for it” (Fiji, male villager, aged 35-45 years). It seems 
that sometimes the complacency and normalisation of disasters manifests itself 
simply in not being overly concerned about cyclones unless there actually is 
one, but at other times it extends to a lack of preparation when there has been a 
warning. I was told a story in the village of radio warnings for Cyclone Kina in 
1993 being ignored by most of the village, even though there was one family 
trying to spread the warning message.  
     As ever though, there is always more complexity to the situation. One aid 
organisation representative talked about preparation for a cyclone as being 
risky. The context was harvesting crops to protect them from an oncoming 
cyclone, and that if the cyclone turns out not to be severe or to change 
direction, then some of the harvested crops may be wasted. Acting on a disaster 
warning is a conscious decision, and many factors will influence the when, 
how and why of that decision. Normalisation of disasters is one of those many 
factors.  
     The responses on Tonga during the main fieldwork were slightly different. 
A lack of preparation and taking warnings seriously was due to a combination 
of warnings happening most years, and a long time since the last major 
cyclone, with the biggest cyclone in memory being back in 1982. Smaller 
cyclones are commonplace and, similar to in Fiji, seen as being just part of life 
in the Pacific. The lack of experience with a more devastating cyclone is 
viewed as an impediment to good preparation: 
  100 
My friend say to me ‘I’m feeling sorry because my family 
do not know that you already warn me, but I don’t do 
anything for my family. That’s the first time for me to see 
the cyclone’. And I said ‘that is my third time with a 
cyclone, you first time. Next time you will understand 
what to do when the cyclone is coming (Tonga, male 
villager aged 60+ years).  
     The person telling this story did not even consider smaller events to be 
cyclones at all. In his view, stronger cyclones reach hurricane strength winds, 
and until then, do not really count. This attitude ties in well with the 
complacency around having only experienced regular, smaller cyclones - ‘you 
think you know what you need to do because you know what it’s like, but 
that’s nothing’.  
     Some of the older community members in Tonga saw a clear distinction 
between those who are old enough to recall Cyclone Isaac in 1982, and those 
who do not, or who are new to the island and did not experience it: 
He is talking about the real people in ‘Uiha. They were 
worried about the notice about the wave or cyclone. 
Except the newcomers to ‘Uiha. The newcomers to 
‘Uiha, they don’t worry about anything, because they 
have not met any waves, see the waves or see the cyclone 
(Tonga, male villager aged 46-59 years, through an 
interpreter). 
     Supporting this view, government representatives in Australia working on 
disaster response, have noted that people with experience of a particular 
disaster are better at coping with them (Boon, 2014). The experience on 
Cyclone Ian also provides support. During the feedback trip when villagers 
were asked about preparations for Ian, some said that the warnings on the radio 
were qualitatively different to in previous years, giving a clue that this time 
should be taken more seriously. However, for most people, it was just another 
warning. Even when natural warning signs were also observed, many thought 
they just indicated bad weather, rather than a major cyclone, and dismissed 
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them. There is a consensus among villagers that Ian has shocked them, and that 
while before they did not really care too much, next time around they will be 
prepared. 
     The dominant view in Tonga that a lack of experience with bigger cyclones 
leads to complacency around preparation does not bode well for the future. The 
predicted impact of climate change on cyclones in this region is for less 
frequent but stronger and longer lasting events (see section 1.3). This would 
mean that at any one time, there is likely to be a larger proportion of the 
population with no living memory of a large cyclone. According to the 
perceptions and experience in Tonga, this is likely to mean that larger 
proportion of the population is not taking preparations, the key to survival, 
seriously.  
4.5 Gender issues 
     Gender divisions in Fiji are prominent, as they are an integral part of 
traditional culture. Men and women have separate and clearly identified roles, 
and in traditional villages, by and large, those differentiations are respected and 
adhered to, disaster or not. 
     On the island, most people I spoke to stayed well within the confines of 
those specified gender roles, and it was difficult, especially at first, to find 
anyone who would express alternative opinions. It was generally agreed that 
after a disaster, men are responsible for cleaning up the village, repairing 
houses, and re-planting crops and women are responsible for cleaning up the 
home, cooking, and caring for the children. This closely reflects the roles in 
daily life in a traditional village. Following on from this, most people also 
agreed that this translated into men experiencing greater stress after a cyclone, 
having more responsibilities: 
He thinks that men are more reliable and they are 
responsible to make, try and rehabilitate them, the 
community and the family. So women are more likely to 
just look after the kids and cook. But for the building 
houses, men are mostly responsible to do that kind of 
work (Fiji, male villager, aged 35-45)  
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Yes, more stressful for men than women because the men 
are responsible for repairing things and getting things to 
eat for the family, while the ladies just stay at home and 
look after the kids and do the cooking (Fiji, male 
villager, aged 46-59). 
     The only problem with this expressed view is that it was not completely 
compatible with the daily routines I witnessed on the island. Women were 
usually involved in fishing, which plays a major role in the provision of food, 
including after a cyclone. Women also helped on the plantations. Men rarely 
crossed into women’s traditional roles, although I did see this when women 
were injured by stingrays while fishing and their husbands helped with the 
cooking for the next day or so. This blurring of traditional role boundaries was 
explained to me: 
If they (men) have the late night with the kava bowl then 
the women will just have to do the planting…they do all 
the housework, they do the plantations, they go fishing. 
While men can't come in and clean the house. Everything 
they do is just try to do the repair and the plantations. 
For them, they can’t do all (Fiji, female villager, aged 
35-45 years). 
     One of the younger villagers I interviewed thought that in a disaster 
situation, traditional gender roles should be irrelevant: 
Men and women have to work together. Never mind 
that's not your role. You have to help that one, help your 
husband. Cleaning up, building up, replanting. We have 
to work together (Fiji, female villager, aged 35-45 years). 
     In my later interviews, when the community seemed more comfortable and 
trusting of me, issues around the gender roles started to emerge, particularly 
from younger women: 
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Very very different. The workload is the women's. 
Because the ladies, when we wake up in the morning, we 
start, until at night. But the men, no. One or two working 
one day, then have a rest. If they want to, otherwise, 
nobody can force them. You can't give orders to them, 
but they can give orders to us…Because the children are 
there, no mother will want to see her own children 
crying, wanting to eat. But for the men, they can go with 
it - go to your Mum. For Fijians, it happens. Like the 
load is given to the mother, Mum has to do everything. 
That is one thing too I have experienced in this village. 
Like the women you see, going out to the plantation, 
going to the sea, going to get firewood. Not just in the 
cyclone season, but it's their daily routine. And when the 
men sit and drink kava in the night, they will just be 
sleeping the next day. Sleep the whole day. Who does the 
work is just the mother. It's their daily routine (Fiji, 
female villager, aged 35-45 years). 
It’s mainly to women, the workload. Men they just come, 
they say things and they go away. We are the tools. In 
the morning, from morning they are starting until late at 
night (Fiji, female villager, aged 35-45 years). 
     In the stresses of the aftermath of a disaster, when there is devastation all 
around, but the need for food and shelter do not wait, inevitably tensions will 
rise and the conditions for conflict are present. There were two contrasting 
examples provided to me of when such conflict arises. Firstly, in the 
organisation and co-ordination of the clean-up and repairs to the village: 
Well, most of all it (conflict) is just the men. Because 
after that there is a meeting, whatever we have to do this, 
we have to do that, that house has to be replaced, so like 
women are just following them. So most of the ideas are 
just amongst the men, and the differences are just 
between the men (Fiji, male villager, aged 60+). 
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     With the traditional role of women being passive and submissive, they are 
not as involved in the decision making processes within the village. The men 
“are the ones masterminding everything” (Fiji, female villager, aged 60+). 
Consequently, they are less likely to be involved in any conflicts arising 
through those processes. However, the home is the domain of women, and it is 
there that conflicts among women arise: 
Because the hurricane, no houses left. But in that time, 
you can stay, live together. But we used to do temporary 
houses very fast. Men can stay together, women can't. 
Understand?…for one week, two weeks. Women 
can’t…Fijian men can stay together, just talanoa 
(talking), laughing together. Women can't, just a short 
time…Sometimes the women, fight about how things 
should be done. You have to understand about that (Fiji, 
male villager, aged 46-59 years). 
     The gender roles did not always hold however, during the trauma of the 
disaster event. Stereotypically, men would be the strong ones, and most 
responses from the communities were steadfastly consistent with that picture. 
One woman in Fiji though, described how her husband was unable to deal with 
the stress and pressure during the cyclone, leaving her responsible for the 
safety of their children: 
I ask the torch to my husband, you give the torch. That 
one there, can’t hold himself. He was shivering like this, 
my husband…he was too scared. And me no…me was 
not so scared like that one. He was lying like this and I 
asked him, give the torch to me, I want to see the 
roof…(Interviewer: you were trying not to be scared?) 
Yes, because of the kids. Because I was responsible for 
my husband to take care of us. That one there was 
shivering and too scared. I tell him not to be scared 
because of those kids there. I call him, hey, what’s wrong 
with you? And he can’t talk. I try my best to take 
responsible for those kids. My last one there was two or 
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three years old. I was telling him, wrap him in the 
blanket, and I run to that house up there. That one there 
take only one pillow and one blanket, and run up there, 
my husband. He was so scared…I told them - you run. 
You have to find your way there. You run. But that part 
there was so bushy and they needed the torch there like 
that. The torch that my husband was taking first (Fiji, 
female villager, aged 35-45 years). 
     Aid organisation representatives talked about other ways in which the 
traditional gender divide impacts upon women. For example, with damage 
assessment teams being male only, certain topics are taboo for women, which 
may mean that certain needs are not attended to. You cannot ask for underwear 
if you are not supposed to talk to a man about not having any. There were 
reports that in some damage assessments, only male-headed households are 
recognised, which makes assessing support and aid extremely difficult for 
female-headed households. The responsibility women take for disaster risk 
management is sometimes not recognised, even though with traditional gender 
roles, it is women in Fiji who are most often closest to the home. These types 
of issues for women in disasters have been recognised worldwide (Heckenberg 
and Johnston, 2012). 
     Gender impacts discussed in Tonga were from a slightly different 
perspective. The community in Tonga recently had an aid organisation project 
on diversifying income implemented in Falemea village. This led to more 
reliable incomes, and an understanding that sharing the load of work reduces 
the pressure on everyone. For example, one or two boats will fish for the entire 
community when there is a large school going past. When the boats arrive back 
at shore, villagers (men and women alike) will all help in getting the fish out of 
the nets. The fish are then divided amongst those who participated. Because the 
number of people is what’s counted, both men and women help. However, on a 
day to day basis, roles are clearly defined for men and for women.  
     Most of the income in the Tongan villages came from selling mats that are 
woven from pandanus leaves. This is a real industry in those villages, with 
most women spending all day weaving. Gender issues become apparent after a 
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cyclone because the pandanus plants are destroyed and can take six to nine 
months to re-grow. During this time, money is a real concern within the 
village, and men must try to take over the income earning role, selling fish at 
the markets. In Fiji, most of the income is derived this way, and once the seas 
are calm enough, fishing can re-commence fairly quickly. But in the Tongan 
villages, it seems that the source of income is more severely disrupted.  
     Gender issues are complex in Fiji and Tonga, and have a variety of impacts 
not only within communities, but for aid organisations also. Aid organisations 
in both countries spoke of the difficulty in meeting the conditions of donors for 
female representation on village committees for projects. Some donors make 
such representation a condition of the project and the aid organisation is left to 
convince them that a committee of all men is better than no committee at all in 
communities where having even one female representative is a huge step 
forward: 
That’s the other thing we face is the international norms 
of gender and equality. When you get to community level, 
how you play this is really the difference between your 
project succeeding and not succeeding. At the other 
level, the donors and the Australian office, they can’t 
understand that. When we say ‘oh no, the community 
said no women’…’no, no, no, you have to have women’. 
But it’s better having a committee of all men than no 
committee at all and then something happens. I think in 
one way it’s been a big push towards that gender 
equality thing in as many committees as we have, to have 
a women representative and a youth representative (Fiji, 
aid organisation representative). 
     The extent to which traditional gender role boundaries may be blurred will 
affect preparation for and response to cyclones and climate change impacts, in 
terms of both resources and ideas available. Where only men are involved in 
decision-making, half the population’s ideas and efforts are at risk of being 
wasted opportunities. 
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4.6 Faith and religion 
     In both island communities, religion and faith and trust in God were an 
important part of daily life: 
They trust to God every time and every day and night, 
and during our work, we thinking about the God, and 
trust him. All the time. We do our work and think about 
the God, give us a chance to make the pandanus (Tonga, 
female villager, aged 60+). 
     Many people described turning to God and their faith, during times of 
disaster, and that this not only gave them strength, but that sometimes prayer 
will change the course of a cyclone: 
For us, we are a Christian country, so in the community 
on this island, what they have experienced before, 
sometimes when there is two or three cyclone warnings 
coming, sometimes they have a prayer session, and 
sometimes the cyclone changes its course. So most of them 
come and then go somewhere else, and they believe that. 
That is what they have been experiencing in the past (Fiji, 
male villager, aged 60+). 
     This strong belief in the power of prayer was mainly held by the older 
community members, although not exclusively. The speaker from the above 
quote apologised for his beliefs, thinking that he would be considered foolish, 
but maintained that they come from experience.  
     It has been suggested that reliance on faith is a hindrance to action on issues 
like climate change (Lata and Nunn, 2011; Barnett and Campbell, 2010). Many 
villagers expressed the view that environmental changes and challenges are 
God’s will, and some took this further, to mean that therefore the only thing 
people can do is pray: 
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If it’s God’s will, then it will happen. If it’s not God’s 
will, then it will not happen…only if they pray harder 
and harder to God to stop the water, it is possible for 
him to stop the water…he is the one who can stop it 
(Tonga, female villager, aged 18-25). 
     Certainly, the perception that people rely on faith instead of their own 
actions existed among some aid organisations: 
For example with the coast line, if we are predicting that 
in 20 years for example, we’d say about 1000 people in 
Fiji will have to shift to higher level of ground for 
sustainability. But then people are not ready for that. 
They prefer to turn to their faith, to be optimistic about 
things, and say that this is nature and nature can take 
care of itself and we need to pray about it. That’s the 
culture here in Fiji (Fiji, aid organisation representative). 
     However, most people thought of God as the ultimate authority rather than 
the only actor, so that people have to try in the first place: 
What I believe, if I have to tie down something outside. 
But if God like to damage our property, then everything I 
did has no meaning…take the first step, God will do the 
rest (Fiji, male villager, aged 60+). 
We can do the praying, so that is the protector. We can 
take faith that our prayer is working…our faith, if we 
pray and then sleep, then God do not help us. So we can 
work. We can pray and we can plant our trees on the 
beach so that God will see that we will work, and maybe 
he can help us (Tonga, male villager, aged 35-44). 
     Indeed, the most devout person on the island in Fiji, was also the most 
prepared. The difference between just relying completely on God, and putting 
work in yourself as well was explained to me: 
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I think there are difference. I think some people believe 
God but only for their lives, directly for their lives, not 
for their material properties. Concerning their material 
properties like their house and all those stuff, they have 
to use their hands. But concerning directly their lives, 
that’s what they know for sure that’s someone else for 
that. So the rest, apart from their lives, it’s up to them to 
do that. That’s why they were given two hands (Tonga, 
aid organisation representative). 
Sometimes we have faith to the Lord. He is the one who 
look after our life. If we do like our pray. If we do the 
bad thing, maybe God will punish us. That is like our 
trust and our faith (Tonga, male villager, aged 35-44 
years). 
     Where faith is such an important part of a community, it will need to be 
taken into consideration. However, while it may sometimes make the path to 
community action more difficult, it should be considered an element, rather 
than an obstacle. Beliefs in the need for work in combination with prayer, and 
that people are the stewards of what God has provided and need to look after it, 
may be able to be harnessed to motivate climate change adaptation action at 
community level. 
     There were interesting differences in the ways in which Churches 
penetrated the communities in Fiji and in Tonga. In Fiji, with only two main 
churches represented on the island, the Pastors were given equal (or higher) 
status with the mataqali (clan) leaders in terms of joint decision making on the 
island. This meant that village committees included the pastors along with 
mataqali leaders. Presumably, this helped to ensure also that all community 
members who belonged to either church were represented on community 
decision making bodies. 
     In Tonga, however, with the relative proliferation of Churches represented 
on the island, their status was enacted in a completely different way. The 
power and financial control exerted by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
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Day Saints (Mormon) in Tonga was clear in the village. Firstly at a purely 
visual level, the Mormon church was physically the biggest and sturdiest 
building (hence being used as an evacuation centre), and some houses, funded 
and/or built by the Mormon church stood out from others as being similarly 
bigger and stronger than their neighbours. Secondly, which Church you belong 
to impacts significantly on your post-disaster experience: 
The Bishop is first to come to our home, because I 
belong to the Mormon church. That’s why after it, only 
the Bishop come to our home and second the Town 
Officer. Look around. But the first time, help to us is our 
church, church leaders…the government takes longer. 
The church, the Mormon church, very good. After 
hurricane, after cyclone, they going to help hard and 
fast, good and fast…the other churches, they love their 
people, but they have not enough money to help their 
people (Tonga, female villager, aged 35-44). 
     Many people in the community, and the Mormon church itself, were 
adamant that the church will help anyone who needs it, not just members. The 
fact that the Mormon church is the common evacuation centre for the whole 
community supports this, and the church has a separate charitable humanitarian 
arm that provides help to those who shelter there, regardless of membership. 
However, the difference in experience particularly post-disaster, depending on 
which church you belong to, was evident and obvious enough that it was 
considered to be a factor in choosing which church to attend: 
But you know there is Bahai faith here, and Jehovah’s 
Witness. They have a church not strong enough to build 
a house for their members sometime. Those people like 
this, they are the poorest people in the village, or on the 
island. There’s people still living in the old way of 
living…you must go and join a church if you have 
something happening. In the future, your church will 
help you. But some people, it’s a different way of living. 
People thought there is no cyclone every year. So they 
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choose a church they don’t donate money or something 
like this. But then a church like Church of Tonga, 
Mormon, Methodist or other church like this, they 
donated money. After a disaster is happening, the church 
will help people. Sometimes they bring food, they will 
build house, something like this. But some people say - 
no hurricane every time, so we choose the other church 
(Tonga, male villager, aged 60+). 
     Faith in God, belief in the power of prayer, and membership of particular 
churches directly impacts upon community members experiences of disasters, 
with prayer an important consideration in preparation for a cyclone, and 
churches heavily involved in post-disaster response. Religion appears to be 
playing several important roles in these communities. Clearly religion has a 
role in aid and income redistribution, from both within the islands and from the 
developed world donations and funding. However, the importance the villagers 
place on prayer and faith both before and following disasters demonstrates the 
role religion plays in giving meaning to life and events, decreasing anxiety and 
despair, and providing a source of identity.  
4.7 Conclusion 
     For the remote islanders in this study, cyclones are simply a part of life. 
They are scary and unwelcome, with devastating and sometimes deadly 
consequences, but nonetheless they are accepted. Most people have lived 
through multiple cyclones and many have experienced the damage or 
destruction of their homes as a direct result. With cyclones being normalised 
for many people, thoughts about them are usually restricted to the time of year 
when they are most likely to occur - the ‘cyclone season’. Within this, some 
think about cyclones all the time, and others only when there is a warning sign. 
Traditional knowledge and practice about food preservation was less apparent, 
possibly because with disaster aid and food rations, people see less need for 
maintaining the ‘old ways’. This may be reflective of diminishing traditional 
strategies (Barnett, 2001), and increased expectations of and reliance on aid 
(Mercer et al., 2007). 
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     The normalisation of cyclones sometimes works against the communities 
also, with many expressing the view that people do not take warnings seriously 
and that some are caught unprepared. Indeed, the experience of Cyclone Ian in 
Tonga supports this, with many admitting to being ill-prepared, and vowing to 
do better in future. Having a safe place to shelter during a cyclone is vital in a 
location where retreating from the path of the storm is not an option. Most 
people simply go to the strongest building in their village or their immediate 
vicinity, but there was no consensus on whether or not these buildings are 
actually safe. 
     Faith was an important part of daily life in both study sites, playing an 
especially important role after cyclones in Tonga, depending on which church 
you belong to. The heavy reliance on prayer and faith in God is an impediment 
to action for some, and requiring action for others. In keeping with the Otin 
Taai Declaration (Pacific Council of Churches, 2004), elements of the strong 
faith should be able to be harnessed to the advantage of community action and 
responsibility into the future, with prayers only being answered if you work, 
and people being the stewards of what God has provided. The parallel practices 
of non-Western countries (Chester and Duncan, 2010), support the notion that 
the strong faith may be harnessed for resilience and adaptive capacity. 
     The islanders are highly exposed to disaster. They live in places that 
frequently experience cyclones, in low-cost westernised houses that are 
constructed to serve the purpose of providing shelter, not cyclone-resistance 
(unlike traditional Pacific island homes). They are not, however, helpless. The 
positives of remoteness (see Chapter 9) - good local environmental knowledge, 
resilience and strong community bonds - are apparent in the strength and 
resilience of these isolated peoples. 
  113 
Chapter 5 warning signs of cyclones6 
     On remote islands where communications are not always reliable, warnings 
of cyclones come from multiple sources. This chapter documents some 
traditional warning signs that were described during the community interviews. 
The signs cover a broad temporal spectrum of warning, and show remarkable 
consistency between the countries. 
5.1 The importance of warning 
     The best chance a person has of being safe during a disaster is to know that 
it is coming – well positioned and managed evacuation facilities will be empty 
if no one has time to reach them. The importance of early warning systems for 
disasters is clear. How to translate that need into efficient and effective systems 
is not always so clear. An early warning system is:  
The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate 
timely and meaningful warning information to enable 
individuals, communities and organizations threatened 
by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in 
sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or 
loss…A people-centred early warning system necessarily 
comprises four key elements: knowledge of the risks; 
monitoring, analysis and forecasting of the hazards; 
communication or dissemination or alerts and warnings; 
and local capabilities to respond to the warnings received 
(UNISDR, 2009).  
     A system will be less effective when one of these elements is weak or 
absent. 
  
                                                            
6 This section was published in another form as - Johnston, Ingrid (2014) 
Traditional warning signs of cyclones in Fiji and Tonga. Reviewed by 
Environmental Hazards, currently implementing changes for re-submission. 
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     The socio-psychological steps involved in responding to warnings are 
hearing, understanding, personalising the risk, and the decision to respond 
(Paul and Routray, 2013). Some of the reasons why warnings are ineffective or 
people do not respond in a timely way are economic factors, lack of 
understanding, experience that official warnings are not always reliable, 
inconsistencies in the warnings, and warnings coming from a single source 
only (Howell, 2003; Ronan and Johnston, 2005). Cyclones in particular are 
unpredictable in their behaviour, and so official warnings are often considered 
unreliable (Veland et al., 2010). People need to trust in the warnings and in the 
need to act upon those warnings. It has been found that communities with good 
traditional knowledge and oral histories of previous disasters are more likely 
than others to survive disasters (Arunotai, 2008; Mercer et al., 2007).  
     Traditional or Indigenous knowledge is a: 
body of information passed down through generations in 
a given locality and acquired through the accumulation 
of experiences, relationships with the surrounding 
environment, and traditional community rituals, practices 
and institutions (Kelman et al., 2012, p13) 
     This type of knowledge is often overlooked and undervalued as not being 
‘scientific’, but rather inaccessible and different or difficult to deal with 
(Mercer et al., 2007). However, natural warning signs are understood locally 
by people who may feel alienated from the scientific system, and give good 
lead times for preparation (Howell, 2003). Traditional knowledge has been 
found to significantly enhance the ability to understand and interpret warning 
information (Sharma, Patwardhan and Patt, 2013). The incorporation of 
traditional knowledge into warning systems has been recommended to increase 
perceptions of reliability and hopefully thus increase responses (Howell, 2003; 
Paul and Routray, 2013).  
     While there have been studies looking at how to integrate traditional and 
western scientific knowledges (e.g. Cronin, Gaylord, Charley et al., 2004; 
Hodgson, 2010; Kelman et al., 2012; Mercer et al., 2010), there are few studies 
concentrating on actually documenting the traditional knowledge on weather 
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forecasting and early warning signs of cyclones. Some have been done in 
Bangladesh (Howell, 2003; Paul and Routray, 2013), Samoa (although about 
weather forecasting generally, Lefale, 2010); Vanuatu (concentrating on one 
tsunami event, Walshe and Nunn, 2012) and the Cook Islands (United Nations 
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 2011). Fewer 
still, are studies seeking to validate natural warning signs by looking at the 
statistical links between them and actual events. One is also currently 
underway in Vanuatu to validate traditional weather forecasting against 
scientific forecasting, following a successful pilot in 2012 (Government of 
Vanuatu, 2012). More work has been done in this field in relation to 
earthquakes both in documenting signs and validation (e.g. Grant and Conlan, 
2013; Tributsch, 1982; Yong, Tsoi, Feibi et al., 1988).  
     This study adds to this growing knowledge base, by documenting traditional 
warning signs of cyclones on two remote islands in the South Pacific, one in 
Fiji and one in Tonga. The study provides evidence from two more locations, 
and directly compares traditional warning signs of cyclones in two different 
countries. 
5.2 Descriptions of the signs 
     Community members on each island were interviewed and asked how they 
know if a cyclone is coming, for details on any natural warning signs they 
know of, and which signs they consider to be the most reliable. On both islands 
people talked often about the importance of having some warning before a 
cyclone arrives. Those with the most experience of cyclones considered 
warnings to be more important than the strength of the winds:  
Never mind it’s a strong hurricane, the warning is the 
best thing to come…the warning is more important so 
you can get people to be prepared (Fiji, male villager, 
aged 60+). 
      There were a variety of warning signs and methods discussed, including a 
mix of traditional signs and radio warnings. Some signs were mentioned by 
only one or two people; others by almost everyone interviewed. 
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     There were more than 15 different traditional warning signs described, and 
many people nominated traditional signs as their first and most reliable ways of 
knowing that a cyclone was approaching. These signs cover a broad temporal 
spectrum of warnings, from months to days, and were often described in terms 
of being specifically traditional knowledge, passed down through the 
generations, and applicable to their local context. There was remarkable 
consistency between the Fijian and Tongan communities in terms of the 
traditional warning signs described. Most of the signs described in Fiji were 
also described either closely or exactly by community members in Tonga. The 
warnings concern the behaviour of both flora and fauna, as well as the wind 
and the ocean. 
Nesting behaviour of bees and hornets 
     In the months prior to the November-April cyclone season, honey bees and 
hornets build their nests closer to the ground. In Tonga, this was noted during 
the one to two months prior to a cyclone: 
It’s telling by the insect named bee. If they were coming 
with their home and live under the tree like this (points 
down low), tell them there will be a cyclone. And if they 
are hiding up the tree, there will be no cyclone. They are 
telling it by how they live (Tonga, male villager, aged 35-
45 years). 
     In Fiji, the nesting of the honey bee was noted to change earlier than in 
Tonga, during the July-September prior to the November-April cyclone season. 
Fruit growth 
     Fruit, especially breadfruit, grows in bunches rather than just one or two 
together: “Here on the island, when there is plenty of breadfruit, they say that 
next year there will be a cyclone here” (Fiji, male villager, aged 45-59 years). 
     In Tonga, this was explained as being related to a lack of rain during the 
early part of the cyclone season. Less of the heavy summer rains means that the 
baby fruit are not damaged, so they are more likely to grow in bunches. This 
sign, of fruit growing in bunches, was described consistently in Fiji and Tonga. 
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     The new growth on banana plants changes shape, curling over instead of 
growing straight up, in the period preceding a cyclone. Almost identical 
descriptions of this sign were provided in the two countries: 
Some signs that our older generation used to talk about, 
he has experienced that as well. The vudi plant, like a 
banana but short and fatter, the shoot right on top, when 
it’s three or four months before a hurricane, it comes 
down like this. It used to point up, the younger leaves 
(Fiji, male villager, aged 60+, through an interpreter). 
He is talking about the old people. They can understand 
there must be a cyclone for about months or weeks 
before cyclone hitting our village or Tonga. They are 
looking for, you know the banana trees, and the tree like 
this, you know the young one. The straight one is going 
like this, show us nothing bad, the forecast must be good. 
If bend down, you know, the trees understand there must 
be a cyclone (Tonga, male villager, aged 45-59 years, 
through an interpreter). 
Ocean currents and tides 
     In Fiji, the community members described changes in the currents of the 
ocean, about one month before a cyclone: 
Current, because when the waves come on the barrier 
reefs, sometimes it’s coming with a lot of current, and 
then we can experience that when the tide comes in, it 
goes right to the beach. Sometimes we can see the big 
waves coming when it’s high tide like that, from the open 
sea (Fiji, male villager, aged 45-59 years). 
     The Tongan villagers also described the behaviour of the ocean currents and 
waves as being a warning sign of a coming cyclone or bad weather. The tide 
rises, with waves coming in towards the houses, before the cyclone comes.  
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There was also a description of changes in the shape of waves: 
From the waves, also the wave of the sea. When the 
waves are too strong, sometime you can see there is like 
a flag on top of the wave. If there is another small one 
like a flag over the wave. There’s nature tell us to get 
ready, something will happen in the future (Tonga, male 
villager, aged 60+). 
Rainbows 
     The villagers in both countries noted changes in the shape of rainbows. In 
Fiji, the change is in the appearance and timing of the rainbow: 
Another sign is like a rainbow, but rainbow is longer, 
this one is a little bit shorter. Sometimes when it’s a good 
day like this, you can see this rainbow. So then they know 
that there are some changes coming in the weather, 
especially the strong wind or hurricane (Fiji, male 
villager, aged 60+).  
     In Tonga, an incomplete rainbow is a warning sign: 
They said they can tell when they see the rainbow, half 
rainbow. Then it might be bad weather or cyclone. Half 
rainbow (Tonga, female villager, aged 35-45 years, 
through an interpreter). 
Birds 
     The behaviour of a particular type of bird was the one of the most common 
natural warning signs in both countries, with especially detailed descriptions 
from a variety of people in Fiji: 
We see birds like that. There’s one big bird that usually 
knows that the hurricane or bad weather is about to 
come. A big bird, if it gets down. It flew up there. If it 
gets down to want to touch the ground, that’s a warning 
that a hurricane or bad weather is about to come. If it’s 
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high up, that’s OK…big wings there. We call it manu ni 
cagi (bird of the wind) (Fiji, female villager, aged 35-45 
years). 
Another sign that he knows, is a type of bird. A bigger 
bird. We have a special name for it – bird of the wind. 
We hardly see them on a day like this, but when we see 
them coming in numbers, about 20 or more, then it is a 
sign that a cyclone is coming. When they are coming 
down, because they normally are at cloud level, but if 
they are coming down, about 20 or more of them, that is 
a sign for him (Fiji, male villager, aged 45-59 years, 
through an interpreter). 
There is the hurricane bird. It’s a sign to here that there 
is a cyclone coming…it never fails. If she sees the birds, 
strong winds are definitely coming. So that’s the only 
time that she recalls the hurricanes – if she sees those 
birds (Fiji, female villager, aged 60+, through an 
interpreter). 
     Similarly in Tonga, there were numerous descriptions of a particular bird, 
motuku, being a reliable warning sign: 
Sometimes they can tell the bird, there is a big bird, 
flying and they can tell there’s going to be a big storm or 
hurricane…the black one, big and black (Tonga, female 
villager, aged 60+ years, through an interpreter) 
It was the black one, and they have something on the 
back. And if it’s open like this, there will be a cyclone, 
and if it’s closed like this, then there will be no cyclone 
(Tonga, female villager, aged 35-45 years). 
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Coral reefs 
     In Fiji, community members described the sounds coming from the coral 
reefs near their island when a cyclone is approaching: “And the reef, like in the 
night, sometimes when it’s calm you can hear the reef like roaring, crying.” 
(Fiji, male villager, aged 60+, through an interpreter). “The reef will be 
roaring. It’s a kind of sound that we hear which is different from now” (Fiji, 
female villager, aged 60+). “She (mother) told us, when you hear the sound of 
the sea, boom, don’t sleep, wake up, it’s time to get up” (Fiji, male villager, 
aged 45-59 years). 
     In Tonga, it is the appearance of the reef, rather than the sounds coming 
from it, which signify that a cyclone or bad storm is coming: 
And they said they can tell from the reef. The reef was 
very white from the waves. Because when it’s normal, we 
can tell, like there’s no reef on the ocean. So if anyone 
goes to the beach and they see every reef is white, so they 
said there’s going to be a storm (Tonga, female villager, 
aged 35-45 years, through an interpreter). 
Wind 
     Changes were noted in both countries, concerning the behaviour of the wind 
before a cyclone. In Tonga, the direction of the wind is particularly important 
and provides both long and short-term warning: 
She said the other sign. Do you know the last day of 
December? If the wind blow from the south, long ago 
they said there will be a cyclone on that year (Tonga, 
female villager, aged 35-45 years, through an 
interpreter). 
     Wind blowing from the northwest is a sign of a cyclone on ‘Uiha island in 
Tonga, and if the wind comes from the north, there will also be higher waves 
accompanying the wind. 
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     The regularity of strong winds was another sign described in Tonga: 
The one thing I heard from the old people. If you are 
going to have some wind every year, it’s good…or after 
two years or three, it’s good. If we can’t get some wind 
after 10 years in between, you can ready for the big 
cyclone coming (Tonga, male villager, aged 35-45 years). 
     In Fiji, it was simply the building of wind during the cyclone season that 
signifies a warning for an impending cyclone: 
He knows that in Fiji there’s a month for hurricanes 
from December to April, so he knows during that time 
that if strong winds keep on coming, there will be a 
cyclone very soon because it’s the season for cyclone 
(Fiji, male villager, aged 60+, through an interpreter).  
Clouds 
     The community members in Tonga described particular shapes of clouds as 
being a warning sign: “He said about looking at the cloud in the sky, there is 
like a horse tail” (Tonga, male villager, aged 45-59 years, through an 
interpreter). 
Spiders 
     Spiders were described as making more webs before a cyclone comes: 
Many different things that the old people learn from. You 
know the spider, they say the spider when we are going 
on the road in the bush, trees from trees, the spider make 
their net between trees and trees. That is one of the thing 
that the Tongan people said that the spider try to get 
good to get ready for the next season. There must be a 
hurricane or strong wind or something like this (Tonga, 
male villager, aged 60+). 
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Chickens 
     In Tonga, the behaviour of chickens was noted as providing confirmation of 
whether a cyclone that the radio warning says is approaching, will actually hit 
your particular island: 
During the cyclone warning, if the chickens are flying up 
and sleep in the tree…if the chicken sleep down, there 
will be a hurricane…sometimes you know, the radio says 
that there will be a hurricane, but because of the 
direction, the movement of the hurricane, it will not 
come. So at the first time, come straight. So after two 
hours, three hours, change direction so it will not come; 
the same with the signs. We see the chicken is flying up 
and sleep there, we know it’s okay. We trust that (Tonga, 
male villager, aged 46-59 years).  
Stars 
     One of the signs during ‘the calm before the storm’ in Tonga is in the 
appearance of stars in the night sky: 
When you looking to the sky, the stars. Plenty stars in the 
sky, but they not look bright (Tonga, male villager, aged 
46-59 years, through an interpreter). 
Coconut leaves 
     One villager in Fiji described how elders used to be able to see from the 
way the sunlight reflected on coconut leaves, that a cyclone was coming. This 
was particularly noted as something younger people do not know how to do. 
5.3 Regional and local signs 
     It is possible that some of these signs might be closer to folklore than actual 
traditional knowledge. Certainly there have been controversies in the past 
regarding the interpretation of Pacific Island culture from anthropological 
studies, such as in the case of Margaret Mead’s studies in Samoa (Shankman, 
1996). The signs documented in this study have not been validated using 
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methods that give them currency in Western scientific knowledge, although it 
may be argued that traditional knowledge should not be subjugated by Western 
knowledge in that way. There are, however, initial indicators of validity. 
     The reliability of these traditional warning signs of cyclones is supported by 
the strong consistency between Fiji and Tonga in the descriptions. Local 
variations are to be expected, since the ecological systems on which the signs 
are based are not identical on the two islands. However, while sometimes the 
details differed, and there was an overall greater number described in Tonga 
than in Fiji, for some signs, the consistency was remarkable. This is further 
supported by a recent documentary made by the United Nations Educational 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) during a project in the Cook 
Islands looking at traditional warning signs of cyclones in that country 
(UNESCO, 2011). In that documentary, some signs were broadly similar such 
as the shapes of clouds, direction of the wind and changes in the tides. There 
were other signs that were described almost exactly as in both Fiji and Tonga – 
a particular bird seen only prior to a cyclone, curled new growth on banana 
plants, fruit growing in bunches, and chickens cooping at ground level. This 
suggests that there may be some signs that are common to South Pacific 
islands, and others more localized. 
5.4 Limitations of the traditional signs 
     It is noteworthy that in the descriptions of the traditional warning signs, 
people often referred to storms or bad weather, not just cyclones or hurricanes. 
The signs are of strong winds and rain, but in these descriptions, they were not 
able to differentiate between severe storms and cyclones, or between cyclones 
of differing strengths.  
     As the environment and climate changes, so too natural warning signs may 
change, and traditional knowledge may need updating (Kelman, 2011). In 
some instances, traditional knowledge may be already outdated and considered 
ineffective by some within the community itself (Mercer et al., 2007).  
 The signs described here were considered to be current and reliable by those 
who held the knowledge. The risk in these communities was more in the 
limitations of interest in retaining that knowledge. 
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5.5 The future of traditional knowledge 
     There is a perception among some of the elders in the community that 
younger people on the island don’t know traditional signs and are not 
interested in learning about them: 
Most of the younger generation now, sometimes they 
don't trust what the elders say about the natural signs, 
because of what they know now. Because they are more 
educated than the elders, and you know, technology, it 
seems like they don't believe in natural signs now. They 
are not interested in getting it from the elders (Fiji, male 
villager, aged 60+). 
     To a certain extent, the perception of the elders was supported by the 
interview data, in that in Fiji younger community members (aged 45 years or 
less) nominated only one type of traditional warning sign - the manu ni cagi, 
and thought the radio was more reliable. However, most of them still 
nominated the traditional sign first, with the radio viewed as providing 
confirmation of the traditional sign. In Tonga, again it was elders who provided 
both the greatest number of signs, and the finest level of details. There, 
villagers were equally like to first nominate the radio only or the radio together 
with a traditional sign. People trust both types of signs, and opposite to Fiji, 
view the natural signs as confirmation of whether an approaching cyclone will 
impact their particular island or not - the radio tells you a cyclone is in the area, 
but the natural signs tell you whether it is coming to your island. 
     A discussion with a class six school group (upper primary) in Fiji yielded a 
long list of traditional signs. While there was not as much detail provided as by 
the elders, the sheer number of signs the school children knew about was both 
impressive and surprising, given that the elders had said young people were not 
really interested in traditional knowledge. It is not clear whether this topic may 
have been recently studied by the school class. 
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     The implication here is that younger people are content to rely on the radio 
to provide cyclone warnings. However, relying on technological warnings can 
be difficult on remote islands, where communication is unreliable. The Red 
Cross in Tonga in theory telephone each Town Officer in their area when there 
is a cyclone approaching, to make sure the warning is received. However, that 
doesn’t always work: 
Sometimes the network isn’t good in the outer island, so 
we can’t call through. The only thing they hear is the AM 
radio. So if the radio doesn’t have batteries, they will not 
hear. That is how difficult the connection through to the 
outer islands…sometimes it’s no good. And if I don’t 
reach to them to the Town Officer, and that village, that 
island don’t have any radio or their battery is gone, I 
feel sorry for them. The cyclone hit without any warning. 
That’s how difficult through the connection or warning 
for the cyclone (Tonga, aid organisation representative).  
     Even if there are working radios, people may not be listening to them. This 
is especially the case with younger people: 
But to listen to the radio to get the warning, it’s not 
happening with the youth. They are not listening to any 
radio, they are listening to music (on their mobile 
phones). They just respond when their family starts 
telling them OK, it’s a cyclone (Tonga, aid organisation 
representative). 
     This is reflected in the large body of work in the literature exploring the 
changing nature of youth culture and the way young people use media (Smaill, 
2008). As mobile phone technology has spread in developing countries intro 
rural and poor communities, the technology is increasingly being used by 
development projects and even community radio stations as a way of engaging 
with youth (Watson, 2012).  
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    In both Fiji and Tonga, aid organisations talked about these changes in the 
ways young people are using the radio - listening to music on their mobile 
phones more commonly now, rather than listening to the radio. This means that 
the radio is at risk of becoming a less effective method of disseminating 
disaster warnings, particularly to remote communities. In Tonga, the problem 
is recognised and is being addressed in a very modern way. There are only two 
mobile phone carriers in Tonga, and the network is used extensively by local 
businesses for advertising through text messages. This has been taken 
advantage of with the same system now also being used to send text message 
warnings of disasters. It was tested successfully for the first time during 
Cyclone Jasmine in 2012 to send warnings throughout the main island of 
Tongatapu.  
5.6 Conclusion 
     Although there is a heavy and increasing reliance on the radio for receiving 
warning of an approaching cyclone, the traditional knowledge of cyclone 
warning signs was impressive on both islands, with remarkable consistency 
between them. The ways in which this local knowledge combines with external 
knowledge and improvised responses in the Pacific has been noted (Lauer, 
2012). With an almost unanimous agreement within this study that preparation 
is key to surviving a disaster and minimising damage, adequate and accurate 
warning is essential. Properly acknowledged, preserved and formalised, 
traditional knowledge has the potential to combine with technological warnings 
and overcome some of the impediments to warnings being recognised, taken 
seriously and acted upon. Locals understand the natural signs, and the 
understanding may be passed on to those younger people who currently do not 
have the same knowledge. They are considered to be reliable and consistent, 
and when combined with the radio and mobile phone warnings, are able to 
overcome the problem of the mistrust of warnings coming from a single 
source. In fact given the range of natural signs, both in terms of which part of 
the ecosystem the sign emanates from, and the temporal scale of it, the 
traditional knowledge already may provide multiple sources for the warnings.  
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Combining them with the technological warnings formalises that with the 
advantage that the multiple sources would then include both types of 
knowledge – traditional and western scientific. 
     Traditional knowledge is being held mainly by elders, and younger people 
are relying more on technological warnings such as through the radio, so it is 
important that those technological warnings keep up with the changes in the 
ways young people, even on remote islands in developing countries, use that 
technology. 
     With mobile phone reception on these remote islands being dependent upon 
standing under the right tree, or on this particular rock however, the importance 
of traditional knowledge is likely to remain for some time to come. The 
evidence from this study shows that these warning signs are not only accessible 
to the local people, but also reliable and consistent, even across countries, 
which is crucially important for their acceptance. The integration of traditional 
and western scientific warnings brings the two worlds together - the wisdom of 
the elders and the methods of the younger generations. Their integration may 
also help to reduce the vulnerabilities inherent in each system. Western 
scientific warnings are able to provide information about the likely severity of 
an approaching cyclone, but are often unreliable concerning the actual location, 
given the unpredictable behaviour of cyclones. Traditional knowledge can 
warn of a cyclone or storm on a particular island, but not identify anything 
about the severity of it. People on each of the islands were already informally 
integrating the two systems by using one as a validation of the other. These 
remote islanders may be people ahead of their time, displaying flexibility and 
adaptive capacity. 
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Chapter 6 - Disaster aid and relief 
     The Pacific is the most heavily aid-assisted part of the world in terms of aid 
per person (Connell, 2010). Despite this, the area has been found to be under-
prepared to deal with climate change impacts, with limited community 
awareness and buy-in to adaptation initiatives (Nunn, 2012). As discussed in 
Chapter 9, the communities in this study definitely had awareness of 
environmental changes impacting their daily lives. Links to climate change 
awareness were less evident however, and adaptation strategies that did not 
seem to be of clear and immediate benefit to them had little support from the 
communities. Nonetheless, while establishing a lack of preparation for climate 
change, and problems with aid investment and implementation to date, Nunn 
notes: “It is difficult to estimate the amount of aid that has come into the region 
in the past 25 years for climate-change adaptation and mitigation, but it has 
probably been several hundred million US dollars” (Nunn, 2012, p37). 
     Regardless of the actual amount, the report recommends changes in the way 
aid funding is allocated and implemented, calling for international donors, 
regional organisations and governments to make greater efforts to ensure the 
effectiveness of their assistance and initiatives, and for local influential people 
at the community level to be empowered to make informed and sustainable 
decisions (Nunn, 2012).  
     This chapter looks at aid around the disaster management cycle, in terms of 
current implementation and effectiveness. Suggested changes for the future are 
addressed in Chapter 10. 
6.1 Examples of aid provided 
     The community, aid organisations and government representatives listed 
examples of the types of aid provided after disasters. Predictably, given the 
difference in aid organisations attending disasters on the main islands and on 
remote islands, there were fewer examples provided by those on the remote 
islands, than those on the mainland. 
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     Community members recalled items such as kumala (sweet potato) seeds or 
plants, food rations, tarpaulins, pots, eating utensils, sleeping bags, water, 
water containers, clothes and housing. Aid organisations and government 
representatives added other items such as blankets, water purification tablets, 
soap, hand sanitiser, hygiene packs, school kits, first aid kits, water filters, 
gardening tools, cleaning tools, fuel for lights, condoms, mattresses, and in the 
2012 Nadi floods nappies and milk for infants. Some aid organisations spoke 
of distributing whatever was donated. Sometimes there are ‘cash for work’ 
programs designed to help communities restore livelihoods and increase 
resilience. Examples of this were seen in Fiji following the 2012 Nadi 
flooding, and in Tonga following the 2009 tsunami, when participants were 
paid for a short and specified period of time (two to three weeks), for work 
such as re-planting their vegetable gardens, and transferring knowledge within 
the community. 
     Seeds were distributed to villagers in Tonga after Cyclone Ian in 2014, and 
there was both appreciation and respect shown for that aid. The head of the 
village disaster committee, who liaised with the government for receipt of the 
seeds, was conducting inspections of plantations in the community, and said 
that those who did not plant and nurture their seeds would not be given any 
more when he returned to the government for a second round of seed aid. 
     The villagers in Fiji thought it was standard to be provided with a tarpaulin 
following a disaster, for temporary shelter, and that was their experience. 
However, that contrasts with a statement by Fiji to the 2011 Global Platform 
on Disaster Risk Reduction: 
Using traditional housing materials as temporary shelters 
during the recovery phase is more convenient and has 
privacy for the family than tents. The materials are 
readily available and no fund or very little fund is needed 
to erect them…Erecting houses after events for those that 
lost their homes will not be a problem. These homes only 
take a matter of days to complete (Vaniqi, 2011).  
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     This statement is consistent with the Fijian National Climate Change Policy 
2012, which lists traditional building practices as providing a level of resilience 
to extreme weather events (Government of the Republic of Fiji, 2012). While it 
may be true that bures do provide some resilience and protection against 
extreme weather events, as noted by community members in this study (see 
section 4.3, safe place to go), it is largely historical now. It is very uncommon 
for people to live in bures now - not one family on the island in this study did 
so, and it was rare to observe them in other parts of the country as anything 
other than tourist destinations. Interviews with government representatives did 
not reveal a perception that people are protected because they live in bures, so 
these statements and policies appear to be at odds with current practice of both 
housing and aid provision. This may represent an example of the disconnect 
between the formal and informal systems in Fiji, or in this case the written and 
practiced policies (see Chapter 7 for other examples). 
     In Tonga, the aid seemed to be much less consistent for different events. 
Families with damaged crops may be provided with free ploughing of their 
fields. Following Cyclone Juliette in 1973 in Tonga, the government offered 
short-term work visas for New Zealand for a limited number of men from 
affected villages, so that those chosen could work in New Zealand to raise 
money to repair damages. Tongan villagers also spoke of the Health 
Department providing vaccinations following one cyclone with severe 
flooding, but not after similar recent events. 
     For the villagers, food rations and housing were definitely the focus of aid. 
Despite free disaster relief housing beginning in 1973 in Fiji (Campbell, 1984), 
it was perceived as being a new system to the elders in the village: 
Government is giving new houses to the villagers. That's 
a new system. If the village goes, the DISMAC comes in 
and counts the houses. The number of houses that's 
damaged, that will be replaced (Fiji, male villager, aged 
60+). 
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     The types of houses provided have changed in recent years, and this change 
was noted by the community. It was generally felt that the older ones were 
better equipped, including a toilet, but the newer ones are better constructed. A 
government representative outlined the differences and how they came about: 
Right now we are constructing houses that cost us about 
$15,000 just for the material cost, excluding the labour 
cost. The government also pays the labour, so in total it's 
about $20,000 per house. The standard housing structure 
is 24x16ft wooden structure without toilet and 
bathroom…Before government was assisting with 
Cyclone Ami there were three phases - the first we built 
24x16 houses with toilet and bathroom, after that when 
government want to minimise costs, so they constructed 
only the house and the communities’ contribution is to 
construct a toilet (Fiji, government representative). 
     The system for the provision of housing aid in Tonga was more complicated 
and less consistent than in Fiji. Food was clearly nominated as being a higher 
priority for the government in Tonga than housing aid, which is entirely 
dependent on donor funding. There is supposed to be a policy in place that the 
government should help anyone whose house has been destroyed. However, if 
donor funding is not available, this may not always happen. When housing aid 
is provided, sometimes the recipient has been asked to contribute towards the 
cost of it. For example after Cyclone Isaac in 1982, families were asked to pay 
TOP700 which represented about 20% of the cost of re-building the house. 
This policy is not consistently applied though, leading to confusion and 
uncertainty in communities.  
     Following the most recent cyclone in Tonga, Ian, there were at least four aid 
organisations providing housing aid - Red Cross, LDS Church (for members), 
Caritas (for members), and the World Bank project which is being 
implemented in conjunction with the government. None of the programs seem 
to include requests for financial contributions from the recipients. The World 
Bank project, which is being modelled on their response in Tonga to Cyclone 
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Waka in 2001, includes repairs for housing and key community facilities using 
a combination of contracted labour and ‘supported self recovery’.  
     The examples provided above are of aid that is targeted towards addressing 
need, and is beneficial to communities. There are other examples however, of 
aid that achieves neither of these aims. Following Cyclone Ian in Tonga, there 
were reports of inappropriate and unhelpful aid to communities. The 
government provided food aid to communities in Ha’apai on two separate 
occasions and both times, the food was unfit for consumption. In 
February/March, food aid was received that included tinned fish which people 
reported as being ‘expired’, and that made several people ill. Tins 
spontaneously burst open, and most people either threw them out or fed them 
to their dogs. In April/May, rice was received that did not absorb water during 
cooking, and again left people ill. Many reported that the expiry date on the 
bag, which had passed, was covered by a sticker with a new, future, expiry 
date. Complaints to the government about this were numerous, and I was told 
that the Government’s explanation was that the rice had not expired, just the 
bag itself. These reports from the community are supported by media articles 
(e.g. Radio New Zealand International, 2014; Radio New Zealand, 2014).  
     In an unrelated example, water tanks were donated to the community on 
‘Uiha island. Households were surveyed to establish who needed them, and 
when there were more tanks available than required, the extras were simply 
delivered to households whose tanks showed the slightest sign of wear and 
tear, even if they had indicated that they did not need a new one. This is despite 
some in the community requesting septic tanks instead. It is likely that there 
were no septic tanks available, which is understandable, however, this is an 
example of the less than optimal outcomes achieved when particular aid is 
delivered before the need for it is established. 
     Although not widely recognised, or perhaps openly acknowledged, a few 
respondents talked about the benefits of aid, outside of fulfilling humanitarian 
needs. Some community members in Fiji talked about the virtual 
transformation of their island since Cyclone Ami in 2003, when more than half 
of the houses on the island were destroyed: 
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It’s a big thing that they have brought into this island is 
the houses that they have there. Without that I don’t think 
so that they can afford to have one (Fiji, female villager, 
aged 60+). 
     Similarly in Tonga, some community members talked about the housing aid 
‘beautifying the village’.  
     One aid organisation representative in Fiji described disasters as presenting 
governments with an opportunity to ‘score points with communities’. The ways 
in which this was seen to manifest itself were not elaborated upon, but are 
likely to include favouritism for certain communities in the prioritisation, 
timing, amount or type of aid provided. A Fijian government representative 
pointed to such behaviour as having occurred during Cyclone Ami in 2003, and 
there was some mention of this in newspaper reports at the time. 
6.2 Corruption/favouritism 
     Several distinguishing features of humanitarian assistance that make it 
vulnerable to corruption have been identified including: 
• Pressure to act quickly and be seen to be doing so; 
• Going to places such as disaster zones, where local or national 
infrastructure has been destroyed and 
• The rotation of senior staff because of the stressful nature of the work 
(Maxwell, Bailey, Harvey et al., 2012).  
     Similarly, where opportunity to influence decisions, the existence of 
obtainable benefits and the possibility of remaining undetected coincide, there 
is a risk of corruption. This risk is likely, especially in emergency situations 
where financial controls are relaxed to speed up the process, aid organisations 
have a pressure to spend their donations quickly, and there are new players in 
an unfamiliar setting (Schultz and Søreide, 2008).  
  
  134 
    There is a sense from all groups in this study that aid is not necessarily 
assigned and distributed according to need, and that not all aid makes it to the 
destination communities. Aid organisations recognised that corruption and 
favouritism do take place, in various forms - greed within the government, aid 
organisations favouring their own communities and helping those they know 
first. Monitoring and evaluation is weak, so it is difficult to distinguish 
between poor governance and actual corruption. Few aid organisations have 
the bureaucracy and systems in place to be able to track their donations, and 
even where those data do exist, they are rarely analysed. 
     From the perspective of the community, it is the government systems and 
employees at fault: 
He thinks that sometimes there’s a difference between 
the teams that come over and the information given back 
to the government (Fiji, male villager, aged 60+, through 
an interpreter) 
Like when the aid comes in, it doesn’t go straight to the 
certain place that it has to go to. Only half of it will go. 
The rest will be shared amongst themselves (Fiji, male 
villager, aged 60+) 
I think the government is the first aid for the cyclone. It’s 
not aid for… sometimes they have aid for another people 
or some people who have a lot of foods. But the poor 
people not have (Tonga, male villager aged 45-59). 
     While in Tonga some community members did question the integrity of the 
Red Cross, the focus of blame for corruption in both countries was on the 
government. There is a view within both communities that they would be better 
off if donors and aid organisations came directly to them, rather than going 
through the government. This may be similar to the situation for more easily 
accessible communities on the main islands in Fiji, although it seems that the 
islanders are not necessarily aware of the huge number of aid organisations 
working directly with those accessible communities (see Chapter 7).  
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The perception does seem to be about making the system fairer, rather than 
trying to get more aid per se. 
     With the mixed views within the community in Fiji about whether or not the 
current role and responsibilities of the turaga ni koro work well (see Chapter 
7), there are differing opinions on whether the turaga ni koro was a source of 
or potential answer to such corruption. Some blamed the turaga ni koro for 
being directly responsible for some of the corruption and favouritism, while 
others thought that the system would be more fair if the turaga ni koro was 
able to follow through the entire process, having a copy of assessment reports, 
and overseeing the allocation and distribution of aid. The longer the supply 
chain is, the more opportunity there is along the way for corruption, and it is 
those on outer islands for whom the chain is longest. 
     Another view of the sources of corruption and favouritism, and its 
consequences was provided by a government representative in Fiji: 
The dependency and the level of expectation has really 
increased over the years. I would say this is where also 
politics come into play as well. We've had disasters in 
the past where a lot of political parties came in and did 
their own relief supplies and whatever to gain political 
mileage. This has raised the level of expectation. We've 
had some disasters where cash was given. These are 
what previous governments did maybe to please the 
people, but now it has changed the mindset of the people 
(Fiji, government representative). 
     Reference to political parties distributing aid has been made elsewhere. 
Political influences in disaster aid decision-making have been established in 
both the United States of America (Stramp, 2013), and India (Cole, Healy and 
Werker, 2012). The political motives of the Tongan government response to 
Cyclone Ian have been questioned, with suggestions that relationships with 
New Zealand and China, and the timing of an election in Tonga within 12 
months of the cyclone, have all affected the Tongan government’s response 
(Brown Pulu, 2014).  
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     The impacts of this affect aid long before it has reached communities, 
especially on remote islands. Issues such as whether or not containers of aid 
are charged various types of transportation fees and taxes, which aid 
organisations are allowed to bid for aid funding, and when and to whom 
government-to-government requests for assistance are made (Brown Pulu, 
2014) will usually play out on the remote islands simply as more delays. 
6.3 Crime 
     Particularly in a developing country, when there is a sudden influx of 
money floating around, crime will follow. Disasters present a temporary boon 
for opportunistic crimes, and many examples were provided by aid 
organisations and government representatives. Community members stealing 
from flooded shops, shop owners selling damaged goods, aid distributors 
stealing aid, villagers stealing crops from neighbouring plantations, assaults, 
and even police stationed as security succumbing to temptation. There have 
been newspaper reports from previous cyclones in Fiji, of these types of crimes 
(e.g. Fiji Times, Saturday 18th January 2003, p3 and p34; Fiji Times, 
Wednesday 17th March 2010, p5; Fiji Times, Friday 19th Mach 2010, p5). This 
not only adds to the disaster itself, but takes police and other officials away 
from disaster relief work, to prevent and respond to crime. While sufficiently 
detailed crime statistics were not readily available to allow for verifying 
whether or not an increase in crime levels actually took place, authorities seem 
to be responding in kind regardless. 
     Security in Nadi after the March/April 2012 floods was high, with access to 
the town itself blocked by security officers. Aid organisations spoke of soldiers 
accompanying aid distributions to provide security for those distributions, and 
of people refusing to leave their homes during a disaster for fear of returning to 
find their home looted: 
I heard stories of a family in Nadi and the husband 
wouldn’t leave because he didn’t want the house to be 
looted, and he couldn’t swim. And in the end he was on a 
table with his chair on his table, and the water came up 
to about his chest. Then it went down again and he was 
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fine, but another four hours of rain and he may have died 
(Fiji, aid organisation representative). 
     The Governments spoke of communities making fraudulent claims for aid 
or dismantling houses to qualify. “It means that stealing is all over, at every 
level” (Fiji, aid organisation representative).  
     On the remote islands in Fiji and Tonga, people were generally much less 
forthcoming about crime and conflicts within their community after a disaster. 
Many people simply refused to talk about the issue, shutting that line of 
questioning down with an adamant - ‘I have never seen anything like that’. 
Some, however, did acknowledge rising levels of tension and aggression in the 
disaster aftermath, especially if expected food aid was late in arriving. It was 
agreed in Fiji that it was up to the turaga ni koro to act as peacekeeper, but that 
it was rare for tensions to spill over into physical aggression in their small, 
isolated community: “They don’t find any trouble, because if you want to make 
trouble here, where else can you go?” (Fiji, male villager, aged 35-45 years). 
     When outright theft was acknowledged, it was presented as opportunistic 
crime stemming from laziness rather than desperation: 
After the cyclone, those people they don’t plant food, 
they go and like a thief there, they go and pull out the 
food. That’s the worst thing (Fiji, female villager, aged 
35-45 years). 
     In Tonga, where acknowledged, it was considered not to be theft if the 
culprit owned up when asked, “they are forgiven because everyone is family 
anyway” (Tonga, female villager, aged 35-45 years). 
6.4 Prioritisation of aid 
     The theory of how aid is prioritised, and the reality of its distribution do not 
always meet. Government representatives confirmed that the National Disaster 
Management Office (NDMO) in Fiji gets information from the district and 
divisional offices about the needs in communities and evacuation centres. An 
initial damage assessment is done as soon as possible after the event, and this 
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determines immediate needs such as food aid. A detailed damaged assessment 
follows, for housing and infrastructure needs.  
    Aid organisations try to attend to the most affected areas first, and donors try 
to align their funding with existing programs to maximise efficiency and 
effectiveness. Some aid organisations in Fiji work outside the NDMO system, 
and prioritise their efforts based on their local areas, and reports in the media 
and from other aid organisations about where aid is being distributed. 
     No system is perfect, and in the chaos that inevitably ensues following 
extreme weather events that turn into disasters, with transport and 
communication disrupted and affected communities isolated, it is perhaps to be 
expected that there will often (or even always) be difficulties and mistakes 
made with the prioritisation of help. People on the island in Fiji talked about 
inconsistencies in the prioritisation and distribution of aid. Some people 
thought that everyone should receive the same aid, regardless of need. It was 
very difficult to tease out the exact reasons for this, given that there was also 
recognition that there should be a focus on those most in need. It seems that the 
idea of equality in aid is in response to the inequalities and perceived 
favouritism inherent in the current system, which is supposed to be needs based 
but does not always end up that way in practice: “That’s what I’m asking. If 
there is the same damage, why can’t they give the same to us?” (Fiji, male 
villager, aged 46-59 years). 
     There were examples provided by community members of inconsistency in 
the approach of the prioritisation and distribution of aid. This community had 
been through both Cyclone Ami in 2003, which devastated the island and 
Cyclone Tomas in 2010, in which a small number of houses were affected. The 
inconsistencies mentioned were in the receipt of both food aid and housing 
reconstruction assistance: 
Like on Ami, when they come in, they count each person 
who lives in the house and the total population. Then 
they divided the ration per head for each individual 
person. In Tomas, only the families were counted, they 
did not count how many people were in the family. They 
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just counted the families and then gave it out. So in most 
families there were a lot of people there, because the 
families were given the same amount of rations. So in a 
bigger family it was not enough (Fiji, male villager, aged 
46-59 years) 
Like when the government, they come and we can't 
change that, because the government has decided when 
they come into the community, we can't change it. 
Because the community knows what is happening, maybe 
that house was fully damaged and this one partly 
damaged. The partly damaged one, they give the full 
house, and the fully damaged one, they give the part 
house (Fiji, male villager, aged 46-59 years) 
     But within the island, there was no consensus on what would constitute a 
‘fair’ system. The three different viewpoints presented by various community 
members were for aid to be distributed according to need, equally per person, 
or such as in this example, equally per household: 
Some of them want more. Like if there are five tinned 
fish, and a big family is given three because there are so 
many of them, and the other family they have two. That is 
unfair to the others, when the cyclone, it came to 
everybody. So why three to them and two to us? So it's a 
bit unfair too. That’s how they are kind of greediness 
develops…It shouldn't be shared like more to the plenty 
people in the house. It should be shared equally amongst 
everybody (Fiji, female villager, aged 35-45 years). 
     The sentiment that aid should be given to everyone equally regardless of 
damage was echoed in Tonga, during a discussion about the provision of aid in 
the form of cooking utensils: 
Because we all live here, we all went through the 
cyclone, and whether your house is broken or not, we all 
feel sad in our heart. Aid giving something helps people 
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to feel a bit happier (Tonga, male villager, aged 35-45 
years). 
     This seemed to be making a clear distinction between housing aid and other 
types of aid. However, talking about housing aid specifically, it was clear that 
some of these ideas arose out of a frustration with the inconsistencies in their 
experience of aid from one cyclone to the next, and that tensions and conflict 
within the community result: 
And when the helps come, just help those who are, who 
have been their whole house has been blown away. And 
the ones who just the roof or just one to two tins blown 
away, sometimes they give the roof, sometimes they not. 
You know, some of them, they will feel sad (Fiji, female 
villager, aged 35-45 years) 
     There was a sense that distribution according to need is great in theory, but 
is not always translated into practice, and so simply allocating equally within 
the community would be fairer. From the perspective of the aid organisations 
though, this was about greed, not equality: 
When I'm looking at that, people are looking at the wants 
too, not the need. The completely destroyed one, that's a 
need. The partly is a want. My house is completely 
damaged, and that's a need for me. And her house is not, 
and she really wants her house too to be given the whole 
package, even though she didn't suffer as much. That's 
greediness (Fiji, aid organisation representative). 
     Rather than moving towards the system many members of the community 
seemed to be asking for, aid organisations extend the concept of ‘need’ from 
just an assessment of the damage sustained, to be inclusive of aspects of the 
resilience of the affected family: 
I also remember that after the floods, there were those 
who had received food bags, but they had a full time job 
and things. But there were those who were left out (Fiji, 
aid organisation representative). 
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     At the village level, where there is a clear expectation that everyone will 
help each other in the aftermath of a disaster, these types of resilience factors 
are likely to be viewed at a community, rather than individual, level. 
     From the perspective of the community, questions around prioritisation and 
distribution of aid link directly back to the issues of corruption and favouritism. 
While for the aid organisations and government, prioritisation of aid is usually 
about which communities to attend to first and for what aid, at the community 
level, it is about which families receive what aid. It almost felt as though the 
prioritisation of aid stops at the village level for the suppliers, but that is 
precisely when it begins in earnest for the individuals in that village.  
     Few villagers expressed recognition of the fact that aid is being delivered to 
an affected area usually much larger than just their island, either in terms of 
delays in getting aid arriving, or in the amount available. 
     In Tonga, there were fewer problems with inconsistencies in the distribution 
of aid, with a per person method used each time. However, there were issues 
not dissimilar to Fiji, around differences between what is seen to be needed and 
what is delivered: 
It will happen that it is not fair enough. Because they 
have a survey about how many people in your family and 
I say 10 people in my family. But when they write, only 
two or three. When they share the aid, share it for what 
they put in their paper, but not in the people who live in 
the home. That’s the main thing. Sometimes the people it 
is not fair to them (Tonga, female villager, aged 35-45). 
     These inconsistencies in receipt and allocation of aid impact upon 
expectations and perceptions of equity and fairness. A good example is 
provided in the responses on Druadrua Island in Fiji to Cyclones Ami and 
Tomas. 
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6.5 Differences between Ami and Tomas responses 
     Cyclones Ami in 2003 and Tomas in 2010 were very different events, with 
very different responses. Cyclone Ami devastated much of the Northern 
Division of Fiji, and Druadrua was considered one of the worst affected 
communities. More than half of all houses on the island were destroyed in that 
cyclone, and in one village there were only two houses remaining. The 
infrastructure damage to transport and communications systems was 
substantial, and impacted greatly on the response from the government and aid 
organisations’ perspective. The bureaucracy in place was slow and 
cumbersome and so was the response. The system was considered to be too 
centralised, with decisions made in Suva taking too long to filter down into 
action on the ground, issues which were reflected in several newspaper reports 
at the time (e.g. Fiji Times, Friday 17th January 2003, p2 and p6; Fiji Times, 
Saturday 18th January 2003, p3; Fiji Times, Saturday 19th March 2003, p2).  
     From the perspective of the community on the island, however, the response 
to Ami was unexpectedly prompt and generous. The Prime Minister’s 
helicopter landed on the school oval, and the attention of Fiji was firmly placed 
on Druadrua in the first couple of days after the event (e.g. Fiji Times, 
Wednesday 15th January 2003, p5; Fiji Times, Thursday 16th January 2003, p2; 
Fiji Times, Friday 17th January 2003, p3; Fiji Times, Sunday 19th January 
2003, whole front page and p3). The reasons for this are multiple. Firstly, the 
community was devastated. But perhaps more importantly, they were the only 
village to be able to communicate with DISMAC before all communication 
systems failed, and their message said that there were two children missing. It 
is not surprising that the response was swift and impressive.  
     This clearly set up expectations within the community, and several people 
expressed disappointment and frustration that the Prime Minister did not come 
to their island after Cyclone Tomas. This is despite the fact that Cyclone 
Tomas left only two families homeless on the island, and its more destructive 
impacts were felt elsewhere. When pushed, most (although not all) villagers 
conceded that they were not left in need after Cyclone Tomas, and that the 
difference in response was fair.  
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Most people on the island attributed the difference in response to the change in 
government rather than the impacts of the two events: 
He thinks that the Cyclone Tomas didn't do much 
damage, but still thinks that the ration was not enough 
compared to the damage that's been done. He thinks that 
it was the government, because of the changes in the 
government, changes in the way they look after that (Fiji, 
male villager, aged 46-59, through an interpreter). 
     Villagers spoke of their disappointment with both the aid provided after 
Tomas and the time it took to arrive. After experiencing aid turning up only a 
few days after Cyclone Ami, there was considerable frustration when less aid 
took two to three weeks to arrive after Cyclone Tomas. This has left a number 
of villagers with the impression that aid cannot be relied upon, and is 
inconsistent - that you do not know how long you will have to wait or what you 
will get, so you are better to be self-reliant. 
     This contrasts with the perspective of the aid organisations and government 
representatives, for whom the response to Tomas was vastly improved since 
the lessons of Ami were taken on board. They too attribute this partly to the 
change in government, but in a positive way: 
I'm taking off my hat as a civil servant- it will be two 
perspectives as I answer that question. If I am a villager, 
I will want the response to come quickly, so I'm loving 
how they are doing things. Within a short time, I've got 
my food, my needs with them. But from my side as 
wearing my hat as a civil servant - hey, that's not the way 
to do things, we need records (Fiji, government 
representative). 
The quote from this government representative highlights the 
difficulties in reconciling the expectations of the community with 
those of the government. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
     Most of the issues raised here are similar to those found in another study 
involving interviews with aid organisation representatives and communities, 
specifically about corruption in humanitarian assistance around the world. 
Maxwell and colleagues found preferential treatment in assessments and 
distribution and a lack of formal complaint mechanisms, as being common 
issues. Communities perceived the corruption as being a problem because it led 
to decreased access to aid and other resources. Aid workers saw also the 
potential impact on their future fundraising and programming capabilities 
(Maxwell et al., 2012).  
     The communities perceive themselves as relatively powerless, with the 
assessment teams making decisions and recording information that may not 
always reflect the villagers’ reality, and aid not always matching need. 
Particularly in Fiji, the lack of integration between the formal and informal 
systems contributes significantly to this, with the government seeing their 
responsibility for equity and fairness end at the island shore, where the 
informal systems take over. There seems to be a separation in the governance 
of the formal and informal systems, especially between the different levels, 
with the level furthest from the capital – the remote islands – lacking scrutiny 
and integration between the formal and informal systems. This is less of an 
issue in Tonga, with village committees and the greater involvement of the 
government and military in the distribution of aid. It is probably no 
coincidence that complaints from the villagers of inequities and favouritism 
were more evident in Fiji than Tonga.  
     Conversely, if the reported lack of crime after disasters on these islands is 
true, this seems representative of the positives of remoteness with stronger 
community bonds diminishing the need, motivations and opportunities for 
crime.  
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Chapter 7 - Governance and co-ordination 
     The governance arrangements in both Fiji and Tonga are multi-layered - 
with four to five layers from the national through to local level. In Fiji they are 
the national, divisional, provincial, district and village level. Alongside the 
formal structure, also sits the traditional structure for itaukei or Indigenous 
Fijians, which is almost, but not quite, parallel to the formal structure. In 
Tonga, there are national, district (or island groups), districts within the island 
groups (two layers confusingly both labelled district), and village levels. 
Sitting alongside this is the division between nobles and commoners, which is 
built-into the parliament, with some representative positions designated for 
nobles and others for popularly elected representatives.  
     In each country, villages have a government representative (see turaga ni 
koro/Town Officer role section in this chapter), as well as a traditional chief. In 
Fiji the Chief is the head of the dominant mataqali or clan, and in Tonga they 
are related to the relevant Noble for that village. The exception to this is the 
small proportion of villages in Tonga that are government rather than Noble 
controlled. The co-existence of the traditional and formal governance 
structures is complex, although more so in Fiji where there are more layers, 
than in Tonga where roles seem to be more clearly defined.  
     Even within the formal governance structure, at first glance, there seem to 
be too many layers of government for the given population sizes of these small 
countries. However, they are not geographically small, and it is the sheer 
number and spread of inhabited islands (see section 1.2, Fiji and Tonga) that 
necessitates and makes sense of the multi-layered approach. The formal 
governance structure needs to be able to co-ordinate groups of islands within 
the country. 
     Governance in small island states has been found to be weak and urban 
biased, with central governments often failing to reach the peripheries or outer 
islands (Connell, 2010). On the more remote islands in the Pacific, traditional 
governance tends to dominate (Nunn et al., 2014).  
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     This traditional governance may be a barrier or enabler of change, 
depending on how it is used, and how it interacts with the formal governance 
system. In the Pacific, it has been found to be a barrier to effective climate 
change adaptation with a lack of awareness of climate change in the key 
decision makers, the traditional structures not lending themselves to external 
influence or advice, and religious beliefs discouraging longer term thinking and 
anticipatory responses to climate change (Nunn et al., 2014). Small island 
communities are often under-resourced and over-committed to immediate 
concerns, which renders strategic long-term thinking secondary (Lane, Mercer 
Clarke, Forbes et al., 2013).  
     This chapter looks at the governance of the disaster management systems in 
Fiji and Tonga, and the co-ordination of aid. 
7.1 National Disaster Committees 
     DISMAC is the common term for the Disaster Management Committee in 
Fiji. This is the committee responsible for co-ordination of disaster response. 
There is an official list of members written into the Disaster Management Act 
1995. However, the operationalisation of DISMAC does not always work 
according to the Act, and appears inconsistent and non-transparent. There is no 
general agreement on who members of DISMAC are, and aid organisations 
spoke of ‘sometimes’ being invited to meetings. The number of aid 
organisations has increased since 1995, and some who consider themselves 
members of DISMAC were not even doing disaster response when the official 
membership list was drawn up. 
     Similarly in Tonga, the running of the equivalent committee - the National 
Emergency Management Committee (NEMC) is not always according to the 
legislation and standard operating procedures. This results in a lack of clarity in 
the chain of command, and a less coordinated response. Aid organisations are 
not sitting members of the committee, but a government representative said 
they were ‘normally invited’. The Red Cross until a couple of years ago were 
routinely invited to meetings, but this recently ended. There are a number of 
committees (including the NEMC and a National Emergency Operating 
Committee (NEOC)), with broadly similar membership.  
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     In practice, this can mean that the extra members of the second committee 
miss out on what becomes assumed knowledge among those who sit on both. 
Once the NEMC is activated, a Controller is appointed to run the operations. 
This position is not designated, but decided each time. This is convenient in 
terms of not relying on one person alone, but possibly not an advantage in 
terms of the smooth running of the emergency response. 
7.2 Governance  
     The basic governance of the post-disaster aid system in Fiji and Tonga is 
very similar. Following a hazard event, an initial assessment of damage is 
completed and reported to the relevant disaster management committee. At 
around the same time, aid organisations such as the Red Cross are likely to do 
their own assessments of immediate needs and provide non-food aid. The 
initial damage assessment is then used to inform the allocation of food aid. A 
second, more detailed damage assessment is completed later by the 
government, which will then be used as the basis for allocation of 
infrastructure and housing aid. 
     The contrast in the perceptions and views of the community and the 
government in Fiji in relation to issues of governance and co-ordination of 
disaster response was significant. For the government, the biggest concerns 
were around information management and the co-ordination of aid 
organisations. Where aid organisations work outside the DISMAC system and 
do not co-ordinate with government, keeping District and Divisional 
Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) informed of where they are distributing 
what aid, the task of prioritisation of aid and ensuring that all needs are met 
becomes very difficult. Effort and resources are duplicated leading to wastage, 
while other communities miss out or have their aid delayed. Responses that 
were thought to have worked well were those where there was more 
information sharing and co-ordination between agencies: 
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Each of the agencies are getting their information through 
their own sources, but when we come together as one 
group, we are able to give a detailed briefing of what is 
happening in the division, what is the national response 
like, what are the needs in the communities and then we 
prioritise. I think that was one of the strengths that we did 
in Tomas. It was the synergy, the co-ordination. This 
enabled us to do our responses more efficiently and 
effectively (Fiji, government representative) 
     From the point of view of the remote island community interviewed in Fiji, 
having aid come directly from aid organisations, without the involvement of 
government would be an improvement. They perceive that aid would be 
delivered more quickly and more fairly than in the current system. Many of the 
newer aid organisations, which are often the ones working in isolation from the 
government and DISMAC system, have moved into the disaster response space 
reflecting the frustrations and concerns of communities who view government 
aid as being slow: 
Government has got what is called immediate responses 
at the height, and then after that we wait on assessments. 
It's usually during that period when people are uneasy, 
when people are demanding. We are talking about 
taxpayers money here. There has to be some assessment 
made and then government has to provide the relevant, 
appropriate funding. I think it's this lack of 
understanding of the systems and processes involved that 
frustrates people more (Fiji, government representative). 
     The problems created when the number of aid organisations increases and 
the information flow does not necessarily follow, were recognised even by one 
of these newer players. When donors and aid organisations assume they know 
what the needs of the communities are, rather than waiting to ask and find out 
about each particular community, waste results. 
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     The perceived inequalities in aid that is delivered through government was 
just as significant for the community on the island as the delays (see Chapter 
6). Aid being directly received from the aid organisations was the suggested 
solution to this problem - “because when it comes back from the aid to the 
government, that’s where the help is not fair” (Fiji, female villager, aged 35-45 
years).  
     Currently in Fiji there is an increasing number of aid organisations doing 
exactly what is being asked for here – bypassing government and delivering 
aid directly to the community on the main islands. The view of this community 
seems to clearly reflect an isolated island, rather than a community on the main 
islands. With few aid organisations ever travelling to remote communities, and 
certainly not the ones who are operating in isolation from the government, 
isolated islands have little or no experience of the main islands’ race to be the 
first and resulting duplication and waste (see section 7.3, co-ordination issues). 
Where duplication and waste occur on the remote islands, it is more likely to 
arise from the distribution system and local governance than co-ordination and 
national governance issues. 
      At both the aid organisation and community levels there was a lack of 
clarity around exactly what the governance and structural processes were for 
disaster response. While government representatives said that everything was 
very clear and laid out in legislation, this was from 1995, and a number of 
agencies that viewed themselves as being included in the structures and 
DISMAC, were not in operation in Fiji when the legislation was written.  
Fiji doesn't really have a structure that you can look up 
to see how it all works, it's all in the mind of the key 
players because it's, the structure that's in writing is 
outdated, and the structure that they are operating on is 
not written down. But it's understood by a number of 
people in key positions because they've had so many 
floods and cyclones lately (Fiji, aid organisation 
representative) 
  150 
     The structure is complicated with so many levels of players involved, 
especially in Fiji where regional organisations are all represented. There is the 
household or village level (e.g. individuals donating to particular families from 
having viewed media articles); local (e.g. resorts cooking and distributing 
meals to the local villages), district level (e.g. aid organisations working in 
their local area); divisional (often the focus of a disaster where its affects are 
mainly within one division, which is similar to a state or territory in Australia); 
national (e.g. NDMO) and regional (e.g. United Nations Agencies, 
international donors).While not all the players listed in the examples above are 
or necessarily should be part of the formal structure, they all directly impact 
the disaster response and co-ordination task in various ways. This means there 
are issues of integration - a lot of stepping on each other’s toes and territory.  
     The differences between the paper version of the structure and processes 
and the in practice version were stark. There are multiple agencies that try to 
take on the role of co-ordinating aid organisations, to more or less formal 
degrees. Inevitably, that results in multiple groups of aid organisations, each 
with different co-ordinating bodies, and no central repository of information 
and co-ordination. Some will have better links with the NDMO than others. 
Some make more attempts to keep DISMAC informed than others. Some co-
ordinating bodies see it as their role to liaise with DISMAC, others rely on 
having a number of their aid organisations doing that for them and passing on 
information.  
     Perceptions of control and status are important. Being seen to be doing 
something and responding after a disaster is critical to government, and so it 
follows that they would not want to be seen to be losing too much control over 
the responses. However, the “hero factor” is also great public relations for 
organisations interested in growing their membership (e.g. church based 
organisations), or profits (e.g. companies and businesses), and competing for 
funding (aid organisations). So there may be little motivation for some of the 
aid organisations to better coordinate with DISMAC and the NDMO, if they 
see that as a threat to achieving some of their goals in doing disaster response.  
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Having their response slowed down by linking into the bureaucracy may well 
threaten a goal of disaster response as a public relations exercise, even if the 
humanitarian goals are better achieved in this way.  
     Even among aid organisations with no obvious ulterior motives in doing 
disaster response, the history of fraud and corruption around aid has led to 
suspicions that for example, not all aid delivered to the affected areas is 
actually distributed to affected communities. For reasons such as these, 
working independently of the government is seen to have merits. Some smaller 
aid organisations talked about linking in with DISMAC and the government 
mainly for logistical reasons such as the cost of freight (see section 7.3, co-
ordination issues for a more complete discussion of these issues). 
     An interesting insight into what perhaps lies ahead with more frequent 
disasters was provided in early 2012 with flooding in Fiji. In January 2012, 
large areas around Nadi in Fiji were flooded following heavy rains. In 
March/April that same year, there was a second round of flooding, over a 
larger area, but incorporating the entire area flooded earlier in January.  
     Most aid organisations involved agreed that the response for the second 
event was better than the first: 
So what I thought was interesting was that when the first 
thing happened in January, which was a lot smaller I 
think, there was, you could see that there was nothing in 
place except for in certain sectors like health...But then 
when the 30 March floods happened, those systems were 
basically still in place, at least in people's minds, so it 
was just a matter of standing it up again...So in that 
respect I think the smaller floods in January were 
probably a blessing in disguise for the bigger floods in 
March-April (Fiji, aid organisation representative) 
     Aid organisations reported better organisation and co-ordination of the 
response to the second event, with more consistent information and more 
reliable assistance provided. When the second event occurred, the response to 
the first event was not yet completed. Detailed damage assessments were yet to 
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be done, and the humanitarian assistance was only just wrapping up. Rather 
than descending into chaos however, the system showed itself to be flexible 
and responsive, and with the mechanisms and relationships already in place 
from the first event, the response to the second event was faster and improved.  
     In the 2012 Nadi floods, there were still, however, reports of complaints 
from the public that the Red Cross had received enormous amounts of donor 
support, and were not seen to be doing enough with it (Fiji, aid organisation 
representatives). Some aid organisations, not directly involved in the 2012 
flood response, also questioned the use of the funds donated to the Prime 
Minister’s Flood Relief fund. It is not clear whether these concerns are 
legitimate or not, and thus whether this problem is one of mismanagement, 
corruption or poor public relations. The complaints about both the government 
and the Red Cross speak to an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. 
     In Tonga, where the co-ordination of a proliferation of aid organisations is 
not such a problem, the governance and co-ordination issues are slightly 
different. Similarly to Fiji, the community in Tonga wanted aid to come 
directly from the aid organisations rather than going through government. 
Again this was the suggested answer to perceived inequities, favouritism and 
delays in government response. The aid organisations also noted that the 
formal processes and protocols in Tonga take too long, resulting in donors and 
aid organisations often trying to bypass the systems.  
     The biggest issues raised in Tonga however, were the lack of information 
flow (noted by the communities), the lack of clarity around governance 
processes (by the aid organisations) and the lack of district level co-ordination 
and decision-making power (by the government).  
     For the community, specifically in ‘Uiha village, significant frustrations 
surrounded the issue of housing aid following flooding from recent cyclones. 
They said that surveys were done, and assessments of need made, but then no 
response was ever received from the government regarding if and when 
assistance in making repairs to housing would be received. Aid organisations 
confirmed this, saying that after the flooding, there were rumours about 
assistance but no formal response from the government. Government 
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representatives said that donor funding was applied for but not approved for 
those housing repairs. However, communication of this was lacking. Indeed for 
the community, it seemed as though it was this uncertainty that was more 
frustrating than not receiving aid: 
It took a month and they just came with food, and after 
that they do the research and they just go and go… they 
thought they were going to help out with aid of housing 
and stuff… they thought they were going to get the help, 
but there was nothing… they never knew (why) (Tonga, 
female villager, aged 35-45 years). 
There is widespread recognition amongst community members that housing aid 
(indeed all aid) is very much donor dependent, but the lack of communication 
from the government caused great concern. Some people lived with others for 
over six months waiting for aid that never came, until they gave up and did it 
themselves. Reminiscent of the attitude to whether or not a financial 
contribution should be made to housing aid, the majority of community 
members seemed to be saying - we just want to know what’s happening. 
     Aid organisations and government representatives in Tonga spoke of 
extensive delays and difficulties surrounding decision-making hierarchies and 
processes during disaster responses. This has led to simple things not 
happening in good time, or not happening at all, such as the writing of daily 
situation reports, or the loading and departure of boats with aid. Sometimes 
there is only one person who is authorised to approve things, damage assessors 
are usually sent from Tongatapu rather than using local government 
representatives, and at the district level, there is no formal structure for aid 
organisations to link in with or through which decisions can be made. 
     There is a cultural deference to elders and authority in Tonga that penetrates 
through to disaster response processes. This means that sometimes decision 
makers may be reluctant to take advice and those with the relevant knowledge 
may be reluctant to offer it. The structure and processes, and issues around 
their operation constrain the ability of NEMO and aid organisations to respond 
to disasters. 
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     All of these issues lead to delays and frustrations for everyone involved, 
which then results in people trying to go outside the system to get things done.  
7.3 Co-ordination issues 
     In Fiji there are increasing numbers of organisations entering the disaster 
aid arena for a number of interrelated reasons, resulting in the lack of co-
ordination of aid provided. These ‘non-traditional’ aid organisations include 
for example, civil society organisations and faith-based organisations 
expanding their aid work to include disaster response, and corporations 
establishing aid and disaster response sections of their business. This issue was 
one of the most common concerns mentioned in interviews with aid 
organisations and government representatives. 
     Many people said that there has been an increase in the frequency and 
intensity of natural disasters in Fiji in a noted change from the past. This has 
inevitably meant that there is more concern in the community as more places 
are affected more often. Combined with this has been scrutiny of the responses 
with the greater opportunities presented by the number of events and increased 
media attention. This has laid the foundation for changes in the system, as has 
been the case in many countries around the world experiencing similar extreme 
weather events. The history and political turmoil in Fiji over the past decade 
has added specific context and complexity to this foundation. Two main factors 
have led to an increase in the number of organisations providing humanitarian 
aid after a disaster. Firstly, since the 2006 military coup, there has been a trend 
towards donor countries providing money and support directly to aid 
organisations, rather than always channelling funding through the government: 
A lot of change have come about at the international 
level when the political situation in here was such, and 
this, from my experience have turned a lot of things. 
Because like Australia and New Zealand won't want to 
donate directly through bilateral things, so they go 
through NGOs. That was one thing that have increased 
the number of NGOs in Fiji (Fiji, government 
representative) 
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     Donor agencies confirmed that they actively provide funding to aid 
organisations directly, not just through the government: 
FRANZ (France, Australia and New Zealand alliance) is 
usually one of the first mechanisms to offer humanitarian 
response, to help Fiji. Note there that I said Fiji as 
opposed to just the government of Fiji, so it can include 
communities in Fiji or NGOs in Fiji. It's not just fixed to 
one specific point (Fiji, aid organisation representative). 
     Another factor that may be related to the political situation in Fiji is the 
perception among aid organisations and the community that aid after a disaster 
has been both too slow and liable to corruption, such that the government may 
not be the best provider of aid. Add to these issues the public relations gain to 
be made in being seen to be providing humanitarian aid after a disaster, the 
opportunities for which continue to increase with modern media, and it is not 
difficult to imagine how and why there have been so many new players in the 
disaster aid business in Fiji. 
     Given this basis, the motivations of the organisations may to some extent 
determine how they go about their aid provision. For larger organisations and 
those that have a longer term view and are involved in development work in 
the country as well, the benefits of being part of the DISMAC system and 
linking in with government and other aid organisations may be clear. Your aid 
is able to be part of a coordinated response, and by tapping into the information 
available to the District and Divisional Emergency Management Operating 
Committees (EMOCs) through DISMAC, you are able to be part of a whole 
system addressing the needs of the affected communities. For smaller 
organisations without funding or logistics for freight and transportation of aid 
out of their local area, linking into the DISMAC system makes sense as a way 
of being able to provide aid all over the country.  
     Even so, there are other situations where it is possible to see fewer 
advantages in linking into the ‘system’, and distinct advantages in opting out of 
it. For smaller organisations working in a localised area, where a disaster 
affects communities with whom they have existing relationships, it makes 
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sense to provide aid directly to those communities, as quickly and efficiently as 
possible. Liaison with DISMAC in these situations may be mostly or only to 
the benefit of the broader response rather than the aid organisation itself. 
DISMAC would gain information about what the organisation is doing and 
where, but when the organisation is already receiving their information directly 
from the community, it is hard to see what immediate benefit they would 
derive from making the effort to liaise with DISMAC.  
     Larger organisations with their own infrastructure and funding may not 
need government logistical and transportation assistance. Where the provision 
of aid is peripheral to their daily business, the motivations for providing aid 
may be more about responding to perceptions of the lateness of government aid 
distribution, and the public relations boon to be gained by being seen to fill this 
‘gap’, than about actually fulfilling the needs of the communities after a 
disaster, and promoting resilience and disaster risk reduction in the longer 
term. This means that the other key advantage of linking into the formal 
DISMAC system: that of information, may not be all that attractive either. One 
aid organisation said that they rely on a combination of local aid partners and 
the media for their information about where aid is needed.  
     Another potentially crucial factor is that for some of the newer aid 
organisations, post-disaster aid is peripheral to their daily business. Outside of 
a disaster, there is no one working on the aid program. During a disaster 
response, there is little time for strategic direction and thinking, and outside 
response time, there is no one with the responsibility or time for this, because 
everyone has returned to their ‘real jobs’. Staff are given financial incentives to 
be involved in disaster responses, but there are no positions dedicated to the 
program. 
     The net result of this is a complex system of players, big and small, with 
multiple motivations for being in the aid distribution field, not all of which 
include disaster risk reduction or community resilience. This smorgasboard of 
players link into the formal disaster response system to greater or lesser 
degrees.  
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     As one aid organisation representative pointed out, there is a big difference 
between contacting DISMAC once to say - this is what we are doing - and 
being in regular contact, keeping them informed of your movements and work 
throughout the response period. The situation creates logistical difficulties for 
the body with overarching responsibility for the response and the welfare of the 
Fijian people - the government: 
One of the issues that arise out of this non-co-ordination, 
is people are thinking that there is only one group that is 
being targeted. Because some NGOs, some other players 
are saying - we are going to this particular group. So 
some others are looking and are saying - this is unfair, 
all these complaints. That is why we need to coordinate, 
so that people are again treated equally and fairly and 
with respect (Fiji, government representative). 
     The bigger donor agencies, such as the Australian and New Zealand 
governments, have ‘clear expectations’ that their funding recipients will work 
with the government and formal disaster response system. However, others do 
not see that as part of their role, and simply leave it up to the discretion of the 
aid organisation.  
     Everyone agreed that this current situation leads to duplication, waste and 
some communities missing out: 
There are still some places that do get missed out and we 
hear about that later. There are some areas that are 
complaining that the food did not come to them, and 
there are some areas where they've received two packs 
from two different NGOs. There are some NGOs that 
don't follow the NDMO system and the district and 
divisional EMOCs, and they just go ahead and distribute 
wherever they feel like they want to distribute.  
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Because Fijian people are sometimes opportunistic, so 
they'd receive the pack from the NGO that comes in first 
and if no-one's alerted that they've received packs from 
other places, then we'd probably be doing distribution 
when they've already received. And usually they wouldn't 
tell (Fiji, aid organisation representative) 
However, rather than there just being some players working outside the system, 
there is a perception among some of a number of different systems operating 
simultaneously in Fiji: 
There’s a lot of disaster response programs coming out 
in Fiji. There is the government and there are other 
NGOs coming out with their own distribution systems. I 
don't know if maybe it could be an initiative of 
government to try to bring in all these coordinating 
bodies and try and form a national coordinating 
committee. Instead of us all working separately and most 
of the time we're duplicating and it's a waste of the 
resources we have. I know that in the two floods, we tried 
not to go where the government aids were going because 
that would just be a waste (Fiji, aid organisation 
representative). 
     A national coordinating committee such as the one referred to here already 
exists (DISMAC), but some aid organisations do not feel in any way connected 
to it. It is noteworthy that in this quote, it is up to the government to try to 
increase co-ordination. The government has no authority to direct aid 
organisations, and so even when there is close collaboration, the government 
may only provide information and advice. 
     Some aid organisations though, do recognise the centrality of the role and 
position of the government: 
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Responding to the needs of the people in this country is 
the primary responsibility of the government of Fiji. And 
I think that’s a very bold and simple statement about 
where everybody else should be (Fiji, aid organisation 
representative). 
     The repercussions of being ultimately responsible for the welfare of the 
people, including the provision of aid to communities following a disaster, was 
not lost on the government representatives. They understandably feel frustrated 
with being the recipients of complaints about issues that are to a certain extent 
beyond their control when aid organisations are working in isolation. 
     The implications of the current situation go beyond the problems created for 
government in the co-ordination of aid, and also impacts on the actual aid 
provided - how it is distributed and whether or not it meets the needs of the 
affected communities. The more experienced aid organisation representatives 
agreed that relationships were crucial in humanitarian aid provision: 
But you have to be - you don't only build relationships 
with the people you are assisting to make sure that the 
assistance is in accordance with that they need. You also 
have to build relationships with the people who are 
providing the mechanisms from which you are getting 
the assistance out to the community…The more partners 
that are in the field, the more education and the more 
relationships that will need to be built. At some point 
there needs to be control over the quality and standard 
of relief that is given. Otherwise this can be a very 
lucrative business (Fiji, aid organisation representative). 
     One aid organisation spoke of the expectations by governments of aid 
organisations being sometimes unrealistic, because the government wants to 
control everything and to be seen to be doing it all. One of the organisations 
new at disaster relief said that it is difficult to form partnerships with other aid 
organisations and the government because they do not want to have to wait 
around for the bureaucracy and assessments from the government.  
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But from the government perspective, where aid organisations go into 
whichever community they wish, it will not necessarily be the case that those 
in the greatest need are attended to first.  
     The Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT) has been set up in part to try to 
resolve some of these co-ordination issues. With the United National Office of 
the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) as the central agency, 
the PHT has Clusters (e.g. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene; Health and 
Nutrition; Protection), designed to co-ordinate non-government organisations 
in the Pacific, and to assist and supplement the existing government disaster 
management arrangements. However, it seems that there is some resistance to 
this arrangement, and not all aid organisations, particularly local ones, are 
linked into the PHT Cluster system, which operates regionally in the Pacific. 
There was a perception from some aid organisations that the UN bureaucracy 
is slow and cumbersome, which impacts on the performance of the PHT. It was 
also suggested to me that donor agencies may be in a stronger position to 
influence aid organisations, and are a more natural fit for such a co-ordinating 
role. The reality is that PHT is one of several bodies attempting to form an 
umbrella over the aid organisations, and within the PHT, some Clusters operate 
more successfully than others. Co-ordination is then required between these 
umbrella bodies, creating yet more complexity to the system. 
     A proposed government initiative is to draw up signed agreements with aid 
organisations during disaster management. It is difficult to see though, how this 
would prevent others working outside the system. Once you include 
individuals as well, responding to media reports and donating directly to 
individual families or communities, it becomes clear that it is nigh on 
impossible to have all players working within the formal system. Instead, 
perhaps the goal should be to make working outside the system either more 
effective or less attractive. 
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     In Tonga, the issues of co-ordination with aid organisations are not as 
difficult. Firstly, there are far fewer aid organisations operating in Tonga, 
making it easier for the government to know who is going where. Secondly, 
there are not the same trust issues for donors, with donating through 
government seen as less problematic. However, there are definitely trust issues 
between the government and the aid organisations: 
There are not that many organisations here in Tonga 
that would cause that kind of chaos. We only have just 
enough where the government can control, so I think 
Tonga is not like Fiji. We do not have that many NGOs 
to come in. Because I’m sure the NGO leaders they have 
some money out of this, so they get paid on the side. 
That’s why they do it, because they get paid. We have to 
be careful to make sure that we have the NGOs who has 
the right intention. So that the purpose of why we should 
accept NGO, we have to measure their intentions, to 
make sure the fund goes down to the people, not to come 
to the NGOs. That is something we have to be careful of. 
Of course the NGO people should have some kind of 
payment, but not to eat up all the funding (Tonga, 
government representative). 
     Tensions between the aid organisations and government have been evident 
in the response to Cyclone Ian in Tonga. The Red Cross were one of four aid 
organisations providing housing aid, until the government stopped the building. 
The reasons for this are not clear, with a news article providing the official 
reasoning that the quality of the housing was unsure, and that the houses were 
designed to be temporary, and the government considered this wasteful since 
they would be re-building permanent homes there anyway (Fonua, 2014). 
However, there were suggestions from the community that it was because the 
government was annoyed that the Red Cross had dealt directly with them, 
rather than going through the government. In either case, there are clearly 
issues of co-ordination and governance negatively affecting the response, 
creating delays and uncertainty for the communities. 
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7.4 Turaga ni koro/Town Officer role 
     The turaga ni koro and Town Officer roles are important in the disaster 
responses to remote islands in Fiji and Tonga, because of the powerful position 
they hold as liaison between the villages and government. The turaga ni koro 
in Fiji is the government representative elected from within villages, as distinct 
from the traditional leader, the village Chief (or turaga ni vanua). The 
traditional Chief is usually the more powerful within the village. However, the 
turaga ni koro has a direct connection to the government. The role is given a 
lot of power - a point agreed by all groups in this study. A government 
representative described the turaga ni koros as “the eyes and the ears of 
government in their respective areas”.  
     Descriptions from each group of the role included spreading the warning 
throughout the village, communicating with DISMAC about damage after a 
cyclone, distributing aid, getting the community together to organise cleaning 
up and other jobs in the village, making sure that everyone is helping, and 
preventing any trouble or conflict between villagers. The power of the role has 
been increased since 2010 with the initial damage assessments following a 
disaster now being the responsibility of the turaga ni koro. Community 
members on the island very clearly articulated the idea that the turaga ni koro 
is the exclusive liaison between the village and the government:  
You know the Commissioner, they ask us, ‘who’s 
talking? Oh, OK, the turaga ni koro from Delaidvadra. 
OK then, talk’. Otherwise no (Fiji, male villager, aged 
46-59 years). 
     With this exclusive access to the government, the turaga ni koro role was 
described by one villager as “the door to the government and the aids there” 
(Fiji, female villager, aged 35-45 years).  
     While all groups agreed on the power of this role, there was less agreement 
on whether or not this works. Having only the one person with whom the 
power and control rests has multiple impacts in terms of whether or not they 
fulfil their duties, and how equitable they are in doing so. There was a 
recognition within the community that if the person in the role is not proactive, 
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then “the village will suffer”. For example, there was no consensus in the 
community on the process of getting DISMAC’s assistance after a disaster. 
While all community members agreed that the turaga ni koro was crucial, 
some thought the turaga ni koro should make a report to DISMAC, while 
others thought that DISMAC would come to them. This may have been a 
function of the increased involvement since 2010 of the turaga ni koro in the 
initial damage assessment, however, the current turaga ni koro was one of 
those who thought that DISMAC would just turn up. Combined with the 
perspective of one villager that if the government do not hear from a village 
they just assume that everything is okay, there is some cause for concern. 
     The equity and fairness of turaga ni koros was called into question by both 
aid organisations and community members, and to a certain extent recognised 
also by government. Aid organisations recognised that the distribution of aid is 
not always fair, with some people being favoured and others getting none. 
Villagers described a lack of consistency in how food aid was distributed with 
per household after one event, and per person after another. There is a definite 
perception that while DISMAC may decide how many houses need to be 
rebuilt, it is the turaga ni koro who decides who they should go to. The 
checking done later by government officials is based purely on the number of 
houses, not whether or not everyone is adequately housed. Through this 
system, some people have ended up with two houses, and others have been left 
off the list and had to argue their case with the government over a period of 
years. On a remote island, there are few outsiders around to see this occurring. 
     While there was some recognition by government representatives that 
turaga ni koros may not always be fair, there was definitely no responsibility 
taken for that situation and its results for individual villagers: 
So what we do, we deliver the 100kg bag. We give the 
turaga ni koro- this is the 100kg bag rations. So the 
turaga ni koro has to work it out - how much has to be 
distributed to this family, to that family. The turaga ni 
koro's responsibility comes in there. If he distributed it 
unfairly, that's his call (Fiji, government representative). 
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     One consequence of the fact that the position is elected from within a 
community and retains exclusive access to the government, is that there is no 
one for the community to complain to when there is perceived inequity or 
corruption by the turaga ni koro. I was told that complaints to the government 
would be met with - “speak to your turaga ni koro about it”. Within the 
community some people said the answer would be to elect a new person to the 
position. However, it seems that the reality of the situation may not always 
allow for this simple solution. Villages are often small. There were only about 
150-200 people between the two villages on this island. With many traditional 
communities not recognising women as being eligible for the role, the pool of 
available adult males who are considered to be respected and capable may be 
quite limited. In practice there may be more a sense of sharing the role around 
and giving different people a turn, than necessarily having a selection from 
which to choose the best person for the job each time. 
     The power relationships are clearly complex in the villages, with the turaga 
ni koro and the traditional hierarchy (see Dumaru (2010) for a more detailed 
explanation of Fijian village hierarchies). A number of people in the 
community suggested that there should be a committee rather than the one 
person responsible for so much. Such a committee may include the turaga ni 
koro, the village Chief, the heads of each mataqali (similar to a clan) 
represented in the village, and the Pastors. One of the elders within the 
community said that such a committee used to exist, and the Pacific 
Community-focused Integrated Disaster Risk Reduction (PCIDRR) Project has 
been working since 2008 to establish disaster committees in every village in 
Fiji. However, unless the official bureaucratic policy of only recognising the 
turaga ni koro also changes, ultimately, control will be retained by the 
individual in that position.  
     The whole issue of the power of the turaga ni koro position was not 
significant for either aid organisations or the government, but was fundamental 
in most community interviews. This seems to be representative of the 
disconnect between the village level and the higher levels of the disaster 
response system.  
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     The community in Tonga provides an interesting point of comparison, since 
in both villages there was in place the very type of committee the Fijian 
community were asking for. These village disaster committees are being 
established also as part of the PCIDRR project. With so many fewer villages in 
Tonga than in Fiji, the process is covering the population more quickly.  
     The position of Town Officer (TO) in Tonga is equivalent to the Fijian 
turaga ni koro, in being the community elected government representative. The 
role of the TO is similar to the turaga ni koro during a disaster in that they 
make a report to the government of damages in their community and then 
distribute aid to the community. Also similar to Fiji, not everyone in the 
community thinks this system is good or that the TO is always fair. Some 
suggested that aid should be distributed directly to households, bypassing the 
TO. However, overall the role was mentioned by community members as a 
source of concern and conflict much less often in Tonga than in Fiji. This may 
have been because the individuals in those positions at the time of my research 
were more respected in Tonga than in Fiji, since many of the Fijians noted that 
“it all depends who the turaga ni koro is”. The fact that there is a village 
disaster committee in place to assist the TO in their duties may also be 
relevant.  
     The fact of having a village disaster committee in place does not guarantee 
anything, as was exemplified in the two Tongan villages. Both had a disaster 
committee in place, but with very different experiences. In Falemea village, the 
committee was established and then no further activity took place. The 
committee is not active, and was scarcely mentioned by the community 
members unless I specifically asked about it. The Falemea committee did not 
seem to really know what their role or purpose was, and lacked initiative to 
turn the opportunity into action: 
Only tell us we are a committee, but they don’t use 
us…that’s the last time we can meet with them from last 
year to this year, because the government not work 
together with us…only we have to waiting for them. If 
they can call us, so we can work and they tell us what 
we’re going to do (Tonga, male villager aged 35-45). 
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     A fundamental problem with introducing the village disaster committees to 
a community was summed up by one villager, “there is nothing to encourage 
them or empower them to do this. They will not do it”(Tonga, male villager 
aged 46-59 years). This problem was recognised by the aid organisations that 
acknowledged projects are unlikely to be successful unless there is continued 
contact with the community, who “only take notice when you are there” 
(Tonga, aid organisation representative). But where a project is operating in 
every village in the country, keeping in touch with each community to maintain 
training and motivation is immensely difficult.  
     Even in the other village, ‘Uiha, where the committee was more widely 
recognised and active, there was disagreement about how successful it is. 
There is a view from some community members that the committee is much 
better than having only the TO, and that they were very helpful in the cyclone 
in 2012, giving people advice about how to prepare. However, others see a lack 
of appropriate training for the committee members, and view the committee as 
a missed opportunity because highly functioning committees are likely to build 
trust and attract donor funding for projects.  
     The village disaster committees in Tonga have the potential to establish and 
maintain important networks for disaster management, but this potential may 
not be realised at the moment. There is an opportunity here for the building of 
social capital, linking the villages and the local government. Given the 
importance of social capital in disaster response (see Chapter 9 - issues of 
remoteness), the good work begun in establishing the committees needs to 
continue. 
7.5 Conclusion 
     Governance and co-ordination issues are central to the effectiveness and 
fairness of the disaster response systems in both Fiji and Tonga. In Fiji, major 
obstacles are presented by the sheer number of parties involved in disaster 
response, with the established aid organisations being joined by corporations 
seeing the public relations value of distributing aid, new and local aid 
organisations that appear after big disasters, communities and individuals, both 
nationally and internationally. The government remains ultimately responsible 
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for the provision of disaster relief and ensuring the welfare of their citizens, but 
they have no power or control over the other parties involved. This adds 
complexity to the organisation and prioritisation of aid.  
     In Tonga, there are fewer players involved and consequently, governance 
and co-ordination issues are less problematic than in Fiji. Governance issues in 
Tonga are more concerned with the lack of clarity of governance processes and 
not having a formalised structure at the district level. This leads to confusion 
about who the decision makers are, who has what authority and power, and the 
flow of information between the levels. Traditional power structures are often 
relied upon rather than the formal, documented governance structure. 
     The concerns around governance and co-ordination may, however, be 
viewed positively from the perspective of resilience and adaptive governance. 
The heterogeneity of responders and responses, overlapping responsibilities 
and resulting redundancies in the system are supportive of flexibility – a key 
ingredient of resilient systems (Lauer et al. 2013) and adaptive governance 
(Wyborn and Dovers, 2014). 
     In both countries, what is written and what happens in practice are usually 
different. There is a reliance upon tradition and past experience rather than 
adhering to standardised and formalised processes. For those who are part of 
that system the processes are probably clear. For outsiders and newcomers 
however, this is not the case. 
     The government liaison position (turaga ni koro in Fiji, and Town Officer 
in Tonga) was a source of angst in both communities because of the power that 
resides with that individual - the power to be equitable or not equitable, 
proactive or only reactive. In Tonga, this was somewhat lessened by the 
establishment of the village disaster committees, however, the differing 
experiences in the two villages of the operation of this committee, confirms the 
view of aid organisations - that their mere existence is not sufficient. 
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Chapter 8 - Expectations and dependency 
     Perceptions have been found to influence decision making about disaster 
response and adaptation actions (Schwarz, Béné, Bennett et al., 2011). Equally, 
social and individual factors, such as the perception of risk, habits, social status 
and age will limit adaptation actions (Adger, Dessai, Goulden et al., 2009).  
     This chapter examines the expectations of the three groups, community, aid 
organisations and government, of disaster aid, and of each other in relation to 
disaster preparation and response. These expectations link into response and 
dependency on aid, especially in the Pacific where there is a commonly held 
belief, borne out in the interviews in this study, that communities are aid 
dependent. The chapter pursues this theme, looking at issues of dependency 
and asking - who is dependent on what? 
8.1 Expectations of aid 
     A consistent message from the aid organisations and the government 
representatives in both Fiji and Tonga was that “expectations from the 
communities are high” (Fiji, government representative). However, this 
expectation was not always presented as a negative: “I think as a human being 
I think they expect that. I think every human being needs assistance after a 
disaster” (Tonga, aid organisation representative). 
     Post-disaster aid has not always been available in either Fiji or Tonga, and 
community members recognised this: 
Aid is a new thing for the people of Tonga. They are like, 
1961, no aid. The people will do what to do, only the 
family from overseas country and from Tonga, they will 
bring food for them and something like this (Tonga, 
female villager aged 60+). 
     Aid organisations in Fiji talked about high expectations of aid as being 
relatively new in the history of the country, and across sections of the 
community: 
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If you go anywhere in Fiji today, compared to 40 years 
ago, they will always expect assistance, irrespective of 
the scale of how big the disaster was, they will always 
expect assistance (Fiji, aid organisation representative) 
…in Fiji, whether you've got money or not, once 
anything happens, like a disaster, that millionaire who 
has money will just be waiting for whatever will be 
coming (Fiji, aid organisation representative). 
     There were a few different contributors to this mentioned. Firstly, the most 
experienced aid organisations talked about the importance of having a 
relationship and familiarity with the communities they are assisting. This is 
because as an outsider, it is imperative to arrive with something, and hence, 
outsiders providing aid increase expectations for the future: 
Get here first. Whoever is first on the ground gets a 
handshake. Everyone else after that, you are either 
denied information of what's happening, or you’re given 
a shopping list, everything else that the first ones didn't 
bring. So if you're not very familiar with this community 
you are going to be creating a lot more expectations in 
the next disasters (Fiji, aid organisation representative). 
      With the increase in the number of organisations involved in providing 
disaster aid in Fiji, and the resulting race to be the first to arrive, and be seen to 
be doing something, the connection with the communities may be becoming 
more tenuous, exacerbating the effects. There may also be a difference between 
the aid provided and the actual needs of the community. Where well meaning 
organisations seek to assist by saying, “this is what we do, so we’ll do it in this 
community and hopefully it will help a bit”, the needs of the communities will 
not necessarily be fulfilled, but the expectations of what aid may be available 
will be increased for next time. An aid organisation representative said that 
often the funding agencies assume they know what communities want; 
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Usually there’s a lot of wastage of resources that come 
down because of that. So maybe if we get a clear 
definition of what they actually want from ground level, 
then work them up to where we give down the funding, 
there’s a lot of advantages that would come with that 
(Fiji, aid organisation representative). 
     There is also a realisation that disasters are an opportunity for governments 
to be viewed favourably by communities. Both government and aid 
organisation representatives mentioned politicians and political parties 
delivering aid to specific areas after past disasters. Articles in the Fiji Sun 
newspaper after Cyclone Ami confirm this.  
     There were many examples provided of the ways in which the increased 
expectations of aid manifest and their repercussions. Aid organisations talked 
about people making no attempt to clean up or repair their homes until after the 
assessors had been through in order to ‘guarantee a new home’. In Tonga, 
community members also acknowledge this, saying: “People learn to wait 
before helping themselves with housing damage or else they risk the survey 
saying that they had no damage” (Tonga, male villager aged 46-59). 
     This seems to suggest a sense of entitlement to aid. If you can fix the house 
yourself, then do you actually need aid? Or is it just that because it is seen to be 
available, people think they should get it? One villager thought that the 
community should take photos of the damage prior to making their own 
repairs, so that the surveyors have evidence of what damage there was and the 
community can still be compensated for having made the repairs themselves. 
     The legislation in Fiji stipulates that once people have been in a formal 
evacuation centre for 12 hours, the government has to provide them with food 
rations to cover 48 hours. Accordingly, people in Fiji are turning up to 
evacuation centres without any food and water because they expect to be 
provided with it soon after arrival. In contrast, in Tonga, where there is less 
expectation of food being provided in evacuation centres, people usually arrive 
prepared. A government representative in Tonga spoke of the potential 
consequences of supplying provisions in evacuation centres: 
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At what time they forgot to go back home. They don’t 
want to go home because a lot of cases if they have food 
supplies at the camp or they got clothing or the mentality 
change. ‘We are better off here than if we go home 
because here food is being given away’ (Tonga, 
government representative). 
     There was recognition that aid organisations turning up ‘too early’ will 
reinforce these perceptions: “They spend more time crying than actually trying 
to rebuild their lives” (Fiji, aid organisation representative). Some aid 
organisations talked about the aid as having become a way of getting ahead in 
life - that over time, with the frequency of disasters in Fiji, some people have 
not only become dependent on it for their post-disaster survival, but now see 
disasters as a way of boosting their standard of living: 
Take for example, I'll ask for more cyclones, more 
cyclones, because I know I'll get more assistance every 
time. It's been a long time and there've been no cyclones 
in Fiji and I really need one here in Labasa because I 
really need help, a new house and new water tank. The 
things that I can't afford before, I will put it as a 
complaint. I need a water tank because I'm taking dirty 
water from the river. So I'll ask for more cyclones. To 
better my standard of living (Fiji, aid organisation 
representative). 
     For some of the more experienced and professional aid organisations, the 
increased expectations of aid have direct repercussions on their work. Some aid 
organisations in Fiji mentioned that during the 2012 Nadi floods, the Red Cross 
encountered opposition and criticism from communities that did not understand 
their methods of doing assessments and then providing aid to meet specific 
needs of each community. Where other organisations had arrived quickly and 
handed out aid to everyone, the more structured and needs-directed approach 
of the Red Cross came under attack.  
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     Expectations are to a certain extent naturally based on past experience. So it 
may be logical that expectations of aid over the past 40 years have increased as 
the provision of aid has increased. However, debates about the timing, amount 
and type of aid, dependency and self-sufficiency of the community, date back 
at least that far (McLean et al., 1977).  
     It was not clear that the expectations of aid expressed by the community on 
the islands in Fiji or Tonga matched the descriptions of the aid organisations 
and the government, above. It was true that there were clear and high 
expectations that help should be provided after a cyclone, but it was linked 
directly to needs, and sometimes framed around being seen and noticed by 
government, as much as the provision of aid - “To help us. To come and see us, 
see what’s happening after the hurricane” (Fiji, female villager, aged 35-45 
years). Specific items of aid mentioned closely aligned with examples of aid 
provided in the past: food, housing, clothes, a tarpaulin. In Tonga, there was 
more awareness of the direct link between the availability of donor funding and 
the availability of aid, which tempered expectations: 
Here in Tonga, it depend if any aid. There will not be 
happen hurricane, aid, hurricane, aid. It depend from 
you know, the government, they don’t have enough 
money for the aid. So they have to meet, looking for a 
donor, have some aid from them. Maybe the Red Cross 
will be the first one. But who knows? If the Red Cross, 
they don’t have enough? (Tonga, male villager, aged 46-
59). 
     In Fiji, there was a firmer expectation that there would be at least some aid, 
but the question was how much. Many people said that the government should 
provide rations for three months, because that is how long it takes to harvest 
new crops of kumala, the fastest growing root crop. Most agreed that recently 
provided aid (after Cyclone Tomas in 2010) was not enough, because it did not 
cover this time period. However, despite this perception, there was also general 
agreement that the community did have enough food to eat.  
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     Consistency is important to the community, and not knowing what to expect 
or when it may arrive was difficult for them. “They have to give, always give 
the aid they give before” (Fiji, male villager, aged 35-45 years). It makes sense 
that on an isolated island, it would be important to know how much of the 
recovery had to be done alone - for example, knowing how long leftover food 
needs to last, and the extent to which informal rationing of it is required. For 
people in more accessible locations, inconsistencies may have less impact. 
     Expectations around housing aid also differed between the two countries. In 
Fiji, there was a clear expectation that the government would replace houses, 
whereas in Tonga, some thought it was the government’s responsibility but 
others thought it was the responsibility of the individual family. This contrast 
reflects the recent experiences in these communities, where in Fiji the majority 
of houses in the whole island are ‘hurricane relief’ houses. Although many 
houses in the villages in Tonga were aid houses following Cyclone Isaac in 
1982, they were funded through a patchwork of means (government, church, 
family), and the lack of assistance to ‘Uiha village following the 2011 and 
2012 events has cemented the inconsistencies and uncertainty, further 
dampening expectations. 
     One of the aid organisations talked about the recency of the increase in 
expectations of post-disaster aid, saying that it is the younger generation who 
have these high expectations, but not so much the older generations. This was 
borne out to a certain extent in the community interviews, with younger 
villagers being usually more specific about what types of aid they expect, and 
older villagers expressing gratitude for ‘whatever aid they can give’. It was 
elderly villagers who articulated some discomfort with being given donations, 
saying that they could not ask for anything or express an opinion on aid 
provided, since they are not doing or giving anything in return. This kind of 
appreciation and humility about aid did not seem as apparent from younger 
participants, for whom aid, and asking for aid, appeared more acceptable. 
     Greater contrasts between Fiji and Tonga are found in the governments’ 
expectations of aid and donors. In Fiji, where there is some budget allocation 
for disaster response, and high involvement of aid organisations, the 
expectations of government seem to centre around the governance and co-
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ordination of the aid than in the amount of provision of that aid. There seems to 
be an assumption that aid will appear, and the challenge will be in dealing with 
it all. However, in Tonga, there seems to be a more clear expectation that if aid 
is to be provided, it will only be if there are donors. With a higher priority 
placed on food than housing aid, food is considered a must, and housing an - if 
there’s donor funding available. The response to Cyclone Ian has been 
somewhat contradictory to this, with a clear emphasis on not only replacing all 
the damaged and destroyed housing, but doing so quickly, with the program 
proceeding before clarity on where the funding for it will come from. The 
extent to which the timing of a national election in Tonga, within 12 months of 
this cyclone has affected this response is probably not insignificant.  
     There have been suggestions that aid is being understood as a right rather 
than a gift, an attitude being driven by the government with such examples as 
public predictions that Tonga’s GDP may increase as a result of the cyclone 
(Brown Pulu, 2014). Whether such a prediction may end up being true or not is 
perhaps less relevant than the obvious expectations of aid it demonstrates. 
8.2 Dependence 
     Reliance on aid was recognised by all groups, but expressed in different 
ways, with some viewing it as a human right, others more as accepting help 
than being dependent, while some thought of it as akin to laziness. The 
perception of what post-disaster aid is and is for, varied both between the 
groups interviewed, and among the community members on the islands in both 
Fiji and Tonga. Aid in this context should be about fulfilling needs. In that 
sense, it could be argued there cannot be dependency on something based 
around need. However, that presupposes those needs cannot be fulfilled by any 
other means - that aid is essential to fulfil needs that would otherwise remain as 
needs. Once there is acknowledgement that other legitimate, accessible and 
achievable means of fulfilling those needs exists, there is a shift from need 
towards want, along a continuum. The extreme end of such a continuum may 
be exemplified by accepting food aid that you then have trouble fitting into 
your already full food cupboards, or accepting a re-built house when the one 
damaged or destroyed was not your primary residence anyway.  
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It seems that there is a definite perception among aid organisations and 
government, and from some within the communities, that people are moving 
further and further towards the ‘want’ end of that continuum, and this is 
expressed by many as being ‘dependent on aid’. This calls into question 
definition and use of the term ‘dependent’. Firstly, with the differences 
between the fulfilment of wants and of needs. Secondly, between being truly 
dependent upon something versus seizing the opportunity provided by disaster 
aid, as one of the few opportunities which exist, especially in remote 
communities. 
     Aid organisations spoke about dependency as a mindset of people that can 
and should be changed: 
I’ll always go out with the awareness, focus in the 
communities, try to kill that idea of hand-out mentality. 
Not to wait for the help to come. Just to help yourself and 
see what you can do. Help that will come is an added 
bonus (Fiji, aid organisation representative). 
In the communities we’re training we tell them they must 
be self-sufficient for at least the first three to five days. 
So before the cyclone comes, they must stock up on root 
crops, food and all that, and not to expect that 
immediately after, the government will be at their doors 
(Tonga, aid organisation representative). 
     In Tonga, government and aid organisation representatives spoke of the 
culture of dependency in Tonga. Dependency on post-disaster aid may be seen 
as simply an extension of that: 
So far, you know, the government of Tonga is being able 
to operate simply because of donors from overseas. I 
think we are still far away from, you know…The Tongan 
people as a whole still expect help to come from 
overseas. Because we have no resources, no natural 
resources, so we still rely on government, budget support 
from overseas. So that attitude of expecting help from 
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others, is still pretty much linked within our traditions as 
a whole (Tonga, government representative). 
    One of the aid organisation representatives took this concept further, talking 
about how the dependence on not only aid, but remittances from family 
overseas, becomes a cycle. Parents work hard to get an education for their 
children, with the expectation that once the children have a paying job, they 
will send money home in return.  
But I think we need to teach the people to be self-reliant. 
Too much waiting for handout. Not only from the church, 
but from government, from overseas, and from their 
children who work. The more you ask, or are depend, the 
more you perpetuate the poverty level that we have. I 
think if everybody work and look and think outside the 
box. Don’t stay with the traditions we have (Tonga, aid 
organisation representative) 
     Remittances though serve functions beyond the financial transaction, 
maintaining culture and links to homelands.  During disaster times, these 
networks form an important part of the overall disaster response. 
     Government representatives also spoke of dependency on aid as being about 
inaction on the part of community members, with aid receipt having taken the 
place of self-help in recovery from a disaster: “People have their coping 
ability, we’ve been through a lot of disasters. It’s just the heavy reliance on 
government” (Fiji, government representative). 
     There were numerous examples provided of how this inaction manifests 
itself - fallen and damaged crops leftover from a disaster not being harvested 
and used. Simple, practical actions that are not done: 
The sad thing now in Fijian villages, when government 
provides everything, after for example the water has 
receded, or the cyclone has passed, it continues to rain 
but light rain for a few hours. No-one is even taking 
whatever containers for the water so they can, but they 
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ask for bottle water from government, which is crazy 
(Fiji, government representative). 
     These perceptions call into question the necessity of certain aid, reflecting 
back to the needs-wants continuum.  
     Within the community, there were a variety of opinions expressed about the 
need for and dependency on aid, along with context and detail not seen from 
the groups more remote from the community level. For example, the receipt of 
food aid despite leftover crops being accessible was given a new level of 
complexity by one community member, with rations representing time: 
Well I can say, but we need for the rations too. We need 
for that. Because at that time, if the rations can't be there 
to help us through, to develop what we can do, like when 
houses are. Give us time to do that. Otherwise the time 
we could use on that, we use on finding what we can eat 
(Fiji, male villager, aged 46-59 years).  
     Others spoke of rations providing the foodstuffs that you cannot purchase 
when there is no money after a cyclone: 
So everyone still needs food aid, because there’s no 
money to buy the extra things, the flour and sugar and 
stuff. But if you have the right crops planted, you still 
have some variety in what you are eating. Whereas if you 
haven’t, then you will be eating only the food aid (Tonga, 
male villager aged 60+).  
     For many aid organisations and government representatives, the issue of aid 
was articulated as being much more direct and clear cut - food aid is necessary 
where there is insufficient food available. These community members though, 
were placing the food aid in the broader context of post-disaster recovery. The 
view that acceptance of aid is more about making life easier at a difficult time, 
than about actual dependency, was echoed by another villager talking about the 
government providing materials and help to rebuild houses - “The community 
can do it, but lucky the government comes, and we are very thankful for that” 
(Fiji, male villager, aged 46-59 years).  
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     Particularly among elders within the villages though, the perception of a 
dependency on aid was very clear. One elder was especially critical: 
Yes, there’s a change (from the past). People just wait 
for the government, unlike before when they have to do 
it…If the government is doing this every time, there will 
be people just, they won’t do anything, they won’t look 
after their own places. They will just know - oh, the 
hurricane will come and we’ll wait for the government to 
help…They don’t value it, because they don’t spend 
anything on it. It’s just the government, the hurricane 
comes and takes it away, the government replaces it. So 
nothing from their own pocket, or nothing from their own 
strength to do it (Fiji, male villager, aged 60+).  
     As part of the World Bank housing aid project from Cyclone Ian in Tonga, 
villages were asked to identify a small number of highly vulnerable families 
within the community, to receive houses from one particular category of the 
project. The villager who was tasked with this job said that he was criticised 
for nominating families who others consider to be only the most in need 
because they are lazy. There seemed not to be so much a question of whether 
or not they need a new house, but why they do - because they are vulnerable 
and unable to help themselves, or because they are choosing to be dependent 
on aid? Debates and conflicts on this issue abound within the community, as 
well as at a broader level. 
     Some of the younger generation also recognised the dependency within 
their own community - “They will just sit and wait for the government to come 
and do their job” (Fiji, female villager, aged 35-45 years). However, this 
younger perspective seemed to be more that this is just the way things are 
done. If you have no memory or experience of disasters before there was aid, it 
makes sense that you would not necessarily perceive yourself and your 
community as being dependent on aid in the sense that there is another option, 
but that this is simply how it works.  
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    When asked about the likely availability of aid in the future, many, including 
younger villagers, quickly responded it seems unlikely that aid would continue 
to be as available in future if disasters get worse, and that they would just have 
to do everything themselves instead. This was usually expressed more with 
resignation than the outrage or despair one might expect from people who feel 
dependent on aid to meet their needs. It might be the case that the dependency 
perceived by the aid organisations and government is less apparent among my 
remote island samples. It might also be that the shift away from aid 
dependency may be more achievable than at first glance.  
    The people in Fiji expected a certain level of aid because that was their 
experience in the past. Those in Tonga expected aid would come subject to 
donor funding availability. Few expressed the view that they cannot do it on 
their own, and that without aid they would be in dire trouble. That level of 
despair and hopelessness was expressed much more in relation to the longed-
for seawall, than post-disaster aid. So while aid-expectations-dependency-aid 
may well be a cycle that feeds onto itself, on these island communities at least, 
it seemed far from unbreakable. 
8.3 Conclusion 
     The concepts of expectations and dependence are complex, and feed into 
each other. The view among the governments and most aid organisations in 
both countries is clear - the people have unreasonably high expectations of aid, 
and are too dependent upon it. However, the view from the communities was 
more that expectations of aid were consistent with previous experience of 
receiving (though not always) it, and that it arrives so late that they have to 
know how to fend for themselves anyway. Late or not, the food aid is needed 
and welcome, but the communities on the remote islands are not about to start 
relying on it turning up soon after a disaster, and therefore not helping 
themselves. 
     The community perspective also showed that aid makes life easier during 
the difficult post-disaster period, freeing up your time for making housing 
repairs, helping with rebuilding houses, and providing the extra food to allow 
for some variety in your diet while incomes are disrupted.  
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These views add layers of complexity to the definitions of need and 
dependency, and exemplify the chasm between the views and experiences of 
the government and aid organisations on the one hand, and the remote islanders 
on the other. 
     The stated expectations of aid of the community were primarily related to 
Maslow’s physiological and safety needs levels (Maslow, 1943). There are two 
instances where the increase in the availability of aid may be said to elevate 
these expectations to higher levels: firstly when need is expressed at the 
community level for aid as acknowledgement of what the entire community 
has been through. Secondly, and most likely in less remote places, where 
competition among aid organisations leads to inappropriate and poorly directed 
aid.  
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Chapter 9 - Issues of remoteness 
     When there is a disaster, in today’s world of global connections and 
communications, we tend to think that people will know what has happened, 
and will come and help, sooner, rather than later. Especially in modern cities, 
when there are delays, there are outcries, as seen after Hurricane Katrina. 
However, for those in remote places the experience is entirely different, with 
delays a way of life. What do you do when a disaster has struck and you know 
that no-one is likely to come and help the next day? Or the day after…or the 
one after that…? Remoteness impacts all stages of the disaster management 
cycle. 
     A remote island is difficult to define. It is not simply a geographical 
construct, with some places being outer islands, and other places perhaps even 
on main islands, but considered remote in terms of their development options, 
service provision and modernity (Connell, 2010).  
     This study specifically focussed on two remote island locations in Fiji and 
Tonga, to investigate the experiences of the people, and to explore their views 
on how disaster response may need to change in future. The islands chosen 
here are considered remote because of both geography and service provision, 
with both islands being a boat ride away from a main island, which itself is a 
regional rather than country capital. This chapter details the issues of 
remoteness faced by these communities. 
     During my fieldwork, I experienced what could be described as two 
different Fijis. The first was that of a small isolated island, and the second was 
the main islands. On the isolated island, aid organisation visits are few, and the 
waiting time for post-disaster aid is better measured in weeks than days. The 
contrast with the described experience of the main islands was vast. The main 
island experience - an over-abundance of aid organisations, many of whom 
arrive and deliver aid before the government have arrived, provisions to 
evacuation centres within 24-48 hours, and aid arriving from multiple sources - 
could not be further from that of the village communities. 
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9.1 How long for help to arrive 
     All groups in this study noted communication as a difficult issue for remote 
islanders. On the island in Fiji, a lack of communication directly equates to a 
lack of warning about cyclones, and a lack of assistance afterwards. People 
spoke of having to travel into the nearest District Office (three hours away) 
when telephone and radio lines were down following a cyclone. Aid 
organisations and government representatives agreed that the Red Cross are the 
only ones in Fiji with satellite phones. During 2012, they were being trialled in 
the Northern Division by government, but their implementation was considered 
to be very slow. Similarly in Tonga, satellite telephones are not readily 
available to government, although the armed forces do have them and are a key 
partner in aid distribution. 
     Almost all community members in Fiji thought that the aid, and rations 
specifically, takes about two to three weeks to arrive after a cyclone, and that 
this is too long to wait. They spoke of the uncertainty around whether there 
would be rations and if so, when they would arrive, and of it taking so long that 
alternatives had to be found. An example was provided of family in Suva 
organising and delivering aid before the government or aid organisations had 
arrived. Others spoke of travelling to Labasa to either sell fish at the markets so 
they can purchase their own ‘rations’, or being asked to travel to Labasa to 
collect the rations rather than waiting for the extra time it would take for them 
to get to their island. There was some recognition by those who had had direct 
involvement with government that the logistics of post-disaster aid delivery are 
not simple, with roads to be repaired and sometimes communication issues.  
     The experience of having very quickly received a lot of aid and attention, 
including from the Prime Minister who visited the island in the days 
immediately after Cyclone Ami in 2003, seems to have coloured perceptions of 
aid and timeliness. So while logistical issues are sometimes recognised and 
acknowledged, these islanders are also aware than things can and sometimes 
do happen much more quickly. It was not clear whether or not the connection 
between need and prioritisation of aid was well understood. Few talked about 
the cyclones in terms of their impacts outside their island.  
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     There was less consensus around how long leftover food will last before 
people are desperately in need of rations. Estimates ranged from four days to 
two months, with some people saying it depends on how well protected your 
crops were from damage in the cyclone. It also depends on the type of crop. 
For example, yams kept dry can last for considerably longer than taro.  A few 
community members spoke of feeling lucky that they are on an island with 
abundant and accessible fishing, providing a reliable source of food.  
     In Tonga, the wait for aid is likely to be longer. Estimates ranged from two 
weeks to more than a month, with most groups agreeing it takes about four 
weeks for food aid to arrive. Most community members thought that if aid took 
one or two weeks, leftover food would last that long. Some government 
representatives considered that food should last for more like three to four 
weeks, so that as long as food aid is delivered within a month it would be 
acceptable. Housing assistance in Tonga was said to take upwards of 12 
months, with some estimates reaching five years.  
     One of the aid organisation representatives in Tonga spoke of the tendency 
for the government to wait until they have worked out exactly what is required 
before putting in any request for international assistance. This leads to delays 
in donors and aid organisations being able to provide assistance to 
communities, even when they are prepared and have stock available. In 
Cyclone Ian, which hit Tonga between 10-12 January 2014 media reports 
immediately quoted the Tongan government officials and aid organisations as 
saying that this was the largest cyclone to affect Tonga in decades. However, 
there was no request for international assistance until 22 January. For a country 
that is almost entirely dependent on foreign donors for disaster aid, a request 
seemed to be inevitable and yet took 10 days to occur. While the government 
puts the delay down to working out what was going to be required, donors have 
expressed the view that there are some things that will always been needed and 
could be provided immediately and that without a formal request, they are left 
trying to find ways around the system if they want to help quickly. Political 
motivations and issues have also been suggested to have played a role in the 
delay (Brown Pulu, 2014).  Issues such as these extend the wait for those on 
remote islands hoping to receive aid. 
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9.2 Isolated islands 
     Two of the main issues in disaster response, which are relevant throughout 
Fiji and Tonga, but especially for remote islands, are transport and 
communication. One aid organisation representative estimated that 30-40% of 
villages and communities in Vanua Levu (the second main island in Fiji) are 
accessible only by boat. However, few aid organisations use this form of 
transport and fewer still ever make it to the isolated islands. I was told that 
there are no aid organisations specialising in going to the outer islands, and 
most focus only on the two main islands, relying on government to assist 
everywhere else. Neither aid organisations nor the government departments 
responsible for disaster risk management own boats for use in disaster response 
or risk reduction work, so they rely on navy, local businesses and individuals to 
provide transport for them. This means that there are many villages and 
communities that are either inaccessible, or for which transportation is very 
difficult all the time, let alone after a disaster. Some disaster risk reduction 
work is done on outer islands, but this is dependent on donor funding, and the 
willingness of those donors to pay the higher costs involved in working in 
isolated areas.  
     From the villagers’ perspective, being on an outer island has both 
advantages and disadvantages. Having a reliance on the sea and fishing to fall 
back on after a disaster was recognised as an advantage of their island, 
compared with isolated communities on the main islands. However, the length 
of time it takes for help to reach their island is a source of angst, with some 
believing that it was not worth the wait. One person said that they should 
receive money as aid after a disaster, because it represents fuel to reach the 
mainland.  
     The government in Fiji recognised the apparent double standard in the 
provisions supplied to evacuation centres on the main islands compared with 
outer islands. However, it was justified as being about the distance evacuation 
centres are from home. On outer islands, evacuation centres are by definition, 
within the communities. A government representative argued that on the main 
islands, being in an evacuation centre often requires being completely removed 
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from your community or village. However, most evacuation centres throughout 
Fiji are schools, community halls or churches, which are located within 
communities. Therefore, it will not be everyone at an evacuation centre who is 
a long distance from their home. Equally, the school on the island I studied in 
Fiji was located in one of the villages, but served both, as well as villages in 
neighbouring islands. Clearly, not all villages in the outer islands have 
evacuation centres co-located.  
     In Tonga, the contrast between outer and main islands was certainly less, 
probably because there are fewer aid organisations involved in the whole 
country, and because there is at least one, Mainstreaming of Rural 
Development Innovation (MORDI) specialising in remote communities. Their 
goal is “to improve the sustainable livelihoods of the poor people in rural areas 
and isolated islands in Tonga”. Another, the Tongan National Youth Congress 
acts as an outreach services for other aid organisations into the remote 
communities through their youth representatives in every village. However, 
there is still a common perception that isolated islands do get left out by aid 
organisations, donors and governments.  
     One aid organisation representative, talking about climate change 
adaptation project funding said: 
So the government are only doing this for the capital of 
Ha’apai, and the capital of Tongatapu. Maybe the donor 
ignore all the islands, and also the government ignore 
the islands. So they protect the capital only. All the 
donor come to Pangai, all the donor come to Nukua’lofa. 
Or maybe the donor come and the government said 
Pangai or said Nukua’lofa. They ignore the isolated 
island like this (Tonga, aid organisation representative). 
     The community members too noted that being on an outer island changes 
the experience of disasters: 
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It’s different. We live in the island, and it’s away from 
the main island. That’s the one problem. If we have some 
cyclone and some problems, it’s different to…the main 
island, to Pangai. So what thing we looking for, we pray, 
kai (food) or not (Tonga, male villager aged 35-44 
years). 
     Recognition of the resilience of those on remote islands came from 
government, aid organisations and the community itself in Tonga. Aid 
organisations spoke of main islanders viewing those on the outer islands as 
having more traditional knowledge about warning signs and fale building, as 
well as the resilience brought about by getting food from the sea. There were 
also comparisons made with the experience of western countries in disasters 
(as depicted in media reports), from the perspective that Tongan need to hang 
on to their resilience: 
I mean that we’ve all been proud of in the past. When 
people have cyclone comes, we hit, then we got and built 
up and move on. We don’t want to see like when Cyclone 
Katrina hit the United States. The people were 
completely lost. You remove the supermarket from them, 
and completely lost. They have no resilience whatsoever. 
People crying, I don’t know what to do with my babies 
now, I’ve got no milk, there’s no water. When I look at 
that kind of things, I think, well, I’m glad I’m Tongan 
(Tonga, government representative). 
     How should aid work in this instance, and what is sustainable into a climate 
changed future of increased disasters? Should provisions be supplied to 
evacuation centres that can easily be reached under a ‘we’ll do what we can’ 
scenario? People in other centres that are less accessible will have to fend for 
themselves and that is just the way it is? Those who are not helped in this way 
must be more prepared and self-reliant. Every dollar spent on this aid is a 
dollar not available for some other kinds of aid. So if those in isolated areas 
can look after themselves in the immediate aftermath, should those in regional 
and urban areas be expected to also? Or should greater efforts by made to reach 
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isolated communities and outer islands sooner? Who is really more in need? 
Those in remote areas are more likely to have farms and crops but in regional 
and urban areas, people are more likely to have access to money and shops.  
The picture changes when we are talking about medical help for people who 
have been injured or killed in a disaster, especially on a remote island when 
communication and transport are disrupted. Is the response able to make this 
shift in urgency? The issue is complex, with no simple solutions. However into 
the future, with an increasing demand on post-disaster recovery efforts, money 
should be spent where it will have the most impact.  
     There is almost unanimous agreement that this is in disaster risk reduction 
and community education, not disaster response. Perhaps the policy focus 
should shift from doing the most possible for the highest possible number of 
people as quickly as possible, to embracing and expanding the self reliance and 
preparation people on outer islands have no choice but to exhibit. Rather than 
being the forgotten minority, the outer island communities may be a useful 
starting point. At the moment, people on the outer islands wait two to three 
weeks for aid to arrive and, according to aid organisation and government 
interviewees, those in the main islands are in outcry if two to three days have 
passed before aid arrives. Meeting somewhere in the middle may be more 
sustainable into the future, rather than continuing and expanding the current 
main islands approach. 
9.3 Community cohesion as social capital 
     The multi-faceted concept of vulnerability includes features such as socio-
economic status, demographics, lend tenure, and social capital (Reale and 
Handmer, 2011). “Social capital is a resource that facilitates collective action 
for mutual benefit” (Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011, p268). In situations of 
disaster where the wait for outside help is better counted in weeks than days, 
collective action may be vital. Resilient, well-prepared communities may be 
able to be the help rather than waiting for help from outside (Jennison, 2008).  
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Social capital - a sense of belonging, a sense of community, support for 
collective action, and an attachment to a place, have been shown to be 
important in disaster recovery and resilience (Cox and Perry, 2011, Schwarz et 
al., 2011).  
     Networks may be seen to help facilitate community-level planning and 
preparation for oncoming extreme weather events, and to assist in co-
ordinating and managing the response at the community level afterwards 
(Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011). Disaster management specialists have 
called for an increasing focus on the social aspects of disasters, and networks 
among people and between people and policy makers (Pathirage, Seneviratne, 
Amaratunga et al., 2012). Continuity of social networks influences the 
community’s ability to access resources after a disaster (Tan-Mullins, Rigg, 
Law et al., 2007). In the context of a flood-affected town in rural Australia, 
social connectedness and a sense of place and connection to the place, along 
with the collective belief that people help each other in times of trouble, and a 
belief in your own capacity to cope, were found to be important for resilience 
(Boon, 2014). These are all elements found in both remote island locations in 
this study. Nevertheless, the community connectedness was not the same on 
both islands.  
     On Druadrua island in Fiji, during one recent cyclone, the people in 
Salevukoso village realised from the wind direction that Delaivadra village 
would be getting the full force of the wind and waves. So during the eye of the 
storm, a boat was sent over to rescue their neighbours. In contrast, on ‘Uiha 
island in Tonga, the people in Falemea village in 2013 had little knowledge of 
the 2011 storm surge that left people in ‘Uiha village homeless.7 Only two 
people from Falemea village went to ‘Uiha village after the event, and in 
interviews, few details could be provided by anyone else in Falemea of the 
damage sustained in their neighbouring village. 
                                                            
7 The 2011 storm surge waves were felt only in ‘Uiha village, and not in 
Falemea. ’Uiha village is towards the north-west coast, and is open to the main 
currents and larger waves. Falemea village is on the western coast and largely 
protected from storm surge waves by a reef. 
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     This reflects the differing community cohesions of the two islands. In Fiji, 
the two villages firmly considered themselves to be one community on the 
island, whereas in Tonga, there was a much greater social (though not 
physical) separation between the two villages, and the ‘island’ identity was far 
less apparent. It is difficult to understand, from the short fieldwork time in each 
place, exactly why this is the case. The physical access between villages was 
easier in Tonga than Fiji, but the degree of social cohesion was opposite. 
Relative population sizes may have an impact. ‘Uiha village has about 400-450 
residents, compared with Delaivadra where about 20-30 people live, so perhaps 
the better connections the people in Delaivadra apparently have with their 
neighbouring village is because they need it. The cultural implications of the 
noble controlled village (‘Uiha) versus the government controlled village 
(Falemea) may run deeper than is immediately obvious. Perhaps the stronger 
connections with the resource-rich Mormon church in Tonga decreases the 
need for two villages on a remote island to have strong inter-connections. 
Whatever the reality and the reasons behind it, logic would say that where a 
remote island community with a small population has only two villages, strong 
social capital and connections would be important for the island community as 
a whole.  
     Much was made on both islands of the community coming together after a 
disaster and working to help each other. Such a feeling of community cohesion 
is commonly seen in the immediate aftermath of disasters, however it is 
temporary (Ronan and Johnston, 2005). Evidence of this was apparent in the 
response to Cyclone Ian in Tonga. There was a feeling among some 
community members that they should be able to make sufficient repairs to their 
homes after a cyclone to be able to live in it again. The materials needed will 
have been blown away and damaged but they are retrievable and repairable. 
The conclusion was those who still lived in tents months after the event were 
simply lazy. The photo below shows one such couple, living in a tent in June 
2014, six months after the cyclone (Photo 9.1: Limits to social capital). 
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     Photo 9.1: Limits to social capital  
     It seems unlikely that this elderly couple would be considered lazy for 
failing to make sufficient repairs to their home. What is more likely is that they 
did not receive as much help as they needed in order to do this. The social 
capital and community cohesion immediately following the event seems to 
have limits, even for the elderly. 
9.4 Community action 
     Alongside the perception of increasing expectations of aid, there is a sense 
of resilience and action from the communities. Aid organisations spoke of a 
strong resilience within communities, with strength drawn from the kinship 
ties. It is acknowledged that communities are thinking about disaster risk 
reduction, and issues such as where evacuation centres should be sensibly 
located. Humanitarian aid was explained by the most experienced as building 
on the responses of the community, that the people take the first steps 
themselves: 
So first responder - basically anyone can be the first 
responder. But if you’re the first responder without 
appreciating that the communities themselves start 
helping themselves after a disaster, then you’re wrong 
(Fiji, aid organisation representative). 
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     Within the communities, people talked about taking action themselves both 
in disaster response, and in risk reduction. There was agreement from most that 
the community is responsible for starting to help themselves after a disaster, 
over and above cleaning up the village: 
The first thing is the community, because the community 
they try to help after the cyclone, whatever they can do in 
rehabilitation. Try to rebuild the house, plant the root 
crops for the family, that’s what he’s saying. The 
community first (Fiji, male villager, aged 46-59 years, 
through an interpreter). 
     Many villagers said that after a cyclone, they have to start cleaning up and 
making temporary shelters. This needs to be balanced with the view of an ex-
villager in Fiji, who said that when he visited a few days after Cyclone Ami in 
2003, most people were in the remains of their homes, too shell-shocked to be 
actively helping themselves.  
     Various community members on the island in Fiji also spoke about trying to 
do disaster risk reduction work themselves - “Because we are trying to do 
something…government is the second thing, first community to do something” 
(Fiji, male villager, aged 46-59 years). There were ideas and plans for building 
proper evacuation centres in the villages. In one village this seemed to be the 
idea of an individual, whereas in the other it was a plan being put into action 
with a community savings account, and a search for donor funding. The 
erosion of the beach is an issue the island has been wrestling with for a number 
of years, and there was much talk of constructing a seawall to help. Some 
villagers though seemed to be saying that a seawall was the responsibility of 
those living on the water’s edge, rather than of the whole community. A couple 
of people had the idea that there should be community savings so that there is 
money in reserve to use after a cyclone, with each family contributing and 
perhaps a village committee to oversee it.  
     Some of these ideas seem to be just ideas at this stage, and it is not clear 
how much community buy-in there would be. It appears difficult to get projects 
like these off the ground without the support of the entire community.  
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     In Tonga, the main form of community action taking place was the planting 
of trees along the shore as a way of helping to stop the erosion of the beach, 
and to take some of the force of cyclonic winds. However, I did not 
particularly notice young trees that looked to have been planted recently. 
Perhaps this community action took place years ago, since there were indeed 
plenty of older trees along the shoreline.  
     One of the issues raised by community members in Tonga was the lack of 
hardware and tools. I was told that “cyclones motivate people to build stronger 
houses” (Tonga, female villager, aged 39-45 years), but in reality, there is no 
hardware store in the Ha’apai region. This makes turning any goodwill around 
preparation and clean up into reality difficult without the basic hammer and 
nails required.  
     On both islands, the people were very pessimistic about the future, if 
climate change means that cyclones become more frequent or intense. There 
was general agreement that government aid was unlikely to be able to keep up, 
and that they would just have to rely on themselves. Some in Fiji talked about 
having to return to living in bures if the government stopped providing housing 
assistance.  
     Pessimism about the future in both communities however, was more about 
rising sea levels. In both communities, people felt that the sea would consume 
some (in Fiji) or all (in Tonga) of the village within the next 20-30 years, and 
that there was very little they could do about it. In both communities, there 
were murmurings about solutions, but this had not translated into much action 
as yet.  
     In the context of remote Indigenous communities in Australia, it has been 
noted that funding rarely goes directly to the local level, for work to be done 
and managed by locals according to the local needs (Bardsley and Wiseman, 
2012). The same could be said of Fiji and Tonga. In Fiji, the community was 
actively lobbying the government for help to build a seawall, but without much 
success. In Tonga, there was talk in equal measure of needing a seawall for 
which there was no funding, or needing to relocate, for which there was no 
assistance to re-build. If the reason the lobbying for a seawall has been 
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unsuccessful is because it is not the best adaptive response, this reason has not 
been adequately explained to the residents, nor alternatives suggested. 
     There are also examples of the community acting entirely on its own, for 
relatively large scale projects. In ‘Uiha village in Tonga, the community 
established a savings plan, and saved enough money for a concrete block 
outside toilet to be built for every family. When the required amount was 
reached, the toilet blocks were built. They stood out as being the only 
consistent survivors of Cyclone Ian. It seems that this project was done entirely 
from within and by the community, and provides a good example of what is 
possible with sufficient leadership and goodwill from the entire community. It 
is likely that the equality of the outcome, affecting everyone in the village 
greatly assisted the success of the project, compared with something like the 
protection of the foreshore, which has immediate benefits to only those living 
on the shoreline. 
9.5 Conclusion 
     Remoteness was an issue with similarities and differences in the two 
countries, reflecting the diversity of remote islands. In Fiji, the island was 
remote within the region it is located in. In Tonga, the island was within an 
entire region considered remote. Both communities experienced extended waits 
for humanitarian aid, and felt overlooked and under-prioritised, especially by 
governments. However, both also displayed some of the positive cultural 
aspects of remoteness, with strong social capital (albeit in different forms), and 
resilience among the communities. Even within countries consisting of 
multiple small islands, these small, remote, outer islands have experiences that 
are completely different to the main islands within their countries. They are 
viewed as being dependent by their own governments, but in many ways their 
circumstances and remoteness demands independence and resilience not 
required of those on the main islands. Those in isolated islands have the least 
possibility of being able to escape a disaster, but do not have the infrastructure 
or responses that recognise this, such as proper evacuation centres or 
preventative measures, and are last on the list to receive such things unless the 
situation is so dire that there is no choice. There is a clear connection to the 
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notion that even within island countries, remote islands may be remote from 
power centres (Kelman and Khan, 2013). 
     There may be evidence too of the weakening of inter-island relationships 
since both colonisation and the increase in disaster aid, with perceptions in 
Tonga of favouritism among the outer islands with some receiving more and 
earlier disaster aid than others.  
     The strength of community action was variable, with some ideas being 
implemented as concrete plans of action even for the long term, and others 
remaining just as talking points at the moment. The reasons for this variation 
are complex, and likely to include the local community level governance and 
informal systems, expectations, and perceived benefits both to the community 
and to individuals. 
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Chapter 10 – Perceptions of changes needed for the 
future 
     In a study of the adaptive capacity of disaster response systems in the 
Pacific, focusing on the humanitarian phases, Gero and colleagues found that 
in Fiji, the most important determinants were information and knowledge, risk 
perceptions, communication and relationships, financial capacity, leadership 
and governance and management (Gero, Fletcher, Rumsey et al., 2013). The 
current project also includes the recovery and rehabilitation phases of the 
response, the perspective of the affected communities, and the concept of 
expectations of aid, and found similar issues to be dominant. 
     Pacific island nations have traditionally not only embraced the oceans (for 
example, as being a supplier of abundant food), but have had the oceans so 
deeply embedded in their culture and identity, that there is reference to a ‘sea 
of islands’ - reflecting their resourcefulness and connections. This is in stark 
contrast to the more Western view of these islands as being ‘islands in a sea’ 
(Hau'ofa, 1994). However, the impacts of climate change have highlighted the 
pre-existing threatening nature of the oceans - exacerbating storm surges and 
tsunamis, and rising sea levels (Nunn, 2012).  
10.1 Perceptions of aid availability in future 
     Ideas and opinions about the future availability of post-disaster aid in a 
world of increasing disasters varied. Most community members were 
pessimistic and considered that their best hope for the future is likely to be a 
return to self-reliance. Aid organisations and donor agencies though were much 
less consistent in responses.  
     Villagers in Fiji seemed to frame their response to this issue in terms of 
their disappointment and confusion around the differences in aid response to 
Cyclones Ami and Tomas. The reduction in aid for Tomas has left many 
feeling that aid is unpredictable and should not be relied upon in future.  
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There was a sense that any aid into the future would be a bonus, rather than 
conceiving that aid may be able to increase as disasters increase in years to 
come.  
He thinks that if hurricanes are more severe and 
frequently occurring, he thinks the government and aid 
organisations can't do much assisting. From what he 
experienced in the previous cyclone, even Ami and 
Tomas, he saw there was a difference, and that was how 
many years apart. So if they are more frequent, he thinks 
there comes a time the government would not be able to 
provide assistance (Fiji, male villager, aged 46-59 years, 
through an interpreter).  
     There was a consistent view expressed by villagers, that the primary reason 
for the differences in aid between Ami and Tomas was the change in 
government, from the previous democracy to the current interim military 
regime. Aid availability in future was often linked to whether or not there 
would be a return to democracy. This was especially evident among younger 
villagers, who have not had as much experience with cyclones in the past. 
If it's not an elected government, they don't have money. 
So if the hurricane keeps going stronger, what will they 
do, because there will not be enough aid. Before there 
was plenty of aid, but this time no (Fiji, male villager, 
aged 35-45 years).  
     In Tonga, the pessimism was also readily apparent, with most people 
thinking that aid will not be able to keep up in the future. But here, it was more 
related to the donor dependence of aid - “cash on hand, that’s the one thing. If 
no money, no aid” (Tonga, male villager, aged 46-59 years). 
     Aid organisations and donor representatives presented a far more complex 
picture, as may be expected with their closer knowledge and experience of 
donation of aid funding. The one consistent message was that aid availability is 
and will continue to be very much donor dependent.  
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Basically nothing happens without the donors being 
involved. If there's no money coming in, there's no money 
coming in and there's no sense of urgency by any of these 
organisations to have a separate pool waiting there in 
case of any disasters. We'll always have to look to these 
donors (Fiji, aid organisation representative). 
     Some thought more frequent and intense disasters would mean that the 
sources of donor funding would need to be expanded, since currently there is 
often a reliance on one or two countries predominately (Australia and New 
Zealand). Tonga may be working on that already, with requests for donor aid 
being made directly to China after Cyclone Ian in 2014 (Brown Pulu, 2014).  
     The most experienced aid organisation and donor agency representatives 
agreed that aid availability is not likely to decrease in the future. “If the need is 
big enough, we’ll find the money from somewhere, I have no doubt about that” 
(Fiji, aid organisation representative). Post-disaster aid is seen as an attractive 
option for donors, to be seen to be doing something in the small ‘window of 
opportunity’ when the world’s attention is on the event. Politics is seen as one 
of the main drivers of the ‘business of response’, and “whatever the 
relationships, the figures of donations that are coming in from the outside, 
seem to be going up” (Fiji, aid organisation representative). This may be 
especially the case for small developing countries such those in the Pacific, 
where a relatively small outlay for the donor in financial terms has a big impact 
in dollar per capita terms. 
     This is seen as being somewhat contradictory to the rhetoric about moving 
towards disaster risk reduction. A number of aid organisations and community 
members noted the difficulties in obtaining funding for risk reduction 
activities, which contrasts with the increasing availability of response aid. One 
aid organisation in particular, involved in doing disaster risk reduction work 
lamented the difficulties in attracting donor and government interest and 
funding in this type of work.  
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Because unfortunately people want to give money when 
it's in the news and after the fact. It's really not the 
effective way to do disaster management.  
We could prevent a lot of this harm for much less than 
they're spending on coming in after that fact (Fiji, aid 
organisation representative). 
     Examples of community education and risk reduction work were provided 
by a few aid organisations however, they tended to be small projects with 
individual communities. The frustrations of those trying to pursue this work 
and seeing where the money flows were evident: 
It’s before the event which is the problem, but after the 
event it's quite good. People are pouring money like 
anything, they open one account and you will see half a 
million in that account within one week. People from 
overseas. Only if all those money, if they can pour in all 
those fund to educate people. Even to change the 
infrastructure to withstand what is coming (Fiji, aid 
organisation representative).  
     This was noted in Tonga as well, with prevention and climate change 
adaptation funding being much more complicated, difficult to access, and from 
multiple sources: 
I think the hardest part of it is getting the people to 
actually fund the priority actions. I think because donors, 
different donors, each has different requirements, 
different criteria, different timeframes for project 
proposals to be submitted. There are so many processes 
that the proposal has to go through before it is approved. 
So getting a proposal developed and getting a project 
proposal approved is a major problem for us (Tonga, 
government representative). 
     Risk reduction work is simply not as attractive to donors, governments and 
aid organisations that are concerned with being seen to be doing something. It 
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is long term and requires planning and co-ordination of a different type to the 
fulfilling of immediate humanitarian needs after a disaster.  
The responses may be more neutral than the positive responses from the 
communities and the media, invoked by doing disaster response work, where 
the ‘hero factor’ looms large.  
     The World Bank housing project following Cyclone Ian specifically 
includes some prevention funding, with money being allocated to 150 homes 
that did not sustain damage, for ‘resilience strengthening’, and to every home 
for sanitation and water facilities improvements. As well as addressing the 
essential housing needs, the project includes aims relating to the integration of 
DRM and CCA strategies, and the incorporation of prevention work and 
funding into the disaster response is a clever and efficient method of achieving 
the goal. The relative ease with which response funding is available and 
provided compared with prevention and development funding is highlighted in 
the project documentation that states: “As an emergency housing project, no 
economic or financial analysis was undertaken” (World Bank, 2014 p13).  
     The government recognises the contradictions and inefficiencies in the 
current way of operating. However, moving towards a new approach is a slow 
process. There is definitely a sense that some good climate change adaptation 
and disaster risk reduction work is being done, but it is not co-ordinated either 
at a project or policy level: 
I’m really looking at re-aligning the policies, to the 
treaties, conventions and frameworks that we have 
ratified. You know, the Hyogo Framework and the 
Pacific Action Plan. Then after this, I'll go and talk to the 
Australian High Commission here - this is what I'm 
doing on disaster risk reduction, are there any funding 
available? I'm sure they would appreciate it. Probably 
that's something that we are learning as well. We confine 
our planning to what government can afford. But there is 
a bigger world out there, and that's what I'm working on 
right now (Fiji, government representative). 
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     The balancing act comes in being able to seek and obtain donor funding 
without losing control of the agenda. Both aid organisation and government 
representatives spoke of projects becoming donor driven rather than country 
driven, especially where the government, being so dependent on donor funds, 
puts the needs of the international relationship above the domestic problems: 
This is where we are heading. If we don’t be careful 
about that, then we are all geared towards the 
international communities. Whatever comes from them, 
you take it. And I think the political environment, they 
like that. Because they go and showcase that to the 
people in the communities (Tonga, government 
representative). 
      One of the aspirations for the 2013-14 budget of the Fijian department 
responsible for natural disaster management, was to have funding allocated for 
disaster risk reduction and mitigation. Without such mechanisms in place, 
and/or the re-aligning of donor funds away from response, increasing risk 
reduction work is likely to at best remain sporadic and piecemeal, and at worst, 
to remain largely rhetoric.  
10.2 Perceptions of relocation 
     Relocation of entire populations due to climate variability, natural hazards 
and climate change has already happened in at least five islands in at least four 
countries in the Indo-Pacific region (Gromilova, 2014). Fijian villages are 
asking to be relocated (Chand, 2014), more than one has already been 
relocated, and another 42 have been identified as needing to relocate within the 
next 10 years (Pacnews, 2014). While there is debate within academia about 
the extent to which planned relocation of entire islands will be required in the 
near future as adaptation options (Nurse, McLean, Agard et al., 2014), the issue 
is alive and current on the islands in Fiji and Tonga in this study. In fact the 
history of villages relocating as a direct result of disasters dates back in Fiji to 
at least 1931 (Yeo and Blong, 2010), and in Tonga to 1946 (UNCTAD 
Secretariat and UNDRO, 1983).  
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     When discussing the impacts of climate change on the islands, including the 
most often cited rising sea levels and beach erosion, and the increases in 
cyclone activity, relocation was offered by a number of community 
respondents as an adaptation strategy, either within or away from the islands. 
There was a sense of hopelessness, with relocation being considered the only 
possible option, rather than the most attractive among multiple options. In one 
question, I asked what the island would be like looking 50 years into the future. 
The most common response from community members in both countries was 
that the houses closest to the shoreline did not have 50 years, but would be 
unviable within the next 10-20 years at the most.  
If it happens like that, two or three years, we should 
leave this island…we should go to another place…I 
don’t know, maybe sometimes the hurricane will come. 
What will we do if we stay here? (Fiji, female villager, 
aged 35-45 years). 
     However, for the villagers living on the shoreline, relocation was the last 
resort. While there was an explicit acknowledgement that the erosion is quickly 
worsening and that their houses are in danger, the emotional ties to the house 
meant that moving did not seem as inevitable to them as it did to some living 
on higher ground. 
I can tell that moving out from here is not really an 
option. It’s like the second option. The first option is to 
do something if I can to stay here, but to match onto the 
climate changes that is happening now (Fiji, male 
villager, aged 46-59 years). 
     In the two years since the main fieldwork was conducted, approximately 
another one to two metres of erosion has occurred from the shoreline in front 
of the house of this villager, leaving less than two metres from his door to the 
new high tide mark. The government has told him he must relocate, but 
without certainty on financial assistance, he is resisting any immediate move.  
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His house is built up from ground level on stilts, which he considers will buy 
him more time even when the water reaches the door. He is planning to re-start 
work on building up the beach to prevent further erosion - work which the 
entire community began and then abandoned when those living higher up lost 
interest and support for the project.  
     While very important to Pacific islanders, these issues are not unique to that 
region. The importance of sense of place in community resilience and its 
negative association with relocation strategies has been discussed in a rural 
Australian context (Boon, 2014).  
     The house where I stayed in Tonga was close to the shoreline, and gets 
inundated every king tide. But the family was not interested in being told they 
should move, insisting that the flooding would have to be daily from each high 
tide before they would consider it.  
     The government confirmed that in their climate change adaptation 
consultations with communities in Tonga, it is common for people to say they 
would prefer to die where they are than to leave, and would like to build a 
seawall rather than to relocate. This recognition of the challenges of 
environmental changes but resistance to relocation or migration as a solution 
has been found in outer islands of the Solomon Islands also (Birk and 
Rasmussen, 2014).  
     While the attachment of one’s house to one’s identity is undoubtedly real in 
both countries, for many, the logistical and financial realities of relocation 
provide the biggest impediment. Particularly in Tonga, where the entire island 
of ‘Uiha is less than two metres above sea level, many people spoke of wanting 
to find somewhere else to live, but being unable to. There is some government 
assistance in Tonga to find alternative land, but no assistance to re-build. This 
is the end of the conversation for many people, who simply have no way of 
financially being able to afford to build another home elsewhere. A number of 
villagers said that they would move if it were made feasible to do so.  
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    There are talks within government regarding relocating communities 
(‘managed retreat’), but no real discussion about how to overcome the 
obstacles of land tenure and re-building expenses. The situation is frustrating 
also for organisations providing aid after disasters: 
They just wait and ask for the government, but the 
government said they don’t have money for that. So what 
they do?…They face the challenge everyday. They go 
back to their house because there is nowhere else to go. 
The water is always there. When there is a cyclone, the 
big wave come and ruin their house and all their cooking 
set and things outside. But you know what? They come 
back. They ask their relative to give them like a hand 
with their clothes and their cooking set. But they can’t 
move. Why? They don’t have much money. That’s the 
challenge I face with the coastal. We distribute every 
time, every cyclone. Because why? The government don’t 
help to relocate them. They want to move, but they can’t 
go and sit under a tree (Tonga, aid organisation 
representative). 
     In Fiji, the communities must contribute financially for relocating, with one 
village of 30 houses contributing about half the estimated FJD$500,000 cost of 
the move (Valemei, 2014). In order to achieve this, ten years of negotiations 
and planning were invested, and the project was assisted through the use of a 
‘cash for work’ program with villagers providing labour and timber for the 
buildings (International Labour Organization, 2013). Projects such as this 
require leadership, time, good collaborations with government and aid 
organisations, and the co-operation of the entire community. This is not an 
easy combination to achieve but migration is happening anyway. 
     On both islands, but especially on ‘Uiha island, many people migrate either 
to the cities on the main islands, or internationally, as has been the case for 
years. Everyone knew people who had moved or were planning to, but the 
stated reasons were related to education or employment opportunities rather 
than because of climate change impacts. Only one family in the Tongan village 
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was planning to move as a result of Cyclone Ian in 2014, with others flatly 
rejecting the suggestion. This reflects the multiple concerns of people in 
disaster-prone developing countries, such health, economics, and land-tenure 
considered as well as disaster risk and climate change impacts (López-Marrero 
and Yarnal, 2010). The longer-term effects are considered just that - longer 
term, and not necessarily directly connected to decisions made today.  
     It has been suggested that migration as a climate change adaptation option 
has received little policy and planning attention, perhaps because it is viewed 
as failed adaptation. But given the migration that happens already (albeit for 
other reasons) and the likelihood that it will be required further into the future, 
the benefits of and barriers to the current migration should be recognised and 
investigated (Birk and Rasmussen, 2014).  
10.3 Perceptions of preparation and education as resilience 
     The issue of preparing for a cyclone or other disaster was a prominent 
feature of interviews with each group, but in different ways. On the islands, 
villagers talked about preparation mainly in terms of housing - tie down the 
roof, nail window shutters or cover windows with tin or board. Fewer 
mentioned other details like torches with batteries, firewood, drinking water, 
protection of crops. A couple of villagers said that if there was time, they 
would go to the main island to go shopping to boost their supply of food. There 
was a view among the elders in the community that many people are not really 
prepared until after the event, because they are not thinking about cyclones 
enough. One person in Fiji had the idea that there should be a village meeting 
before the cyclone comes, to talk about what needed to be done. 
     There were mixed views among aid organisations about whether 
community preparation is better now than in the past. Some said that the 
general level of knowledge within communities has improved, while others 
thought that faster aid and more of it, combined with, particularly in Tonga, a 
lack of recent experience with larger cyclones has meant that people do not put 
that knowledge into practice. One villager in Tonga spoke of protecting his 
crops following a cyclone warning, only to be laughed at by others when the 
cyclone altered course and missed them. 
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     A key difference in the perspective of the aid organisations and government, 
from that of the community, is in the temporal scale of ‘preparation’. In the 
community it was usually thought about as in the time following the disaster 
warning. Aid organisations and government representatives talked about 
preparation in the longer term, with issues like governance arrangements and 
logistics, as well as community training in preparation and awareness. 
Preparation for the whole disaster season was seen as being vital. While many 
villagers talked about the cyclone season as an entity, only some translated this 
into continual preparation such as in terms of crop planting. Training in this 
area is seen as very helpful, but that there is not enough of it, and there was a 
consensus that community preparation should be a focus in the future: 
What I’d like to see is more focus on preparedness. Like 
everywhere in the world, it’s a ‘nice to have’ as opposed 
to an ‘absolute requirement’ (Fiji, aid organisation 
representative).  
     Many aid organisations nominated increased community preparation and 
awareness as their number one item for changes in the disaster response system 
into the future. The importance of ongoing training was mentioned, with follow 
up visits, rather than one-off community based training, which at the village 
level may be forgotten. 
     A government representative in Fiji brought responsibility into the issue of 
community preparation and training: 
In the Pacific framework for action plan, we have one of 
the thematic areas is the underlying risk factors. People 
need to take responsibility as well. People need to take 
ownership as well (Fiji, government representative).  
     Aid organisations and governments talked about community preparation 
directly in terms of expectations of aid: 
But if we're able to prepare people to be a bit more 
resilient, and to reduce potential risks that they can 
forecast, it will make the work of these people a whole 
lot easier when it comes to disasters.  
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Because the norm right now is that after disasters, 
people expect, people in evacuation centres expect food 
the very same day and things. But if they were more 
prepared, they would know that this is disaster season 
and you should always have things prepared (Fiji, aid 
organisation representative). 
     Humanitarian aid is seen by the more experienced organisations delivering 
it, as something that should complement community action, not be in place of 
it. Without this, the ‘need’ for humanitarian aid increases significantly, and aid 
organisations become limited to the role of ‘professional responders’, rather 
than also trying to reduce risk. 
     There is a cross over between preparation and prevention. Aid organisations 
talked about needing to look at the longer term and instituting behavioural 
change in both Fiji and Tonga towards risk reduction and prevention as a 
method of being prepared for disasters. There is a perceived need to bring this 
into the thinking across government and development planning. A government 
representative said, “Development has occurred over the years in Fiji, and 
development comes with its price”. The need for planning where buildings and 
dwellings should go and to what standard of construction was clear, but this 
was not necessarily translated into action.  
     There is a movement towards disaster risk reduction, but it is piecemeal and 
appears under many labels currently. The lack of co-ordination and status (e.g. 
National budget) of this work means that organisations do not know what each 
other is doing in this area. Mechanisms and policies for making this work 
easier are not in place. There is a view however, that communities are moving 
towards a disaster risk reduction approach, even if they do not apply that label 
to their thinking: 
A lot of communities are thinking about it already. And 
whether they’ve read all the material and know the right 
terminology, they’re thinking about it (Fiji, aid 
organisation representative).  
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     There was some evidence of this in my study. While there was a strong 
focus in the community on the need for a seawall to deal with rising sea levels 
and beach erosion, a couple of people mentioned other types of risk reduction 
activities. The type of crops planted is being thought about in a longer term 
perspective of disaster risk: 
We are encouraging other people to plant another type 
of root crop they stay longer. It can stay for three or four 
years. Like you plant it this year, you won't uproot it this 
year. Maybe next year. Then maybe you take away just 
one or 2 and then bury it again. It will give a lot more 
next year. That's what we are encouraging people to do, 
preparing for the cyclone (Fiji, female villager, aged 35-
45 years). 
10.4 Perceptions of climate change adaptation options 
     In all the interviews I conducted, with government, aid organisations and 
the community in both Fiji and Tonga, people were aware of climate change 
and its impacts, and were thinking about adaptation measures. On isolated 
islands, the environment takes on much more importance than for those living 
in cities:  
Yes, it’s very different now. I’m now 69…when I looking 
back to when I was 30, it is very different. I also live 
beside the ocean and I understand what is 
happening…the ocean is my neighbour (Tonga, male 
villager, aged 60+).  
      The impacts of climate change noted by all groups included differences in 
the disaster ‘season’, in the intensity of disasters, and accelerating sea level 
rise. In Tonga, the villagers talked about a neighbouring island that in their 
youth they walked to at low tide, but which was now a boat ride away. Some 
community members even noted changes in the actual cyclones: 
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That's the cyclone, the direction where the cyclone 
comes. That was before, but now it changes. Now it can 
be from any direction. Before it was only one. November, 
December, January, then no more cyclones. That was 
before. But now anytime. And the direction the wind 
comes, is just any direction (Fiji, male villager, aged 60+ 
years). 
     There was agreement from all groups that the climate change impacts being 
experienced mean there will have to be adaptations made. Aid organisations 
and government representatives each mentioned the need to think more 
analytically and strategically about responses to disasters to avoid just patching 
things up more often. One villager in Fiji who has seen many cyclones talked 
about the futility of making patch repairs to houses that have been badly 
damaged in a cyclone. She said she has seen the same houses have to be 
repaired over and over again, and that it would be more efficient to just rebuild 
in the first place. This echoes the thoughts of post-disaster reconstruction 
housing specialists working for United Kingdom-based organisations, who 
acknowledged that time constraints often mean that mitigation is not done 
(Hayles, 2010). However, the unsustainability of this approach is being 
recognised by government officials also: 
Climate change? Very much. We have to be very quick 
with what we do. The thing is that people need to be very 
analytical. Gone are the times when I would say - oh, 
this is how we used to do it. Things have changed a lot 
(Fiji, government representative). 
     Both government and some aid organisations talked about changing their 
operations as a direct result of seeing an increase in the frequency and intensity 
of natural disasters in their country: 
But now we are starting to build capacity because of the 
frequency of the natural disasters. Before because there 
was once in a while a cyclone or a flood. We just 
responded at the time but were not really serious about 
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building capacity. But now because of the frequency of 
the flooding that happens, especially this year, and the 
change in weather patterns and everything, we are now 
taking that role seriously and are building capacity to be 
able to respond effectively (Fiji, aid organisation 
representative) 
We're working with them now. Next week we're 
conducting training with Divisional Planning Officers 
and some others to work on logistics, and that is the first 
time we're doing it, because of the strength and intensity 
and frequency of the disasters we're facing (Fiji, 
government representative). 
     Translating the rhetoric of a need to work differently into action though is 
difficult and slow. The timing of such a transition is problematic. In the 
immediate aftermath of an event, there is not really the time available to do the 
analysis. Outside of the humanitarian and immediate response though, there is 
not necessarily the motivation or funding available. 
When this last flooding came up and I was pitching what 
we could do to help. I said we're happy to help out and 
these people need help, but I'm just wondering - this is 
happening every year now, so is anyone stepping back 
and saying can we spend a larger amount of money to 
see how we can try to assess how we can prevent this? 
Do we need to move people, do we need to change 
irrigation, do we have to change the way timber is being 
unsustainably harvested? What are the causes and what 
are the real solutions? Because we're just going to do 
this every year and that's just sort of ridiculous. He 
agreed. I think they are trying to encourage talks with 
government about looking at things that way. I'm not 
sure how much headway they're making (Fiji, aid 
organisation representative). 
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     Adaptation measures and projects cited as examples included improvements 
to water systems to diversify water sources, relocation of communities, and the 
extension of the building code from urban to rural areas. Currently in Fiji, the 
building code is not legally binding in rural areas, and one suggested 
adaptation measure is to over time, rectify this omission and then make disaster 
relief housing dependent upon compliance. However, not all development and 
adaptation strategies had good levels of buy-in from the communities. Where 
there was an immediate perceived benefit to the community, there were good 
levels of support, such as the community fishing project in Tonga (see section 
4.5, Gender issues). Where these benefits were less obvious, the support was 
not there. In Delaivadra, the smaller village on Druadrua island in Fiji, a 
composting toilet in the middle of the village gathered dust - ‘public toilets’ on 
the island were in the mangroves, where people could not see those using them. 
     Community members on both islands often spoke of the need for a seawall 
to be built in their community, because of the increasing erosion of the beach. 
Past decisions, in the name of ‘development’, have not assisted the 
communities. In Fiji, colonial administrators demanded the clearing of 
mangroves from village fronts - a decision that has resulted in erosion and 
increased sedimentation (Veitayaki, 2006). On Druadrua island, the evidence 
of this practice and its results was clear. The erosion, which has been occurring 
for decades, is accelerating and when cyclones coincide with high tides, the 
storm surge has been known to take more than one metre of beach with it. 
There was general agreement that the houses on the shoreline of the island in 
Fiji are in increasing danger and are likely to be washed away completely 
within the next 20 or so years. That is with just the rising sea levels. A couple 
of strong storm surges would be enough to potentially wash some houses away, 
since there is one house with water already lapping at the timbers, and a few 
less than five metres from the high tide shoreline. In the photos over the page, 
the same house is shown in 2012 and 2014. In just two years, the rocks in the 
groyne (or breakwater) have sunk into the sand, and the high tide mark has 
moved well under the house, washing away the remnants of foreshore in front 
(see Photos 10.1 and 10.2: Druadrua foreshore 2012 and 2014). 
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Photo 10.1: Druadrua foreshore 2012 
 
Photo 10.2: Druadrua foreshore 2014 
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     The community is keenly aware of what is happening, and that the people in 
those homes affected are running out of both time and options: 
His idea is there are two things that can be done. Either 
recreate that place again, or those people to move 
somewhere. Those are the two things to be done (Fiji, 
male villager, aged 46-59 years, through an interpreter). 
Within the community however, there was some debate about whose 
responsibility it was to build the longed for seawall. Some thought that if the 
whole village was not involved, then it was up to those families living on the 
shoreline. While there are efforts underway now, such as creating groynes, 
with varying degrees of success, a seawall is agreed upon as the ultimate, but 
too expensive, solution. I was told that there have been requests to the 
government for the past five to seven years for funding and assistance in this 
adaptation project without a response so far that is seen as satisfactory to the 
community. 
     The clear calls for the construction of seawalls on both islands, but 
especially on Druadrua, should be put in the context of findings that seawalls 
are not always the best solution, and are often ineffective. Many seawalls last 
for only 18-24 months before collapsing, and repair work is usually expensive 
and limited (Nunn, 2012). A seawall is an adaptation option community 
members know and therefore see as desirable. Formal assessments of other 
engineering or natural solutions have not been conducted. Indeed, there have 
been unintended consequences to the building of a seawall on Lifuka island in 
Tonga, which may render it maladaptive. Lifuka came to the attention of many 
in the climate change adaptation field when an earthquake caused the Western 
side of the island to lower by 23cm in 2006, resulting in a massive and instant 
sea level rise. This was quickly seen as a preview of the future for Pacific 
islands. A seawall was constructed to protect the hospital, and then 
subsequently, the hospital was relocated further inland. Both the actual 
construction of the wall and its location has made houses further along the 
shoreline more vulnerable. The displacement of the water has increased 
erosion, and sand mining from the beach during the construction further 
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exacerbated the problem. Houses where previously the water was close are 
now being inundated daily, and need to relocate. 
     As referred to in the quote above, relocation is considered the alternative 
solution by the community. Some spoke of this in relation to the homes closest 
to the shore but for others it was a realistic future scenario for the entire island. 
Relocation though is not simple. It was recognised by some aid organisations 
that relocation is expensive, and often involves conflict-inciting traditional land 
ownership issues. Some community members expressed frustration with the 
suggestion that they should move their homes. As well as the emotional and 
historical ties to the houses, some of which have been occupied by the same 
family for generations, the logistical, practical and cost implications are serious 
concerns: 
One time I was with them when they came here after 
Cyclone Gavin. They just come and say - you should go 
there to the other side of the island, change your place, 
or go somewhere. That made me very angry with them. 
Why do they come and say that to us? To change where I 
am, somewhere on top to build my house. If they can tell 
us that to change that, to build my house on top of where 
the waves can't strike, but they don't give me any help, 
what's the use of coming and giving me that advice? 
(Fiji, male villager, aged 46-59 years).  
     In Tonga, government and aid organisation representatives spoke of higher 
level and more general problems with tackling climate change adaptation 
issues. An aid organisation representative spoke of the difficulties of enhancing 
community preparation for climate change impacts that are slower onset (than, 
for example, cyclones) and of which there is less experience. Another said that 
motivation in communities is a big problem because the more you explain 
about climate change, the more apparent it becomes that despite local efforts, 
others around the world are still contributing to the problem so then people lose 
hope.  
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Climate change is…I’ve been telling the outer islands, 
that we are on the receiving end of it. We didn’t create it 
(Tonga, government representative). 
     This core inequality, which is fundamental to climate change, does not go 
unrecognised by many in the field throughout the world. However, while those 
in the countries who did create the problem talk about this issue, those ‘on the 
receiving end of it’ must act now. 
     Clark and colleagues build on this idea of environmental justice, linking it 
with disasters. Both areas acknowledge the disproportionate susceptibility of 
the under-privileged minorities and disempowered social groups, with 
disadvantage linked to vulnerability - exposure, susceptibility and capacity to 
recover. Extending this thinking, a logical consequence of anthropogenic 
climate change is that there is a social element to the actual hazard, as well as 
to its becoming a disaster (Clark, Chhotray and Few, 2013).  
10.5 Conclusion 
     Prevention and preparation are seen as key for all participant groups in this 
study, with a recognised need for more community education in future. 
Combined with this is the pessimism displayed by many of the remote 
islanders about whether and what government assistance is likely to be 
available. The limits to aid (either political or donor-driven, or both) are 
apparent to these communities, especially for disaster prevention or climate 
change adaptation strategies.  
     Both communities wanted a seawall to be built to protect them from the 
visibly rising sea level and ultimately, for assistance in relocating to a safer 
place to live. Realistically however, this was viewed as being unlikely in the 
foreseeable future. This may be a reflection of the recognition by the respective 
governments that alternatives to seawalls may be more effective and efficient. 
Indeed, a government representative in Tonga confirmed that they were 
trialling alternatives, such as gabion baskets, following advice that seawalls are 
often short-lived and expensive. For the communities though, these details are 
absent and there is only the waiting. 
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     The idea of relocation was resisted by many and considered to be an option 
of last resort. People are living with regular inundation of their homes and 
simply coping with it rather than leaving. However, the financial realities of 
actually moving to another place were apparent in the decision making, with 
people on both islands saying that government assistance to find new land and 
rebuild would make relocation seem like an available option. 
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Chapter 11 - Issues of adaptive capacity of disaster 
response systems in Fiji and Tonga 
     This chapter will discuss the issues raised in the results around the capacity 
to achieve adaptation and resilience. An analysis is presented of the focus of 
aid funding, governance, expectations, remoteness, the alignment of 
perspectives of the participant groups in the study and progress being made. 
The experience of community members on remote islands presents a new and 
different perspective on disaster management and response, and climate change 
adaptation. Issues prominent in the disaster literature around distribution and 
effectiveness of aid, dependence on aid, resilience, vulnerability, and 
difficulties in aligning disaster risk management with climate change 
adaptation are experienced in a different way on a remote island community.  
11.1 The move towards preparation and prevention 
     There was very little agreement between all three participant groups in this 
study, but the one area of consistent agreement was the importance of 
preparation. Most people agree that those who have experienced and remember 
experiencing a severe cyclone take warnings most seriously, and prepare the 
best. This is supported by the views of the younger community members in 
Tonga who agreed that they largely ignored the warnings for Cyclone Ian in 
January 2014, but will know better next time. This means that predictions of 
climate change do not bode well for future community preparations because at 
any one time there will be more people alive who have no memory of a big 
cyclone. This is especially pertinent for demographically young populations, 
such as in Fiji and Tonga.  
     The populations on the remote islands are almost devoid of people in their 
late teens, twenties and even thirties. Young people leave the islands for high 
school education and work opportunities, with those who do return to live there 
again generally not doing so until years later. Most of the younger people who 
do remain seemed to be the youngest child, living at home to care for their now 
elderly parents. The strong presence of elders may leave the remote islands in a 
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slightly better position in terms of community memory of strong cyclones, but 
will rely on the knowledge of the elders being respected and passed on. Social 
memory is said to be an important element of resilience (Carpenter et al., 
2012). The current systems, both formal and informal, are not able to readily 
adapt to and cope with this likely reduction in social memory of cyclones, 
because the money flows into emergency response, not the longer term risk 
reduction and preparedness.  
     The efforts put into preparation for an oncoming event are one of the 
biggest factors in the outcome. Essential and ongoing challenges nominated by 
all groups were timely and accurate warnings being successfully delivered to 
the right communities, and the responsiveness of the communities to such 
warnings. This is recognised by government and aid organisations, and 
community awareness training is frequently offered as the disaster season 
approaches each year. However, more can always be done, not only in doing 
this type of training but in ensuring that it is appropriate to the needs of each 
community. Following the 2009 tsunami in Tonga, warning signs were placed 
in villages across the country (see photo 11.1 below). 
      
     Photo 11.1: Tsunami warning sign on ‘Uiha island 
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     The intention was clearly right - to provide information to communities 
about tsunamis and how to escape them. However, the advice in the sign is to 
‘move inland and to high ground’. It is a running joke on ‘Uiha island that 
there is no-where high since the entire island is less than two metres above sea 
level, and is so small, that moving inland would have you in the water on the 
other side of the island. The advice provided on this sign is neither relevant nor 
helpful to people on islands such as this. Country-wide disaster preparation 
programs need to be tailored to suit each place in which they are implemented, 
rather than simply being a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Despite the 
inappropriateness of the tsunami warning sign to this particular island, it 
probably does have the potential to achieve a slightly different purpose - that of 
maintaining attention on disaster preparedness throughout the year. 
     Most people agreed that extreme weather events are not usually discussed 
outside of disaster season (see section 4.1, thinking about cyclones), which has 
several potential flow on effects, particularly for preparation. Firstly for the 
communities, it allows time to ‘forget’, and requires preparation for disaster to 
be re-introduced as a concept annually, rather than being a normalised part of 
life in at-risk communities. Secondly, it cements the idea of a ‘disaster season’, 
despite perceptions from some that the season is either changing or cannot be 
relied upon any more, and that disasters can happen at any time. This has the 
potential to increase the risk that events happening outside this ‘season’ will 
catch people off-guard, and be more likely to turn into disasters. For aid 
organisations and governments, there is a similar risk of a focus on preparation 
during the ‘season’ leading to a lack thereof outside that time. The line 
between a sensible concentration of efforts during the time extreme weather 
events are most likely to happen, and a totality of efforts being restricted to the 
‘season’ may be a fine one.  
     Another important implication of the lack of attention to disasters outside of 
the perceived disaster season is that it is precisely during the more quiet times 
of the year, that the opportunity is available to dedicate to prevention. Debriefs 
following the events are not new, but they are inconsistent and often only done 
after the biggest events. For adaptive governance and a resilient system, such 
debriefs should be routine so that lessons learned can be gathered together. 
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This is important for smoothing out operational concerns and obstacles. 
However, this is still different to issues of prevention. The emergency response 
and rehabilitation phases may be understandably chaotic, and it would be 
inappropriate during those phases to wait until longer-term issues of prevention 
are considered before supplying relief to suffering communities.  
     Prevention, and the ways in which it might alter the response and 
rehabilitation phases needs to be given due consideration and thought when 
there are not current emergencies. Rather, prevention should be part of the 
planning for the response and rehabilitation phases. Where for example, the 
Committees responsible for disaster management with all the key players, both 
government and non-government represented, do not meet until there is an 
emergency warning activated, there is no structure available for those 
conversations to take place. It is admirable and visionary to insist that disaster 
relief housing be built to withstand floods and cyclonic winds, and located to 
minimise risk within acceptable boundaries of the communities. It is difficult 
to see communities not wanting that to happen. However, if it takes an extra 
two to three years for the relief housing to be built, while those issues are 
figured out, the reception from communities is unlikely to be as positive.  
     Certainly some of the issues will always be location and time dependent and 
need to be addressed case-by-case. But a certain amount of planning and 
preparation can be done ahead of time. ‘How can we make this happen?’ 
should be a question asked during the quiet times, so that during the chaotic 
times, the task is translating the answer into ‘how can we make this happen 
here and now?’. There are always pockets of work being done on prevention 
issues like the example above, by the government, aid organisations and the 
communities themselves. However, the recognition and integration of this 
work is much more difficult without the governance structures in place to 
allow for it. 
     Of course, much of the prevention work requires funding from sources 
separate to the response and rehabilitation phase money. Disaster management 
experts and aid organisations have noted the need for flexible funding systems, 
and the lack of funding for preparedness and prevention phases of the disaster 
management cycle (Pathirage et al., 2012, Aeberhard, 2008).  
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In Australia, there have been calls from practitioners for funding to be diverted 
from relief to mitigation, with the recognition that disaster relief in its current 
form does not necessarily increase resilience to disasters (Wenger, Hussey and 
Pittock, 2013). It has been noted that international adaptation funding 
mechanisms currently do not adequately address the causes of vulnerability or 
support systems transformation (Kuruppu and Willie, 2014). 
     Historically there has been little to no funding specifically allocated to 
disaster prevention in Fiji (NDMO Fiji, 2011). This changed in the 2013 Fijian 
national budget for the first time. As climate change adaptation and disaster 
risk reduction areas are brought together in the Pacific, increasingly, the 
disaster prevention funding will come from climate change adaptation funding 
sources. As noted by all participant groups, this money is much more difficult 
to access than disaster response and rehabilitation funding. This problem has 
been recognised in the literature, with the institutions such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
reporting on how to increase investment in disaster risk reduction work. 
     International funding for disaster response is neither simple nor consistent. 
The funding allocated to relief work has been found to be disproportionate 
from one event to the next, and to bear little relationship to the number of 
people affected or the amount of damages (Ferris and Petz, 2011). Meanwhile, 
an ODI analysis of development aid over the 20 year period 1991-2010 found 
that disaster response funding increased massively, but mainly in 
reconstruction and rehabilitation, with little increase in the area of risk 
reduction. Disaster losses in developing countries amount to the equivalent of 
about one third of the international development aid spending, yet only 40c 
from every $100 of aid money is spent reducing the risk of them. Nearly two 
thirds of disaster funding is spent on the emergency response, over one fifth on 
reconstruction and rehabilitation and only one eighth on risk reduction. For the 
majority of low-income countries, the equation is worse, with $160,000 in 
disaster response received for every $1 of disaster risk reduction (Kellett and 
Caravani, 2013). Recognition of the problem, and the need to shift focus from 
reactive emergency aid to proactive risk management investment is not new, 
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with calls for increased spending on disaster prevention having been made over 
a number of years (Syroka and Wilcox, 2006).  
     While full details are not yet available since the response is still in action, 
recent funding announcements following Tropical Cyclone Ian in Tonga, 
suggest that the balance has not tipped far yet. The first draft response plan 
estimates the total requirements for immediate needs, recovery and initial 
reconstruction over the following 12-18 months to be TOP90.2 million 
(equivalent to approximately AUD53.6 million, or 11% of Tonga’s GDP), of 
which TOP83.4 million was unmet at the time (National Emergency 
Operations Committee Government of the Kingdom of Tonga, 2014). At 
around the same time, the ADB signed off on a grant of TOP23 million for a 
Climate Resilience Sector Project for Tonga to operate from 2014- December 
2018. This equates to about TOP4.6 million per year for five years.  
     If most people agree more should be spent on prevention and preparation, 
why the difference? There are several complex and interconnected reasons why 
the current system persists. Firstly, in order to attract funding, the goal or 
outcome must be attractive to funders: 
The low visibility of disaster risk reduction work in 
comparison to emergency relief has made it unattractive 
for governments chasing votes and international 
recognition and for non-governmental organisations 
dependent on disasters for funding (Schipper and Pelling, 
2006, p25) 
The absence of an immediate guaranteed political payoff 
for a risk reduction investment tends to discourage the 
assignment of political and financial priority to the 
problem…Greater rewards are accorded to those leaders 
who visibly assign attention and resources to respond to 
disasters than to those who labour unseen to reduce their 
root causes (Basher, 2008, p.937-8). 
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     Politically then, countries without short election cycles should theoretically 
be in a better position to make long term decisions, where there is political will 
to do so. It may be that the 2006 coup in Fiji, and the absence of democratic 
elections during the following eight years has provided an opportunity for Fiji 
in this regard and may have been an enabling factor in the allocation of disaster 
prevention funding in the 2013 budget. 
     The issue of incentives however, seems like an almost intractable problem, 
operating in a variety of ways to reinforce aid allocation strategies and risk. 
While global ’24/7’ media exists, humanitarian aid will always present a good 
public relations opportunity. Media attention to disasters may be positively 
related to the volume of aid, but not necessarily to the level of need (Franks, 
2008). Also, incentives sometimes exist to actually increase rather than 
decrease risk, for example through development on vulnerable and high risk 
locations (Vorhies, 2012). This means that changing the incentives must 
address both decreasing risk, and not increasing it elsewhere. 
     In a vicious cycle, the greater the investment in emergency response, the 
less the incentive to invest in prevention: “In the event of a government’s being 
ill prepared for a disaster, international relief effectively rewards bad 
behaviour on the part of the poor countries’ governments” (Cohen and Werker, 
2008), p796). This links back to the ‘crowding-out’ effect of aid on disaster 
mitigation (Raschky and Schwindt, 2009). It is difficult to say whether this 
effect is evident in this study. While the community members interviewed were 
unsure about the availability of future disaster response aid, the civil society 
organisations and governments saw no reason for concern, perceiving the 
receipt of future disaster response aid as being reliable. Remote communities 
therefore may alter their behaviours and have increased incentive to invest in 
prevention strategies due to uncertainty about future response aid, but the 
government and aid organisations may not have this incentive. 
     There is definitely a dependence on international donor funding, particularly 
in Tonga, which may alter the incentives and the influence of particular types 
of aid on those incentives. It may be that a ‘crowding-out’ effect is more 
relevant for wealthier countries where there realistically are internal budget 
allocation decisions being made. The Tongan government can and does have 
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policies and priorities, but in practice reliance on donor funding is 
overwhelming and it usually comes with its own priorities and conditions. In 
Fiji, there is an expectation that funding will continue to be donated to and 
from both formal and informal sources, and while steps are being made 
towards the prioritisation of prevention work, in practice there is little time or 
energy available for it. With an increase in disasters already being felt in the 
country, the focus is on co-ordinating the disaster responses, and trying to keep 
up with recovery and rehabilitation from one event before the next one occurs.  
     Added to this, is the issue of the structure of funding availability and 
allocation. In contrast to humanitarian aid funding, which is usually 
immediately allocated to perceived and actual need, risk reduction and 
prevention funding is more likely to be subject to stringent tests and approvals. 
There is currently little empirical evidence that investment in resilience is more 
cost effective than a humanitarian response (Venton, Fitzgibbon, Shitarek et 
al., 2012). However, this may be an artefact of the type of evidence economists 
want. Cost benefit analyses are difficult to do in this area where some of the 
costs are indirect, such as the impact on economy, and benefits are usually the 
avoidance of possible future costs (Vorhies, 2012).  
     The ADB looked at the economics of climate change in six Pacific island 
countries including Fiji and recommended adopting a risk-based approach to 
adaptation and disaster risk management, prioritising action on climate change 
and increasing the cost-efficiency of adaptation measures. Improved access to 
climate finance and strong co-ordination and cooperation with regional 
partners were also seen as critical (Asian Development Bank, 2013).  
     The rise of the non-traditional aid organisations represents both an 
opportunity and a risk in terms of trying to shift the focus from response to 
prevention. As an opportunity, funders may be able to utilise the extra 
resources informally entering the disaster response sphere to free up their 
resources for prevention. With disaster risk reduction funding increasingly 
being sourced through climate adaptation financing (Kellett and Caravani, 
2013), there may be better availability of funds, but with the associated 
problems of accessibility. As a risk though, the funders may equally see this as 
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an opportunity to reduce rather than divert their disaster funding - a type of 
‘crowding-out’ effect. 
     There are examples now of civil society organisations embracing and 
funding prevention activities, specifically in the field of disaster prevention, 
such as a Red Cross pilot project to fund prevention measures based on 
forecast weather hazards in Uganda. This project focuses on seasonal forecasts 
about three months in advance. Prevention actions might include 
prepositioning aid supplies, or selection of crops for planting based on rain 
forecasts. Projects such as this start to establish a middle ground between 
response and prevention that make the prevention activities more attractive to 
funders, by targeting them to places and times of heightened disaster risk 
(Coughlan, van den Hurk, van Aalst et al., 2014).  
11.2 Expectations 
     The expectations the community, aid organisations and government have of 
each other are high and somewhat conflicting, but held with pessimism. There 
is a clear separation, particularly for the community and aid organisations, 
between their expectations and their assessments of whether or not those 
expectations will be met. This is in keeping with the distinction made between 
expectations of intention and expectations of capability (Chamlee-Wright and 
Storr, 2010). There may, for example, be high expectations that one group 
would like to provide certain aid, but low expectations that they are capable of 
doing so. 
     The community and aid organisations both expect the government to be 
responsible for the timely provision of aid to the affected communities. Neither 
group has confidence that this will occur however. Community expectations of 
aid are based on experience - increasing as receipts of aid have increased, and 
dampening where aid receipt is inconsistent. The communities rely on each 
other, extended family elsewhere, churches (especially in Tonga) and their own 
resilience during the wait for aid. They are uncertain how long aid will take to 
arrive and what it will consist of if and when it does arrive. In Fiji, 
inconsistencies between different events have contributed to this uncertainty.  
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In Tonga, both the community’s acknowledgement of the government’s 
dependence on foreign donors and changing policies for different events are 
contributors. The very existence and participation of some of the organisations 
newer to aid distribution is testament to that sector’s lack of confidence that the 
governments are going to deliver timely aid to all affected communities. This 
was openly stated by the organisations and acknowledged by the governments.   
    The communities on the remote islands have lower expectations of aid 
organisations than of government. They see the government as being 
responsible for the provision of aid and their welfare post-disaster, whereas aid 
organisations are viewed differently. Their work is seen as being voluntary and 
without payment or reward and thus, outside the realm of expectation or 
criticism. Sometimes it was clear that there were criticisms to be made, but the 
community members stated their objections to doing so, saying for example, ‘it 
is the Red Cross so who can complain?’ 
    The governments expect the communities to prepare and be able to look 
after themselves in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. For remote island 
communities, these expectations are heightened, and the length of time they are 
expected to cope before aid arrives is increased compared with urban 
communities. The Fijian policy to provide food and water to non-remote 
evacuation centres within 48 hours but not to the remote areas is a practical 
application of this differential. There are clearly cost effectiveness issues 
making this a rational response from the government. However, despite any 
rationality, it may represent a shift in the responsibility from the government to 
the community for remote islands, in a way that does not happen for non-
remote areas. The commitment to community awareness programs and training 
around disaster preparedness may be indicative of pessimism around the 
expectation that communities will be prepared. At the very least it is 
recognition that such preparedness requires ongoing support.  
    The governments also have expectations of the aid organisations around 
linking into the formal response system. Again, this expectation is held with 
much pessimism, especially in Fiji where the number of organisation operating 
outside the formal system has in recent years been high. In Fiji, there is a 
policy shift from the government towards attempting to enforce the 
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expectation, with threats of de-registration for organisations that continued to 
operate in isolation from the formal system. These moves are very recent, and 
it remains to be seen what, if any, effect they have. 
    The other significant element of expectations of aid is around equality and 
fulfilling needs. For the communities, there was a distinct disconnect between 
these two key issues. Aid seemed to be serving multiple purposes for these 
remote communities. Firstly, it was definitely about fulfilling needs, for 
example, with those who had lost everything needing basic necessities like 
shelter and clothing. Secondly, aid provides some recognition of the experience 
the entire community has been through, for example with those who were 
physically and materially unaffected expecting to receive a share of any aid. 
Finally, aid eases the pressure during a difficult time, for example with food 
aid representing time to do other recovery activities.  
    These three roles of aid for the communities are not mutually exclusive, and 
it is in the areas of overlap that the expectations are most difficult to make 
sense of. It may be that especially in group-oriented (rather than individual-
oriented) communities such as these, the second role of recognition has a level 
of importance that clashes with donor dependent, needs-based aid. The whole 
community has been through the experience of the cyclone, presumably all 
have been involved in community-level cleaning up and recovery, and all feel 
the distress of the experience. This may represent the communities and the aid 
organisations having different perceptions of which level of the Maslow 
hierarchy aid is supposed to be fulfilling. The aid organisations, especially 
those that are western-based or dependent, are likely to see aid as addressing 
the lowest level of needs - physiological. However, for the communities, it may 
be that the aid is addressing higher-order needs. Where aid, especially food aid 
is inconsistent, slow to arrive, and unreliable (including in quality), 
communities would be foolish to rely on it for their survival. Communities may 
instead to a certain extent be looking for aid based on recognition of this 
community-level need, rather than on the individual household assessment 
based need.  
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    This links back to the idea that communities expect to receive some aid - not 
necessarily to fulfil their survival needs, but something even to barter or sell. If 
disasters are an opportunity to receive aid, and there is so much of it around, 
how much should it matter whether your roof flew off or not? Some aid 
organisations clearly do attempt to take this perspective into account, providing 
particular types of aid to every family in an affected community, based on 
being part of that community, not on individual-level damage. Others do not. 
Obviously this is easier to do in smaller communities where the inclusion of 
those ‘not affected’ does not increase the requirements by thousands.  
    Perhaps this is a complex mask for simple greed. There was no clear answer 
to this question in this research, and participants from both countries, from 
communities and aid organisations would argue fiercely for both points of 
view. The conclusion must be however, that cultural issues such as these 
complicate matters significantly when an aid system driven by western values 
of individualism meets more community based cultures. These issues and 
complications cannot be ignored in discussions of what aid communities 
expect to receive and why. 
    There is also a link from expectations to resilience and community action 
that should be acknowledged. It was admitted on both islands that people have 
learned that making repairs before the damage assessments have been done 
means you risk not receiving aid. The individual-based approach does serve as 
a disincentive to community action. It may be that community-level aid 
responses would be a greater incentive for community-level action in 
community-oriented cultures. Different values may account for differences in 
what is viewed as rational and logical by governments compared with 
communities (Adger, Barnett, Brown et al., 2013) 
     The issues around poverty and dependence are very complex and bound up 
in culture. One the one hand, there is clear poverty. People wear shoes that are 
barely held together, clothes that are torn and dirty, and live in housing that 
lacks good sanitation and hygiene, and is in a constant state of disrepair. On the 
other hand though, people are dressed immaculately to attend church every 
week, watch SkyPacific on their flatscreen TVs, and play games on their 
tablets. Money cannot be found to buy a pump for the footballs and netballs at 
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the school that are used daily by both the school children and broader 
community, yet, according to three separate discussions with villagers, it is 
possible to earn FJD700-1000 a week on an island where you grow and catch 
your own food, there are no mortgages, and daily expenses are minimal. 
     The culture impacts on these issues in multiple ways. Firstly, the concept of 
community means that one person cannot work hard, save their money, and 
build themselves a very strong, new house. Everyone must be treated equally 
on the island, so once you finished your house, you would then need to be 
prepared for everyone to be asking you to build houses for them too. So - I 
cannot afford a new house - merges with - I cannot afford a new house for 
everyone. The patriarchal nature of the society impacts too. Money, time and 
energy are spent on fishing, and all the associated perks and displays of wealth 
and success. If you are a good fisherman (and this is predominately the domain 
of the men here - women mostly do fishing from the shore), you will have a 
bigger boat, with a bigger engine, and be able to afford the gadgets inside your 
homes for your family. Areas predominately the domain of the women, which 
include the house, sanitation and healthcare, are a lower priority. It is the areas 
where the men spend the most time and effort where the money is spent. It is 
likely that if women, rather than men, controlled the money, priorities may be 
different.  
     All of this makes the question of dependence more complex. There is 
enough money in the community to achieve many of the very things for which 
aid is sought and provided. In ‘Uiha village, the community established a 
savings plan until there was sufficient money to build every family a new 
concrete block toilet, and then built them all. These toilet blocks remained 
standing on every destroyed house site I witnessed following Cyclone Ian. This 
is a good example of what is possible. However, it requires leadership and 
community will for success. On Druadrua, people spoke of the difficulties in 
maintaining community consensus on projects such as the erosion of the 
foreshore. There is will at the beginning, but soon those whose houses are 
higher on the hill and are not immediately affected by the erosion lose interest 
and no longer think it is a project worthy of the entire community’s time and 
effort.  
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     The Chief spoke of his diminishing influence and authority in the 
community, where people no longer listen to or heed his advice and 
instructions. So there is a leadership vacuum without which community 
projects will not succeed. Further, in a culture where no individual will take 
responsibility for the purchase of a $10 bike pump for the whole community to 
benefit from, it seems that projects must be at community level. As more 
money and focus is spent on things that may be considered unnecessary, yet 
housing and healthcare remain vulnerable, it may be that individuals in the 
community are moving to higher levels on the Maslow hierarchy, jumping 
ahead of truly fulfilling the basic needs of safety and shelter. This may also be 
reflective of a disconnect between a traditional and a Western view of what 
constitutes having those basic needs fulfilled.  
     A house can be built for about FJD20,000 and bought in town for 
FJD50,000. If weekly earnings on the island can be FJD700-1000, new houses 
are well within reach at a ratio of house price to annual income of about one. 
Or at least more so than in many Western countries such as Australia where the 
ratio is above four, with some estimates closer to seven (Fox and Finlay, 2012). 
The house may not be up to the standard expected in those Western countries, 
but proportionally, there will be money leftover to make improvements to get 
them to a higher standard, well before having spent more than four times your 
annual income. 
     The issues of expectations of and dependence on aid are complex and bound 
up in experience, perceptions and culture. Just as the different parts of the 
disaster management cycle are interdependent, so too are the elements that 
impact upon that cycle. The expectations of aid are affected by the provision of 
aid, which is affected by the governance and co-ordination of the aid system. 
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11.3 Governance and co-ordination issues 
     After a disaster, there are accumulations of three things - people, 
organisations and aid. The governance and co-ordination of these will always 
represent a challenge of one kind or another, whether it be too much of one 
thing or too little of another. It also seems to be a reality now that there will be 
donations of aid in the form of goods and cash from a variety of sources, both 
formal and informal, and that those donations will make their way towards the 
affected communities through a variety of routes, again both formal and 
informal. This movement of aid will be bi-directional in that there will be 
approaches made from both the providers and the affected communities. 
Extended families will contact and provide help to one another. Aid agencies 
and civil society organisations will receive donations and distribute them 
amongst the affected communities.  
     Governments will be responsible for the provision of aid and ensuring the 
security and well-being of their citizens. Their task will be to oversee and 
attempt to co-ordinate all the efforts that are simultaneously occurring. 
Realistically, they will not be able to. In the increasingly connected world we 
live in, with websites instructing people on how to rapidly establish informal 
volunteer relief organisations following a disaster, no single central co-
ordinating body is going to be able to manage all the information. Much of 
what is happening will never reach the knowledge of the co-ordinating body, 
and there will be too much to organise and make sense of in a timely way. 
Families are very unlikely to routinely inform government of what they are 
providing and when to their affected members, and nor should they have to. 
Their role during the aftermath of a disaster is to help make sure their family 
members are safe, not to navigate bureaucracies. So, a starting point should 
perhaps be that information management is vital with as much information as 
can be usefully gathered, but it will never be a complete picture. However, 
lacking all the information does not negate the government’s responsibility to 
its citizens. This is a difficult position indeed.  
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     The government’s efforts must be to ensure everyone affected has their 
basic needs fulfilled - that is, Maslow’s first two levels of need - physiological 
and safety. That will be a challenging enough task to tackle with efficiency, 
timeliness and equity, given the limited resources including human resources 
available in these countries. Whether individuals, particular families or 
communities are being elevated on the Maslow scale through aid from other 
sources outside the Government’s control is exactly that - outside the 
Government’s control. Issues of endemic corruption and favouritism within the 
formal system are, or should be, within their control however, and are central 
to fulfilling their responsibilities. 
     If Governments were able to remove all traces of corruption, favouritism, 
and inefficiencies and fulfil the basic needs of the affected communities in an 
effective, timely and equitable manner, the whole system would be simpler. 
Many of the actors who deliberately operate outside the formal system would 
either not exist, or would be more likely to link in, because their stated reasons 
for their modus operandi (corruption, favouritism and inefficiencies) are the 
very things that would no longer be problematic. In a vicious cycle though, the 
informal system highlights and exacerbates the perceptions of inequality and 
delays in the formal system by circumventing the very processes that make the 
formal system formal. Conducting assessments, allocating resources across the 
entire affected area and co-ordinating multiple players and systems are the 
reasons why the formal system is both formal on the one hand, and slow and 
bureaucratic on the other. Smaller, independent agencies and individuals 
operating informally do not have to follow any of these rules or systems, and 
are not accountable for their actions. 
     With disaster events predicted to become more frequent and severe, these 
issues are not going to disappear. Rather, they are likely to continue as the 
informal side of the system increases and in some instances tries to formalise 
itself, leading to multiple systems operating simultaneously yet separately. 
Indeed some in Fiji perceive this to be already happening. The governance and 
co-ordination of disaster response is going to have to adapt. If this reality is 
accepted and embraced, it may be transformed from a problem into an 
opportunity.  
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     Being able to take advantage of opportunities is adaptive capacity at work. 
What seems like a nightmare for the government as far as co-ordination and 
control is concerned with a lack of integration of the formal and informal 
systems, may in fact represent important elements of adaptive governance and 
resilience (Biermann et al., 2010). The multiple levels and players within the 
system provide the flexibility required of a resilient system (Ostrom and 
Janssen, 2004). Should the role of responsible and accountable provider be 
separated from co-ordinator? How can the extra resources of the informal 
system, both financial and personnel be harnessed effectively to work 
alongside rather than in competition with the formal system? If the competition 
can be transformed into collaboration and learning, effective adaptive 
governance may be achieved (Wyborn and Dovers, 2014). These issues will be 
important into the future, as will considerations of the differences in experience 
of response for remote communities. 
     There was an intention in this project to focus on the response and recovery 
side of the disaster management cycle, with enough consideration given to the 
prevention and resilience side just to be able to make sense of the response and 
recovery issues. However, it quickly became clear that the issues are so 
intertwined that separating them is somewhat artificial. The ways in which 
prevention and resilience are addressed or not, directly influences the impact of 
an event becoming a disaster. This in turn, directly impacts the response and 
recovery actions required. Completing the loop, the ways in which the response 
and recovery issues are addressed adequately or not, directly impacts upon the 
prevention and resilience into the future. The immediate humanitarian response 
may be able to be extracted from this vicious cycle, since it is short term and 
targeted. In reality though, the experiences of humanitarian response influence 
perceptions and expectations from all involved, which influences preparation 
in future. The realisation of just how interconnected and interdependent the 
elements of disaster management are means that there is a greater emphasis on 
the prevention and resilience aspects than intended in the research questions.  
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     There is an interesting irony here. One of the biggest issues in the actual 
disaster response, especially in Fiji in this project, is the impact of the newer or 
non-traditional aid organisations operating outside the formal system. The firm 
connections between the different elements of the disaster management system 
are some of the reasons why the short-term strategies of these players do not fit 
neatly into that system. The longer-term view linking the response with 
prevention and resilience requires a professionalism and dedication that is 
unlikely to be immediately apparent in ‘pop-up’ aid organisations, since aid is 
not their core business. Notwithstanding, they also represent some of the 
reasons why the informal system exists. Alongside trying to overcome 
perceived corruption and inequalities, the newer organisations are specifically 
trying to overcome the perceived delays in the formal system - delays in part 
caused by a longer-term view and linkages beyond the immediate humanitarian 
aid.  
     There is no evidence that the informal system is going to slow down or 
cease. Rather it is likely to increase, as communication, travel and technology 
increase the opportunities for it. The challenge for the government is in 
allowing and embracing that expansion and service provision, while ensuring 
the needs of all affected citizens are met after a disaster, and that equity is 
maximised in the process. The various agencies and organisations have 
different roles and functions within the overall system. There is some 
recognition of this and the opportunities it may provide in the draft Strategy for 
Disaster and Climate Resilient Development in the Pacific (SRDP) that 
advocates for the increased use of faith-based organisations’ prevention and 
preparation efforts. It seems unlikely that remote places will ever be part of the 
response element of the informal system in the way in which the urban and 
easy-to-reach places are. For the remote islanders, the informal system will 
continue to consist primarily and sometimes only of their extended family 
elsewhere. This is something that the government already relies upon to a 
certain extent - with clear expectations that people will turn to family first in 
times of disaster. 
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11.4 Issues of remoteness 
     The dominant feature of remoteness for the islanders in this study was the 
water separating them from the main islands. The concept of coping with a 
natural disaster takes on a new meaning on a remote island, within a remote 
country, and requires a shift in thinking for the observer used to referring to 
mainlands. The remote island community must fend for itself for up to three 
weeks after an extreme weather event such as a cyclone, before outside help 
arrives. When it does, there is likely to be the government, and the Red Cross 
only. The proliferation of aid organisations and competitive humanitarianism 
seen elsewhere (Stirrat, 2006) is irrelevant.  
     While the wait for aid is definitely perceived as a problem, the inequities 
and inconsistencies, and power relationships in the system, and the resulting 
unease and jealousy within the community were of equal concern. The 
community expressed high expectations of aid, and some within the 
community consider that there is dependence on aid exhibited. High 
expectations of aid are not necessarily the same thing as dependency on aid, as 
highlighted by the notion of food aid representing time. Dependency suggests a 
lack of alternatives, which is different to hoping for and accepting aid, and 
incorporating it into existing recovery strategies. It may be beneficial to more 
specifically differentiate between for example food aid and housing aid in 
examinations of dependency, since there are separate issues for each. However, 
focusing the discussion on a climate changed future quickly dissolved any 
notions of dependency, with expectations that aid would diminish, and the 
community would have to return to self-reliance. Many community members 
recognised changes in their environment and climate and were pessimistic 
about their future. 
     The type of remoteness experienced on the two islands in this study 
differed. In Fiji, the island of Druadrua is remote within the northern region of 
the country. There are delays in getting supplies and aid from the island on 
which the regional centre is based, and clear experiential differences between 
the two islands, separated by just a small stretch of water. To a certain extent, 
the whole of the northern region of Fiji is remote in the disaster context in that 
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there are so many of the newer aid organisations operating on the main island 
where the capital and tourism centres are located only. However, there are a 
number of aid organisations with bases in the northern region, and the real 
separation was between the individual island of Druadrua and its near regional 
centre neighbour. In Tonga, it is the entire Ha’apai region in which the island is 
located that is remote within the nation. The stretch of water between it and the 
regional centre was geographically far greater than in Fiji, but appeared to be 
of less consequence. In Tonga, it was the region itself that is remote, with 
delays in getting supplies and aid to the entire region. There was also much 
more of a regional identity in Tonga, compared to in Fiji where the island 
identify was very strong, which perhaps reflects this differing concept of 
remoteness. 
     Remoteness can be considered either a positive or a negative. It was a 
negative for these communities in terms of increased waiting times for 
assistance after an event, less assistance (especially in Fiji), and feelings of 
powerlessness. However, it was also a positive for the communities in ways 
they were probably not fully aware of. The sense of community and resilience 
among the people was tangible. The government perceives them to be 
dependent on aid, but they help each other out and get on with surviving during 
the wait for this aid. Traditional knowledge was clearly evident, and the 
consistency between the two countries in the details of this knowledge was 
remarkable. 
     The experience of there being two different worlds: the remote and the non-
remote, in these countries was striking. There were contradictions and 
inconsistencies in the experiences that are difficult to reconcile. On the remote 
islands, when your income is disrupted for an extended period of time after a 
cyclone, you need to rely on subsistence fishing and farming to survive - which 
on these islands you can do. In non-remote places, when your income is 
disrupted for an extended period of time after a cyclone, you are much less 
likely to have a subsistence lifestyle of fall back on. When there is no food 
after a cyclone, in remote places you have to wait for the next crop to be 
harvested, and eat what you can catch from the sea and salvage from your 
plantation in the meantime. When there is no food after a cyclone in non-
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remote places, you can go to an evacuation centre and be fed (in Fiji at least), 
and use money in your bank account and from your job to purchase food from 
the shops. There appear to be advantages and disadvantages to living in both 
places, but of different types.  
     One of the other issues for remoteness is the invisibility of being isolated: 
isolated from scrutiny, from responsibility and from accountability, which can 
work both ways, as a positive or a negative. It may mean isolation from the 
constraints of bureaucracy, and a freedom for innovation and social capital in 
the form of networks and collective action to work. Perhaps an example of this 
is the story of the villagers from Salevukoso rescuing those in Delaivandra 
during the eye of Cyclone Ami in 2003. It is likely that the remoteness and 
isolation moved the villagers from thinking I hope they are alright and that 
someone helps them to we have to help them because there is no one else.  
     There are also clear negatives to remoteness. The lack of available options 
manifests itself in various ways. It seems likely that the position of turaga ni 
koro/Town Officer is in reality more a matter of taking turns than democratic 
elections with a limited pool of apparent contenders. The combination of this 
and there being no one to complain to about your turaga ni koro/Town 
Officer’s behaviour and decisions is a powerful one indeed. The potential is 
laid in the formal systems for corruption and inequalities to go unchecked. 
There may be scope for the informal system to take over or be an alternative, 
or for the Chief or Noble to intervene. However, there are also impediments to 
this. Firstly, there are no Nobles in government villages in Tonga. Although 
these are in the minority, they represent a gap in the systems. Secondly, even 
where there is a Chief or Noble in the village, it is not assured that this person 
will command the respect of the entire community.  
     The traditional leaders are losing their influence in some places, especially 
with the younger generations, and as money and making an income begin to 
dominate and change the culture. The nexus between the traditional Chief and 
the turaga ni koro in Fiji was explained to me as that the Chief makes the 
decisions and the turaga ni koro enacts those decisions. This would appear to 
give the Chief the power in the relationship, and therefore the position with the 
potential to control corruption and inequalities. It does not always seem to 
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work that way in practice however, and the official recognition given to the 
turaga ni koro by the government in the formal system complicates matters 
significantly. As community members noted, this systems works well when 
there is the right person in the position, otherwise it has the potential to cause 
great concern, when, for example, that person is not pro-active enough. 
     What does the remoteness issue mean for adaptive capacity? Suggestions 
from some community members in Fiji of having a village committee 
responsible for disaster management, and perhaps meetings before an event 
strikes, to discuss what needs to be done, are supported in research literature 
from over 10 years ago (Barnett, 2001), and in recent national disaster 
management plans in Tonga (MECC and NEMO Tonga, 2010). But in the 
small island community interviewed in Fiji, such ideas remained just that, and 
with concern that the power and privileged position of the turaga ni koro 
would add complexity to any attempts to turn those ideas into meaningful 
action. In Tonga, the committees were established, but with varied success.  
     The village disaster committee structure should improve adaptive capacity, 
because it will increase the scrutiny and transparency of responses, while 
embracing and utilising the social capital that exists on these remote islands. 
However, as the evidence from Tonga shows, it will depend on whether or not 
the committees are active, and who their members are. Without constant 
external support for the committees, they are unlikely to flourish, which has 
been recognised by the organisations establishing them. It is likely that in those 
communities where the informal and formal systems interact successfully, the 
village disaster committees are likely to fit well and be supported by the 
existing systems. It is likely to be in those communities that need a fully 
functioning village disaster committee the most, where those committees are 
least likely to flourish without the external support. Where the village Chiefs or 
Nobles are either absent or have little influence, and the turaga ni koro/Town 
Officer is not respected within the community, vulnerability is high and the 
need for a village disaster committee would be both the greatest and also the 
least likely to succeed. Where there is limited ongoing external support 
available, it should be concentrated on these most vulnerable communities.  
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     The issue of the extended wait for humanitarian aid in remote places is 
difficult. Aid must be prioritised according to need, but in reality those who are 
closer to the population centres, and live in areas of greater population density 
will usually receive aid before those in sparsely populated, difficult to access 
places. This situation may well be rational in terms of helping the most people 
in the shortest time, and be one that must be accepted. Minimised and kept in 
mind to ensure that need does not become a secondary consideration, but in the 
end, accepted as reality. However, when the issue is prevention and adaptation, 
the situation is entirely different. Without the urgency attached to humanitarian 
aid, the criteria for prioritising spending allocations and funding recipients 
changes.  
     There are a number of reasons why remote places should have priority. 
Firstly, given the reduced access to services and humanitarian aid in times of 
crisis, there is an equity issue meaning ‘it is their turn’. Also, the pre-existing 
vulnerabilities are higher on the remote islands where infrastructure is weaker 
and building codes are not enforced. Secondly, it may be beneficial for 
governments, funders and civil society organisations to prioritise remote areas. 
Where preventative and adaptive work is essentially experimental, it makes 
sense to do those experiments on a small scale. Remote communities allow for 
this. This would also provide the opportunity to do multiple projects 
simultaneously in the smaller, remote places, thereby speeding up the process 
of testing and refining the measures.  
     Tonga is currently testing out adaptation options for sea level rise, under the 
Joint National Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk 
Management (JNAP). But they are doing so on the main island, and telling the 
smaller, remote islands to wait until the results are in. One of the reasons for 
starting on the main island is because part of the JNAP involved risk mapping 
for sea level rise, which has resulted in detailed maps of which communities 
are likely to be impacted when as the sea level rise increases. This information 
provides good evidence for prioritisation of some communities over others.  
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However, the mapping was only funded for the main island, Tongatapu, and 
Lifuka, the main island in Ha’apai. The risk and prioritisation of the smaller 
islands remains unknown, and there is no funding currently allocated to fill this 
gap. The flooding of areas on the main island is known and acted upon, 
because that is where the information is available and where there are civil 
society organisations operating to discover it. That is not the same as those 
areas being at greater risk than other islands and areas that have not been 
similarly surveyed.  
     In discussions around trying to shift the funding focus from response to 
prevention, the issues particular to the remote islands needs to be taken into 
account. If the starting position is always based on the main islands, and a view 
is formed that some of the response funding could actually be moved to 
prevention, as opposed to new prevention funding being found, the remote 
islanders may be placed at extra risk. While individual cases certainly do exist 
of a few people on remote islands receiving more than they needed, overall the 
aid to the remote islands is not representative of duplication and waste. The 
waits are long, and the aid organisations few. It is easy to lose sight of this 
reality when faced with the co-ordination and governance issues in Fiji 
particularly, however, the risk remains. It is possible to envisage a scenario for 
example, whereby a government decides to focus its internal funding on 
prevention rather than response, with only the outer islands maintaining their 
government based aid response receipt. In the ensuing arguments as to the 
definition of an ‘outer island’, some communities may be at risk of missing 
out. 
     Some of the thinking around such future decisions may be gleaned from the 
regional and national frameworks and strategies, and progress towards their 
implementation is discussed in the next section. 
  
  240 
11.5 ‘Development’ and ‘progress’ 
  There are two important adaptation options outlined in Tonga’s JNAP that are 
directly relevant to this study. The first is the development of community 
preparedness plans. Theoretically, progress is being made on this option 
through the establishment of the village disaster committees, which are then in 
turn, responsible for the village plans. However, as the results of this study 
show, not all the village disaster committees are active. An important area of 
future research would be in identifying the extent to which each village 
disaster committee in the country is active, and the factors relating to the 
success of those committees. 
     The second adaptation option is relocation to higher ground. Less progress 
is being made on this option, since there had at the time of fieldwork, been no 
serious discussions within government about how to put it into practice. 
Further, there was no timetable for when such discussions may occur. 
Communities are left with piecemeal assistance in finding new or alternative 
locations to live, but no financial assistance to re-build. This was nominated by 
several people (in both countries) as being the most significant impediment to 
taking up this adaptation option. It is likely that the financial considerations 
represent the greatest difficulty for government in implementing this option, 
and that knowing this, there is little incentive to open debate on the issue. 
However, the need for relocation is now for some families, and imminent for 
many others. It seems likely that unless proactive, prevention-based funding 
for such projects can be found, there will be crisis points that will generate 
reactionary responses.  
     Fiji has been able to relocate several entire communities, some at the 
initiative of government, and some at the initiative of the community itself. It is 
not immediately clear where the funding for these projects has been sourced, 
and it may simply be reflective of the better availability of resources in the 
larger country of Fiji than in Tonga. For the people facing the rising water 
though, such distinctions are meaningless. They simply need help to move 
somewhere safer.  
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     The draft Strategy for Disaster and Climate Resilient Development in the 
Pacific (SDRP) recognises many of the issues identified in this study around 
the way disaster aid is proportioned, distributed and used. The need to move 
from the current focus on response towards risk management, the need for 
improved co-ordination, and the need to make compelling economic cases for 
proactive strategies, are all supported directly by the results of this study. What 
is less clear is whether these messages will filter through to those making 
funding decisions. In countries as dependent on foreign aid as Fiji and Tonga, 
strategies and declarations of intent at a national and regional level will be 
ineffective unless funded. The move from top-down to bottom-up approaches 
should extend from the national to international level. Much foreign aid is 
beginning to do this, with recipient-initiated and directed projects becoming 
more common. However, where that is still within an overall framework set by 
the donors, the point may be lost. 
     Equally, the decisions made by the governments in countries such as Fiji 
and Tonga must, both during and outside disaster times, align with the regional 
frameworks. They should be prepared to insist upon the long-term, preventive 
vision. This may be difficult to achieve for the dependent aid recipient, with 
pressure from the communities to act. 
     Development and progress in Fiji and Tonga have been both helpful and a 
hindrance, in a number of realms including housing, food production and 
traditional knowledge. The shift away from traditional housing materials and 
construction has had opposing impacts. The modern, western style houses 
enable rainwater harvesting for drinking water from the corrugated iron roofs. 
This is an undeniable benefit over thatched roofs from which the water quality 
is usually poor. The modern houses are generally considered to be stronger 
than traditional bures or fales, although this is far from a universal opinion, 
especially among elders in this study. Part of the problem here may be that 
modern houses have the potential to be a stronger, better option, but that does 
not automatically translate into actuality. Poorly constructed modern houses 
will fail in cyclonic winds, and flying tin roofs have introduced a risk that did 
not exist in the past. The disaster relief houses in Fiji are designed to be a 
starting point, for communities to complete, with the additions strengthening 
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the houses. The problem is that many community members do not understand 
exactly what is required or expected of them, or how to achieve it. So the 
partially completed houses remain just that.  
     In Tonga, there is the additional impediment of the unavailability of 
hardware in the entire Ha’apai region. Knowledge and will to build the 
strongest possible house are somewhat hampered when there is nowhere to buy 
nails. Yes, they are available from Tongatapu, for those willing and able to 
order them and wait for their arrival on the ferry. The current situation does not 
promote self-sufficiency and preparedness. Simple and yet extremely effective 
elements such as cyclone ties holding down roofs are rarely seen, although 
notable in some of the houses that survived the recent cyclone, Ian.  
     The newer houses then represent poorly implemented potential, and an 
example of the failings of top-down policies. These houses have been put into 
the communities, particularly as disaster relief houses, without the construction 
and maintenance knowledge also being implemented adequately. As time 
passes, knowledge of the traditional building techniques is being lost with 
fewer of them around and being constructed, leaving many caught in the 
middle. Similarly, the move from subsistence farming to commercial farming 
and fishing has seen a reduction in the variety of crops planted. Having cyclone 
resistant crops growing during the cyclone season requires thought and 
planning throughout the entire year, and where this is not done, families are left 
at increased instead of decreased vulnerability.  
     Ironically, it is the same traditional knowledge and coping strategies that 
have been diminished in recent years by the imposition of Western ideas of 
development and progress that are required and called for in the most recent 
version of that development and progress - preparation and resilience: 
The main aim of disaster management should be focused 
on preparedness. In some senses, this implies a return to 
the development of local coping strategies to make 
communities more resilient in the face of change, as a 
resilient community is better able to cope with change 
and adjust to new realities (O'Brien et al., 2010, p.503).  
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     A return to the local coping strategies as a way of increasing resilience 
should be purposeful and thought through, learning from the past. Remote 
island communities are places where the remnants of those local coping 
strategies are to be found. 
11.6 Alignment of perspectives 
     There were two foci to the majority of interviewees’ suggestions for 
adapting the system to cope with climate change - preparedness and 
prevention, and governance and co-ordination. An increased focus on 
preparedness and prevention was almost universally agreed upon as a priority 
by all stakeholders. This was the single biggest point of agreement in the 
perspectives of the three participant groups. The second focus, on governance 
and co-ordination issues, was equally prominent, but without the alignment of 
perspectives.  
     Communities in both countries, as well as many aid organisations, thought 
that bypassing the government on the distribution of aid would improve 
timeliness and equity. The government is widely seen, in both countries, as 
being the source of delays, corruption and favouritism, resulting in inequities. 
In direct opposition to this perspective however, is that of the governments, 
that would like more rather than less, central control of the aid response, 
because they have ultimate responsibility for ensuring aid is delivered to all 
affected communities and achieving this is more difficult without all the 
information regarding who is doing what and where. The aid organisations, 
while recognising the resulting duplication and waste of resources, seem less 
concerned by this than the governments. Perhaps that is a reflection of the only 
solution currently offered being increased central control by the government.  
     The regional governments would like more control and authority in the 
process than currently exist either in practice in the case of Fiji, and also in 
policy in the case of Tonga. This may be a step towards a solution because 
while they are still government, at the regional level they are better connected 
with the local organisations involved in the aid response. This may assist with 
some of the co-ordination issues, and not having to wait for clearance from the 
national office may assist with the timeliness issues. This is particularly 
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relevant in Tonga where for example, the standard process is for all surveys 
and damage assessments to be conducted by government officers from 
Tongatapu, regardless of the location of the disaster, and capacity of the local 
office. 
11.7 Conclusion 
     Disaster responses need to change to adapt to a changing climate because 
the current system focuses too much on the humanitarian response and not 
enough on prevention and climate change adaptation. With increases in 
frequency and severity of a variety of disasters likely and already being seen in 
some places, preventing the hazards from becoming disasters is essential. 
Adaptive capacity includes the ability to a) adjust to potential damage, b) take 
advantage of opportunities and c) respond to consequences. In the context of 
this study, tropical cyclones are likely to mean for remote islands: a) potential 
increased damage from increased severity of windspeeds and high storm 
surges; b) opportunities presented by cyclones being fewer overall in number, 
and c) respond to the consequences of fewer but stronger cyclones, such that 
there may be more time between cyclones impacting on individual 
communities, but when those hazards do impact they are likely to be at 
increased risk. Sea level rise, however, adds another element to the potential 
damages with flooding and inundation likely to become more frequent even at 
lower windspeeds.  
     The adaptive capacity of the system is constrained by the existing incentives 
being skewed towards short-term, quick fix, high profile responses rather than 
the more ‘silent’ preventative work. While there is will among many of the key 
stakeholders to shift towards prevention and community awareness programs 
are conducted, funding for prevention and adaptation projects remains much 
more difficult and complex to access than humanitarian funding, with many 
more organisations involved in response rather than longer term, forward 
thinking work.  
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     There are many issues involved in the adaptive capacity of disaster response 
in Fiji and Tonga. Donor-reliant aid organisations and governments are 
restricted in their ability to dictate priorities. Alternative incentives and 
processes for the donors need to be found and the German/Ugandan Red Cross 
pilot project and the World Bank response to Cyclone Ian may be good 
examples of this.  
     The importance of community level approaches with good local leadership 
is clear from this study. The complexities of the integration between the 
traditional and governmental systems increase the difficulties of this task, 
particularly in Fiji. However, initiatives such as the village disaster committees 
can work and address many of the issues the communities themselves had. 
     The move towards prevention and preparedness, which places more 
responsibility back onto the communities themselves calls for some of the 
traditional coping strategies that have been eroded in recent times. It is in the 
remote islands and communities that this knowledge is likely be found, 
because they are the communities most likely to have to exhibit such resilience 
now. If your island is one of the most severely impacted by a devastating 
disaster such as 2014’s Cyclone Ian in Tonga, then help will probably arrive 
within about one week. But if you are on the periphery of the high impact zone, 
the wait is likely to be much longer - certainly far longer than anyone in a 
western urban setting would consider tolerable. It may be essential then, to 
look to these remote communities as a starting point, rather than an almost 
forgotten add-on to the process.  
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Chapter 12 - Conclusions 
     This last chapter presents a summary of the research, some conclusions 
from it, and notes its contribution to the field. There are reflections on how the 
aid system might undergo transformational adaptation. Finally, the chapter 
notes the lasting impressions the research experience has left me with, and 
looks to future research. 
12.1 Outcomes from the research 
     Small island developing states are at the forefront of climate change 
impacts. There, debates about what might and might not happen in the future 
are less relevant because it is happening right now. Disasters are already 
increasing in severity and frequency and these small and remote islands are 
dealing with them as best they can. Aid responses to disasters bring with them 
funding and opportunities. The choice is to either ensure they are effective and 
forward-thinking, or simply rely on existing systems matching the increased 
severity of nature’s hazards. 
     This research aimed to investigate how disaster responses need to and are 
able to adapt to a changing climate, with reference to remote islands in Fiji and 
Tonga. With climate change altering the frequency and severity of hazards, the 
responses of communities, aid organisations and governments will need to 
adapt accordingly. Research on disaster response is a well-established field and 
includes work on the integration of the climate change adaptation and disaster 
risk management areas. However, while some previous work exists, research in 
this arena, which includes a focus on remote islands is not common, and rarer 
still if it includes the voices of the remote island communities.  
     Much of the existing research that includes remote island communities 
centres around either disaster response or climate change adaptation. Policy is 
bringing them together, but this is not well reflected in the research. Herein lies 
a strength of this thesis. The fieldwork on remote islands in Fiji and Tonga 
provided an opportunity for the perspectives of those communities to be heard 
on the important issue of climate change adaptation and disaster response. 
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These perspectives were then contrasted with those of organisations involved 
in disaster aid and climate change adaptation and the governments. This 
revealed completely different worlds, with the perspectives of the remote 
island communities having more in common with each other than with those of 
the aid organisations and governments in their own countries.  
     The communities live with cyclones and accept them as part of life on their 
islands. They showed a depth of traditional knowledge of natural warning 
signs, and resilience with waits for post-disaster aid that are more realistically 
counted in weeks than days. Evacuation centre options are few, with the 
communities relying on the strongest buildings in their respective villages. 
These buildings are a safe haven during the event, but are not serviced with 
supplies in the way the main island evacuation centres are.  
     There are diversity issues, with different roles and experiences for different 
parts of the community. For most people in the communities, gender roles 
remain clearly defined during and after a disaster, changing little from before 
the event. This sees women with responsibility for cleaning up and restoring 
order in the home, finding food and preparing meals, and caring for children 
and the elderly. Men are primarily responsible for providing shelter and 
repairing homes. There seems to be little flexibility built into these roles for 
operating outside of normal circumstances, which may be limiting from a 
resilience perspective. Faith plays a very important role as a source of strength 
and meaning, as well as aid, especially in Tonga where the Mormon Church is 
very active and well resourced. In Tonga, the churches are so integrated into 
aid provision, that which church you belong to will impact on your living 
conditions and socio-economic status. Hence, your adaptive capacity and 
resilience are linked to your church membership, as much as to other forms of 
aid. 
     There are a number of important findings relating to the provision of aid. 
Aid is both expected and provided, but very much dependent on location, with 
main islands seeing multiple sources of aid delivered within days from some 
aid organisations, while remote islands will be likely to see the Red Cross and 
government only. Changes in policy and dependence of governments on donor 
funding for aid hampers expectations and leaves many on the islands 
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pessimistic about aid availability in the future. All participant groups noted 
corruption and favouritism in the provision of aid, although there are different 
levels acknowledged and causes attributed to it. The result is real and perceived 
inequalities, sometimes resulting in disharmony within the communities. Aid is 
not necessarily directed towards addressing need, with availability and 
donations sometimes dictating what the aid consists of. This may involve 
jumping ahead on the hierarchy of needs to addressing higher-order needs 
without lower-order needs being fulfilled first.  
     The increases in aid, and especially receipt of aid from multiple sources on 
the main islands, increase both actual and perceived expectations of receiving 
aid next time. This decreases motivations for preparedness and prevention, 
with some viewing disaster aid as a way of getting ahead in life by obtaining 
otherwise unreachable goods. This is seen to a certain extent on the remote 
islands, but not to a level that matches the perceptions of aid organisations and 
governments. The expectations are also borne of experience such that 
expecting to receive aid may not be a sign of dependence upon it, so much as a 
reflection of past experiences. That is different to not being able to cope 
without it, and those on the remote islands who were pessimistic about future 
aid availability said they would simply get on with it and look after themselves. 
That future availability of aid and the provision of it, especially to remote 
islands, relies in part on the management of expectations and the aid system 
itself.  
     Governance of the system is difficult, especially in Fiji where there are 
multiple organisations involved in disaster response operating outside the 
formal system. Often, they are involved specifically to operate outside a system 
perceived to be slow and inequitable, or even corrupt. This means the task of 
co-ordination, information management and addressing need, which is the 
primary responsibility of the government, is more difficult as they are without 
all the information about what is going on where and when. This in turn 
exacerbates the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. In both countries, the 
difference between the policy and operating environments is stark, with most 
of the main stakeholders understanding what happens in practice, but few 
others achieving such clarity. In Tonga, traditional decision-making sometimes 
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overrides operating procedures, leading to confusion and delays, especially for 
remote islands left waiting for the bureaucracy. 
     The remoteness of these islands is both positive and negative for the 
communities. The waits for aid and assistance are long, and fewer resources 
are directed towards them, and from fewer sources. The communities feel they 
are left until last (and in reality they often are), or left out completely. They 
operate with little scrutiny and transparency, and this does not always work 
well for everyone. However, on the positive side, there is remarkable resilience 
and social capital that are commonly seen in remote communities. These are 
elements to be embraced and learned from. 
     The findings in this thesis both support and depart from previous research 
done in this area. One study on a remote island in Fiji after a cyclone in 1975 
revealed findings almost identical to this research in many respects. Most 
people thought leftover food should last two or three weeks; the community 
reported food aid being late, inconsistent, with evidence of theft before it 
arrived, and reported favouritism from the distributors; traditional warning 
signs were used but sometimes ignored; and the government was advocating a 
policy of self-help (McLean et al., 1977). Each of these findings translates 
directly into this thesis looking at events 30-40 years later. One area of 
divergence was that in the study from the 1975 cyclone, the communities 
suggested that every village should have a government built cyclone shelter 
stocked with food, water, building materials and tools. In the current study, 
while communities still thought every village should have a shelter or 
evacuation centre, responsibility for building it had moved to within the 
community. This seems to represent a decreased rather than increased sense of 
dependence and entitlement. Whether this change in expectations is because 
there is an increased sense of self-reliance and resilience or a sense of having 
given up on government assistance is not clear. 
     Attitudes towards migration as a climate change adaptation option were 
very similar in this thesis to a study done in the remote, outer islands of the 
Solomon Islands, where barriers to migration are similar to Fiji and Tonga, 
including land tenure issues, housing and employment concerns (Birk and 
Rasmussen, 2014). Communities in these outer islands identified long-term 
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climate change issues of concern, but did not readily cite them as being linked 
with decisions to migrate and were resistant to forced migration. These 
findings are all similar to this thesis. However, in Fiji and Tonga, some people 
were either actively seeking, or at least willing to accept assistance to migrate 
for environmental reasons. 
     Previous research in Fiji has found conflicting reports from regional and 
local level government and turaga ni koros regarding the processes both pre-
and post-disasters in terms of early warning disseminations and damage 
assessments (Becker, 2012), and government mistrust of community led 
damage assessments (Méheux et al., 2010). These elements were prominent in 
this thesis also, with confusion over processes, and communities both aware of 
and perturbed by government mistrust of their involvement in damage 
assessments, questioning the point of putting much effort into assessments that 
would all be re-done by government assessors anyway. 
     Earlier research in Tonga found that climate change was not being taken 
seriously, with people generally considering Tonga to be at lower risk than 
other countries in the region, and religious fatalism representing a major 
impediment to climate change action (Nunn and Wadell, 1992). This thesis 
demonstrates progress since that time, with generally good awareness of 
climate change issues, and the country being a leader in the region in terms of 
climate change policy. Religious fatalistic attitudes - that God’s will 
determines everything - is still clearly evident, but so are efforts and 
mechanisms for harnessing the faith to work towards adaptation, using the 
notion of stewardship of the earth and the need to protect it. 
     This thesis also makes a contribution in its analysis of the methodological 
issues with doing cross-cultural research, and the presence of the researcher’s 
family in fieldwork. These are very practical issues that are given little 
attention in peer-reviewed journals. The discussion of talanoa research and the 
challenges involved for a foreigner to put this into practice is important. For 
culturally appropriate research in this region to continue to develop, further 
discussions and analysis of talanoa research, from both those within the culture 
and outsiders trying to understand, would be beneficial. There are few 
discussions in the existing literature of the implications of having the 
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researcher’s family in the field, yet as shown in this thesis, it impacts on every 
stage of fieldwork. It is as important a consideration as note taking and 
information recording techniques, since in so many ways it shapes the 
information available to be recorded. Reflecting back to role theory, the notion 
of having multiple identities in the field is complex and was directly relevant 
here (Katz and Kahn, 1978). My identities were highly gendered in some 
respects in these cultures of gender specific roles, but less so in others. I was a 
researcher, but also a woman (sitting at the correct end of the table), a mother 
(at school), a wife (doing the washing). The multiple identities and roles played 
by the researcher in the fieldwork are an integral part of talanoa research. 
     Finally, there are contributions to the field from the conceptual framework 
and the policy implications of the issues around future funding. The inclusion 
of expectations and remoteness in the conceptual framework is a departure 
from much of the previous work in this field, and represents an innovation in 
this research. These issues have been shown in this thesis to be important and 
relevant to prevention and preparation, as is governance. The framework used 
here may well be applicable to other remote places. As the sector struggles 
with how to implement the integration of the adaptation and disaster response 
arenas, this thesis provides practical and policy suggestions. 
12.2 Changes for the future 
     The findings of this thesis have direct application in relation to planning for 
hazards and disasters. This section illustrates this by considering the situation 
as it stands and potential for the future. In the tables below, the main themes of 
disaster aid and relief, expectations, issues of remoteness and governance are 
divided according to the interview groups - community, government and aid 
organisations. The first table represents how the disaster response systems 
operate currently in Fiji and Tonga, and the second suggests how they should 
operate into a climate changed future.
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Table 12.1: How it is now – intentions/motivations vs outcomes/consequences 
 Community Government Aid organisations 
Aid and 
disaster relief 
Intentions/motivations: Aid to fulfil needs; aid to 
acknowledge suffering; aid to ease time pressures 
Outcomes/consequences: Inequitable distribution and 
allocation; aid may not meed needs; inconsistent 
(especially Tonga) 
Intentions/motivations: budget constraints; 
opportunity for easy funding; political gain; 
responsibility for welfare of citizens 
Outcomes/consequences: Difficult to coordinate; 
viewed as being corrupt and slow 
Intentions/motivations: some appear only at times of disaster; 
independence from government; business; see themselves as 
faster and more legitimate alternative to government; various 
motivations including public relations and fund raising value 
Outcomes/consequences: focus on short term goals to the 
neglect of future prevention (and climate change adaptation); 
Inequitable distribution and allocation; aid may not meed needs 
Expectations 
Intentions/motivations: high expectations of aid; 
uncertain expectations arising from past 
inconsistencies; low expectations of governance of aid 
Outcomes/consequences: dependence on aid to the 
detriment of preparation and resilience; self reliance in 
face of pessimism about the future 
Intentions/motivations: perceive high expectations 
from community; perceive high levels of 
dependency from community; high expectations 
of community self-reliance 
Outcomes/consequences: dependent itself on 
donor funding (especially Tonga) 
Intentions/motivations: perceive high expectations from 
community; perceive high levels of dependency from 
community; independence from government 
Outcomes/consequences: increase expectations and dependency 
especially with inappropriate aid (type or amount) (especially 
Fiji);  
Remoteness 
Intentions/motivations: low expectations of governance 
of aid; isolation 
Outcomes/consequences: long wait for aid; 
powerlessness; increased self reliance; better upkeep of 
traditional knowledge; more and faster aid for main 
islands (especially Fiji); lack of external oversight; 
independence 
Intentions/motivations: remote areas able to be 
forgotten or receive less attention; high 
expectations of community self-reliance 
Outcomes/consequences: different policies on aid 
provision (especially Fiji) 
Intentions/motivations: cost of provision to remote areas seen as 
prohibitive; various motivations including public relations 
value; remote areas seen as responsibility of government 
Outcomes/consequences: remote areas often neglected; some 
provide aid only to easy to reach places (especially Fiji); more 
and faster aid for main islands (especially Fiji) 
Governance 
Intentions/motivations: Aid to fulfil needs; aid to 
acknowledge suffering; aid to ease time pressures; low 
expectations of governance of aid; isolation 
Outcomes/consequences: Inequitable distribution and 
allocation; aid may not meet needs; inconsistent 
(especially Tonga); more and faster aid for main 
islands (especially Fiji); lack of external oversight; 
independence 
Intentions/motivations: responsibility for welfare 
of citizens; co-ordination and control over aid 
system 
Outcomes/consequences: Difficult to coordinate; 
viewed as being corrupt and slow; Inequitable 
distribution and allocation; inconsistent 
(especially Tonga); more and faster aid for main 
islands (especially Fiji) 
Intentions/motivations: independence from government; 
business; see themselves as faster and more legitimate 
alternative to government 
Outcomes/consequences: focus on short term goals to the 
neglect of future prevention (and climate change adaptation); 
Inequitable distribution and allocation; operate outside official 
aid system; aid duplication and waste 
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     Many of the issues and problems in Table 12.1 seem to arise from the 
apparently easy availability of disaster relief funding compared with the more 
structured and controlled funding for prevention or adaptation projects. The 
over-abundance of aid organisations and aid is more relevant for Fiji than 
Tonga, but the problems associated with the difference between the two types 
of funding are equally applicable in both countries. This results in continual 
repairs and patches being made without addressing the underlying 
vulnerabilities.  
     The policy focus on prevention and adaptation, which requires a longer-
term view, will need to translate into more actual funding. This will require 
funding provision of this type to be made more attractive to donors, which 
ultimately means politicians. Donor funding is easier to hand out when there is 
an obvious and unequivocal need. Humanitarian disaster relief fits neatly into 
this category. It may be argued living with the water lapping at your home 
every high tide represents an urgent need also. But a home with waves gently 
breaking onto the foundations just does not have the immediacy and same level 
of television appeal as a waves crashing over the entire house, smashing it to 
pieces.
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Table 12.2: Suggested changes for the future – intentions/motivations vs outcomes/consequences 
 Community Government Aid organisations 
Aid and 
disaster relief 
Intentions/motivations: Aid to fulfil needs; 
aid to acknowledge suffering; aid to ease 
time pressures 
Outcomes/consequences: Aid meets needs; 
equitable within and between communities; 
timely; consistent 
Intentions/motivations: responsibility for welfare of citizens; co-
ordination rather than control of aid; long term goals for aid 
rather than 'return to normal’; increased resilience in system. 
Outcomes/consequences: co-ordination of aid whether directly 
or indirectly; timely provision; climate adaptation and disaster 
prevention funding and projects prioritised; decreased 
perceptions of corruption and inequalities 
Intentions/motivations: long term goals of aid rather than 
'return to normal’; appropriate aid based on meeting needs of 
the community 
Outcomes/consequences: equitable between communities; 
links with central coordinating body; climate adaptation and 
disaster prevention funding and projects prioritised 
Expectations 
Intentions/motivations: Expectations for aid 
which will meet needs; prevention and 
preparation prioritised 
Outcomes/consequences: Resilience and 
self-sufficiency through preparation and risk 
reduction  
Intentions/motivations: increased focus of expectations on 
preparation and prevention 
Outcomes/consequences: decreased expectations of relief within 
the community through consistent and equitable aid allocation 
and distribution; decreased dependency on donor funding for 
aid relief through increased funding for prevention measures 
Intentions/motivations: Independence from government but 
consider themselves part of overall aid system rather than 
separate from it; long term goals of aid;  
Outcomes/consequences: increased funding focus on 
prevention and risk reduction, and climate change adaptation 
Remoteness 
Intentions/motivations: remoteness viewed 
as a strength 
Outcomes/consequences: resilience and 
traditional knowledge valued and sustained; 
increased sense of power and control over 
post-disaster recovery 
Intentions/motivations: responsibility for welfare of citizens; 
decreased inequalities between remote and non-remote places 
Outcomes/consequences: remote places prioritised according to 
need including outside disaster time rather than population 
being the main driver of priority setting; remote places given 
earlier opportunities, better co-ordination of aid  
Intentions/motivations: remoteness a logistical issue for 
consideration rather than obstacle to provision; remote places 
not viewed as just the domain of government, but of aid 
providers in general; smaller, remote places as an opportunity 
for trialling strategies 
Outcomes/consequences: equitable between communities; 
smaller, remote places given earlier opportunities 
Governance 
Intentions/motivations: remoteness viewed 
as a strength; independence; links for 
support; inclusiveness 
Outcomes/consequences: flexibility; 
inclusiveness; increased capacity and social 
capital 
Intentions/motivations: responsibility for welfare of citizens; co-
ordination rather than control of aid 
Outcomes/consequences: co-ordination of aid whether directly 
or indirectly; timely provision; improved liaison and co-
ordination with aid organisations; decreased perceptions of 
corruption and inequalities; remote places given earlier 
opportunities, better co-ordination of aid  
Intentions/motivations: Independence from government but 
consider themselves part of overall aid system rather than 
separate from it 
Outcomes/consequences: equitable between communities; 
smaller, remote places given earlier opportunities, better co-
ordination of aid  
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     The path to these changes in Table 12.2 will not be straightforward. What is being 
suggested here will require transformational change of the aid system, both to 
increase the focus on prevention funding and activities, and to find ways to embrace 
the increasing number of participants in aid donation and distribution, while 
addressing the existing equity concerns.  
12.3 Transformations 
     When the thinking on disasters changed from a focus on the physical hazard to the 
underlying vulnerabilities that, in combination with exposure, turn that hazard into a 
disaster, the fundamentals of how to respond also changed. We now know that many 
of these events do not have to become disasters. Therefore, it may be argued that there 
is an ethical responsibility to make every attempt to ensure that they do not. If so, then 
this must be the basic principle that drives policy and practice in this area. A focus on 
prevention and preparation logically follows, which ultimately is likely to reduce 
overall costs. This focus exists in policy and frameworks, but not necessarily in 
practice. What is required to make this happen may well represent a transformation of 
the disaster management systems, since the system as it currently stands is 
fundamentally skewed towards response. The shift is not away from response 
completely, but rather to increase equity in response for remote and non-remote areas, 
and increase the focus on prevention. Currently, the funding mechanisms, the 
operation of many of the aid organisations, and in some senses, the communities 
themselves, are all set up to encourage and enable response.  
     This situation fits with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
definitions of transformation that includes strengthened, altered or aligned paradigms, 
goals or values towards promoting adaptation for sustainable development, including 
poverty reduction (IPCC, 2014a). Such transformations may involve value systems; 
regulatory, legislative or bureaucratic regimes; financial institutions; and 
technological or biological systems (IPCC, 2012).  
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      Hindrances to transformation identified in this study include: 
• The incentives for donor funding and aid organisations favouring the 
more visible immediate response,  
• The rules and regulations surrounding access to adaptation funding, 
• Expectations of aid with communities expecting to receive disaster 
response aid, and governments and aid organisations expecting to 
provide it. This in and of itself is not necessarily a hindrance, but 
flipping it around, there is currently a lack of expectations around the 
receipt and provision of adaptation aid and funding. 
• Non-traditional aid providers participating only in the humanitarian 
response part of the disaster management cycle 
     Expectations and incentives will to a certain extent direct behaviour and 
action. Thus, in order to change the behaviour and action that is the practice, 
these expectations and incentives hindrances will need to be overcome. 
However, there are also enablers currently in place. The need for a shift in 
focus is widely recognised by participants in this study, and within the broader 
field, and is a stated priority of regional frameworks. This means that while the 
incentives inherent in the current system may represent obstacles, the overall 
motivations are different. The will exists to try to change the system. This will 
is expressed not only in the formal frameworks and policies, but by the people 
in this study. The linkages of traditional local and scientific knowledges are 
also specifically referenced in those frameworks, which bring the fields of 
CCA and DRM together. The bit-part played by the non-traditional aid 
organisations with their participation only in the response part of the cycle, 
may also in fact form an enabler since it means that during the non-response 
times when the planning and preparation for prevention work can occur, the 
field is quieter also. There are fewer organisations involved, and those that 
remain active are likely to be those more committed to and able to work in the 
longer term, such that the co-ordination and governance issues should be 
reduced.  
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     Changing the rules and processes around funding will be difficult, but the 
inclusion of prevention work in the World Bank response to 2014’s Cyclone 
Ian in Tonga is a good example of the possibilities. This work was included 
under the response banner, without the red tape that accompanies adaptation 
funding, but achieves the same goal. This may represent a formula that can be 
replicated elsewhere to better harness the opportunity provided by disasters. 
Finally, remote islands provide a ready made pilot location for testing 
adaptation options, in small and discrete places, while simultaneously 
beginning to address the equity issues they face daily. 
12.4 Lasting impressions 
     This research has raised many issues and the experiences in undertaking it 
have been fascinating. Several findings have struck me as significant, 
interesting or unexpected:  
• The consistency of results between the Fiji and Tongan remote island 
communities is noteworthy. Firstly, it strengthens the reliability of the 
findings from each one. Secondly, it suggests that the remoteness of 
these islands is at least as significant as which country they are in, 
despite differences in the policies and procedures of the two countries. 
The depth of knowledge of traditional warning signs of cyclones, and 
the remarkable similarities between the Fijian and Tongan island 
communities was striking. There is much talk of the importance of this 
knowledge, but little work being done on documenting or validating it. 
This clearly represents opportunities for future research. 
• The notion from a community member that food rations after a disaster 
represent time was a completely different perspective. Having rations 
available frees up your time for construction repairs and re-planting 
crops. This is significant for remote island communities where so much 
time each day is spent getting food on the table. In urban areas, the 
challenge is more likely to be able to find a shop that is open and 
stocked. This changes the idea of need, and how those needs should be 
fulfilled. The requirement for food rations is usually based upon the 
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extent of crop damage in the remote island communities. Perhaps this is 
a narrow view of need. 
• Being on the outer remote islands felt like a different world to the main 
islands, even within these countries that are themselves remote island 
countries. Upon returning to the main islands, this contrast was stark. 
But over time, I felt myself being pulled back into ‘mainland world’, 
and having to consciously remind myself that what I was hearing did 
not match what I had just experienced.  
• The differences in the availability of response and prevention aid are 
completely disproportionate to the rhetoric of increasing focus on 
prevention. It seems that when there is a disaster, the funding tap is 
turned on, but only briefly and only for the immediate response.  
• While there were many similarities between the islands in Fiji and 
Tonga, there seemed to be a stark difference in the social capital and 
cohesiveness. In Fiji, one village risked their lives to save the other in 
the middle of a cyclone. In Tonga, one village could tell me virtually 
nothing about the flooding experienced in their neighbouring village, 
despite it being serious enough to headline the news. This is an 
anthropological question that would take much more than one month on 
each island to even begin to unravel properly. 
• Questions of poverty and dependence on the remote islands are 
complex indeed. Australians talk about the ‘tall poppy syndrome’ 
whereby outward expressions of wealth and success by individuals are 
derided by the community as a whole. It seems that remote 
communities are excellent examples of this in operation. Passing 
through one of the villages on Lifuka island in Tonga, I noted the 
presence of a small number of large, new houses that stood out as being 
different to their neighbours. I asked how that makes the others in the 
village feel, and received the response, “we find it hard to be nice to 
them”. There is an implication that policy responses must be at a 
community rather than individual level. 
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• Linked to this issue of community level responses is the question 
around the interpretation of ‘need’ and therefore how and what needs 
should be fulfilled. An individual level assessment of needs-based aid 
system trying to fit into a group-oriented community means that 
something has to be compromised. 
     These impressions do not all fit neatly into one box and they are indicative 
of the complexity of the issues investigated in this thesis. For many of these 
issues, there are no easy answers, but much room for further work to be done. 
12.5 Concluding thoughts 
     As with any in-depth research, there are many questions raised by this 
thesis, and directions for future research. The linking of climate change 
adaptation and disaster risk management at a regional level in policy 
frameworks should have an impact on policies and practices at local and 
national levels. This should be monitored, along with its impacts on funding 
availability and foci. The increase and expansion of the aid ‘industry’ does not 
have a clear and logical end point. If disasters are to become more frequent and 
severe, then more people in the world will have experience of them. If people 
are more likely to donate and become involved in disasters after having had 
similar experiences, then in combination with global communications and the 
ease with which people can make direct contributions, it is likely that this will 
continue to increase rather than taper off. How far this extends and how to 
make it work are areas requiring further investigation. 
     There is much to admire in the remote island communities, even though it 
arises from having few options. In Cyclone Ami, there was one lady 
completely alone on her island in Fiji when the cyclone struck. She saw and 
acted upon a traditional warning sign: the changed behaviour of a particular 
bird, manu ni cagi, which was her only warning. With no evacuation centre to 
escape to, she went to the smallest structure on the island, the kitchen, and 
wrapped it in banana leaves, to seal it and provide protection from the winds. 
Using only her own knowledge and skill, she survived the cyclone which 
destroyed every other building on her island. There is an amazing resilience to 
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be found in remote island communities that should be recognised, nurtured and 
learned from. 
     This piece of research has been intriguing from start to finish. It is multi-
faceted and complex, full of dichotomies: remote and non-remote, 
humanitarian aid and prevention, vulnerability and resilience, developing and 
developed worlds, those who lost everything and those the cyclone passed 
by… I suspect these things will occupy my thoughts for some time to come. 
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Glossary of terms  
     The following terms in this glossary are taken from the IPCC 2014 
report (IPCC, 2014b) unless otherwise stated. 
     Adaptation: The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate 
and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate harm or exploit 
beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, human intervention may facilitate 
adjustment to expected climate and its effects. 
⁃ Incremental adaptation: Adaptation actions where the central 
aim is to maintain the essence and integrity of a system or a 
process at a given scale 
⁃ Transformational adaptation: Adaptation that changes the 
fundamental attributes of a system in response to climate and its 
effects 
     Adaptive capacity: The ability of systems, institutions, humans and 
other organisms to adjust to potential damage, to take advantage of 
opportunities, or to respond to consequences. 
     Climate change: refers to a change in the state of the climate that can 
be identified (e.g. by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the 
variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically 
decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or 
external forcings such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions, 
and persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or 
in land use. 
     Coping: the manner in which people act within the limits of existing 
resources and range of expectations to achieve various ends. In general this 
involves no more than ‘managing resources’ but usually means how it is done 
in unusual, abnormal and adverse situations (Wisner et al., 2004 p113). 
     Disaster: Severe alterations in the normal functioning of a 
community of a society due to hazardous physical events interacting with 
vulnerable social conditions, leading to widespread adverse human, material, 
economic or environmental effects that require immediate emergency response 
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to satisfy critical human needs and that may require external support for 
recovery. 
     Disaster risk management: Processes for designing, implementing 
and evaluating strategies, policies and measures to improve the understanding 
of disaster risk, foster disaster risk reduction and transfer, and promote 
continuous improvement in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery 
practices, with the explicit purpose of increasing human security, well-being, 
quality of life, and sustainable development. 
     Disaster risk reduction: Denotes both a policy goal or objective, and 
the strategic and instrumental measures employed for anticipating future 
disaster risk; reducing existing exposure, hazard or vulnerability; and 
improving resilience.  
     Early warning system: The set of capacities needed to generate and 
disseminate timely and meaningful information to enable individuals, 
communities and organisations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act 
appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or 
loss…A people-centred early warning system necessarily comprises four key 
elements: knowledge of the risks; monitoring, analysis and forecasting of the 
hazards; communication or dissemination or alerts and warnings; and local 
capabilities to respond to the warnings received (UNISDR, 2009). 
     Extreme weather event: Is an event that is rare at a particular place 
and time of year. Definitions of rare vary, but an extreme weather event would 
normally be as rare as or rarer than the 10th or 90th percentile of a probability 
density function estimated from observations. By definition, the characteristics 
of what is called extreme weather may vary from place to place in an absolute 
sense.  
     Governance: The way government is understood has changed in 
response to social, economic and technological changes over recent decades. 
There is a corresponding shift from government defined strictly by the nation-
state to a more inclusive concept of governance, recognising the contributions 
of various levels of government (global, international, regional, local) and the 
  263 
roles of the private sector, of nongovernment actors and of civil society (IPCC, 
2012, p560). 
     Hazard: The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced 
physical event that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as 
well as damage and loss to property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service 
provision, and environmental resources (IPCC, 2012, p560). 
     Mitigation (of climate change): A human intervention to reduce the 
sources of enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases. 
     Mitigation (of disaster risk and disaster): The lessening of the 
potential adverse impacts of physical hazards (including those that are human-
induced) through actions that reduce hazard, exposure and vulnerability.  
     Resilience: The ability of a system and its component parts to 
anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous 
event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the 
preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures and 
functions (IPCC, 2012 p563). 
     Socio-ecological resilience: the ability to absorb disturbance, 
reorganise, and retain essential functions, processes, structures and feedbacks 
(Walker and Salt, 2006; Holling, 1973). 
     Storm surge: The temporary increase, at a particular locality, in the 
height of the sea due to extreme meteorological conditions (low atmospheric 
pressure and/or strong winds). The storm surge is defined as being the excess 
above the level expected from the tidal variation alone at that time and place.  
     Sustainable development: Development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.  
     Traditional knowledge: A body of information passed down through 
generations in a given locality and acquired through the accumulation of 
experiences, relationships with the surrounding environment, and traditional 
community rituals, practices and institutions (Kelman et al., 2012 p13). 
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     Transformation: A change in the fundamental attributes of a system, 
often based on altered paradigms, goals or values. Transformations can occur 
in technological or biological systems, financial structures, and regulatory, 
legislative or administrative regimes. 
     Tropical cyclone: A strong, cyclonic-state disturbance that originates 
over tropical oceans. Distinguished from weaker systems (often named tropical 
disturbances or depressions) by exceeding a threshold wind speed…A tropical 
cyclone is called a hurricane, typhoon, or cyclone, depending on geographic 
location. 
     Vulnerability: The propensity or predisposition to be adversely 
affected. Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts including sensitivity 
or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt.  
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School of Sociology and Social Work 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Climate change adaptation in the South Pacific:  
Responses to natural disasters in Fiji and Tonga 
 
Information sheet for Government or Non-Government 
organisations 
 
Invitation 
This study looks at how communities respond to tropical cyclones, and is being 
conducted as part of a PhD for Ingrid Johnston, under the supervision of Professor 
Rob White, at the University of Tasmania, in Australia. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The study aims to look at the responses of Governments, Non-Government 
Organisations and other Organisations who provide aid following a natural disaster, 
and the people, in the affected communities. As the climate and weather changes, 
there may be more severe weather events such as tropical cyclones, and so it is 
important to understand how and why people respond to them, and how these 
responses may need to change and adapt in future. 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
In this study, we would like to understand that perspectives of as many officials and 
organisations involved with disaster response and recovery as possible. You have 
been invited to participate as a representative of a relevant organisation or 
Government department. 
What will I be asked to do? 
You will be asked some questions about your organisation’s experiences of cyclones 
and responses to them, and the interview/focus group should take about 45-60 
minutes. As there will be a lot of information in this study, the interviews/focus 
groups will be audio recorded so that the researcher can listen to them again later 
when the report is being written. 
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Tasmania 7001 Australia  
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Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
This study may benefit people within the community by increasing awareness about 
disasters such as cyclones, and giving people an opportunity to discuss what those 
events mean for this community. It may also help the Government, NGOs and the 
community to better understand how and why each responds in the way they do 
when disasters happen. We also hope that communities such as yours, who have a lot 
of experience with cyclones, may be able to help people in other places learn how to 
respond to disasters. 
Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
There are no foreseeable risks from your participation in this study. 
 
What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
If you change your mind, you can stop the interview at any time, without having to 
explain why. If this happens, you may request that the information you provided is 
not used in the study and your data will be removed at your request. Once the 
researcher has left the research site, it may not be possible to remove your data. 
What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
The data collected in this study will be kept in a secure location for a period of 5 years 
following publication of the report/thesis. Information from interviews will be 
confidential and not discussed with anyone else. If you are participating in a focus 
group, you should keep the discussions confidential, and others involved will be 
asked to so the same. 
When the study is over and the report/thesis has been written, the researcher would 
like to return to the community to provide feedback to participants on the outcomes. 
How will the results of the study be published? 
The results of the study will be published in a thesis report, and may also be included 
in academic books and/or journal articles. It is possible that direct quotes may be used 
which would identify you through your position in your organisation. You may 
request that this does not occur.   
What if I have questions about this study? 
The researchers are Ingrid Johnston, who can be contacted on email at 
Ingrid.johnston@utas.edu.au and Professor Rob White, who can be contacted on email 
R.D.White@utas.edu.au or on +61 3 6226 2877. 
 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study, 
please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on +61 3 6226 
7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the person 
nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote ethics 
reference number H0012313. 
 
This information sheet is yours to keep, and you can indicate your consent to 
participate either by signing a written consent form, or by saying that you consent 
on the recorded interview. 
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Climate change adaptation in the South Pacific:  
Responses to natural disasters in Fiji and Tonga 
 
Information sheet for communities 
 
Invitation 
This study looks at how communities respond to tropical cyclones, and is being 
conducted as part of a PhD for Ingrid Johnston, under the supervision of Professor 
Rob White, at the University of Tasmania, in Australia. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The study aims to look at the responses of Governments, Non-Government 
Organisations and other Organisations who provide aid following a natural disaster, 
and the people such as yourself, in the affected communities. As the climate and 
weather changes, there may be more severe weather events such as tropical cyclones, 
and so it is important to understand how and why people respond to them, and how 
these responses may need to change and adapt in future. 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
In this study, we would like to hear from as many people in the community as 
possible. Each person has different experiences and different points of view that are 
important in understanding how the entire community is affected. Older people in the 
community may have had more experiences with cyclones and severe weather events, 
and younger people in the community will have to deal with the changes taking place; 
men and women have different experiences of these events as they take on different 
tasks – keeping children safe, finding shelter, and providing food and water. The 
views of everyone are important. 
What will I be asked to do? 
You will be asked some questions about your experiences of cyclones and your 
responses to them, and the interview/focus group should take about 30-45 minutes. 
As there will be a lot of information in this study, the interviews/focus groups will be 
audio recorded so that the researcher can listen to them again later when the report is 
being written. 
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Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
This study may benefit people within your community by increasing awareness about 
disasters such as cyclones, and giving people an opportunity to discuss what those 
events mean for this community. It may also help the Government, NGOs and the 
community to better understand how and why each responds in the way they do 
when disasters happen. We also hope that communities such as yours, who have a lot 
of experience with cyclones, may be able to help people in other places learn how to 
respond to disasters. 
 
Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
It is possible that you might become distressed talking about past experiences with 
cyclones, if for example you are remembering someone who was hurt or injured. If 
that happens, you may stop the interview/focus group, and you may wish to seek 
support from a family member or someone else in your community. 
What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
If you change your mind, you can stop the interview at any time, without having to 
explain why. If this happens, you may request that the information you provided is 
not used in the study and your data will be removed at your request. Once the 
researcher has left the community, it may not be possible to remove your data. 
What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
The data collected in this study will be kept in a secure location for a period of 5 years 
following publication of the report/thesis. Information from interviews will be 
confidential and not discussed with anyone else. If you are participating in a focus 
group, you should keep the discussions confidential, and others involved will be 
asked to so the same. 
When the study is over and the report/thesis has been written, the researcher would 
like to return to the community to provide feedback to participants on the outcomes. 
How will the results of the study be published? 
The results of the study will be published in a thesis report, and may also be included 
in academic books and/or journal articles. You will not be identifiable in any 
published results.  
What if I have questions about this study? 
The researchers are Ingrid Johnston, who can be contacted on email at 
Ingrid.johnston@utas.edu.au and Professor Rob White, who can be contacted on email 
R.D.White@utas.edu.au or on +61 3 6226 2877. 
 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study, 
please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on +61 3 6226 
7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the person 
nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote ethics 
reference number H0012313. 
 
This information sheet is yours to keep, and you can indicate your consent to 
participate either by signing a written consent form, or by saying that you consent 
on the recorded interview. 
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Climate change adaptation in the South Pacific:  
responses to natural disasters in Fiji and Tonga 
 
Government/Organisation interview/focus group 
participants 
 
1. I agree to take part in the research study named above. 
2. I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study. 
3. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
4. I understand that the study involves an interview/focus group discussion 
which may be audio taped. 
5. I understand that participation involves no foreseeable risks. 
6. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of 
Tasmania’s premises for five years from the publication of the study results, 
and will then be destroyed.  
7. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
8. I understand that the researcher(s) will maintain confidentiality and that any 
information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the purposes of 
the research. 
9. I agree to be identified as a participant in the publication of the study results.  
Yes   No   
10. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any 
time without any effect.  
If I so wish, I may request that any data I have supplied be withdrawn from the 
research until December 2012. 
 
 
Participant’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Participant’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Statement by Investigator 
 I have explained the project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and 
I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of 
participation. 
 
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them participating, the 
following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided 
so participants have had the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to participate in 
this project. 
 
Investigator’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Investigator’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Climate change adaptation in the South Pacific:  
responses to natural disasters in Fiji and Tonga 
 
Community interview/focus group participants 
 
1. I agree to take part in the research study named above. 
2. I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study. 
3. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
4. I understand that the study involves an interview/focus group discussion that 
may be audio taped. 
5. I understand that participation involves the risk(s) that I may become upset or 
distressed when discussing past experiences of tropical cyclones and that I 
may stop participating at any time should this occur. 
6. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of 
Tasmania’s premises for five years from the publication of the study results, 
and will then be destroyed.  
7. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
8. I understand that the researcher(s) will maintain confidentiality and that any 
information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the purposes of 
the research. 
9. I understand that the results of the study will be published so that I cannot be 
identified as a participant  
10. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any 
time without any effect.  
If I so wish, I may request that any data I have supplied be withdrawn from the 
research until August 2012 (or date when researcher leaves the research site). 
 
 
Participant’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Participant’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Statement by Investigator 
 I have explained the project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and 
I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of 
participation. 
 
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them participating, the 
following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided 
so participants have had the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to participate in 
this project. 
 
Investigator’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Investigator’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Climate change adaptation in the South Pacific:  
responses to natural disasters in Fiji and Tonga 
 
Government/Organisation interview/focus group 
participants 
 
• I agree to take part in the research study named above. 
• I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study. 
• The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
• I understand that the study involves an interview/focus group discussion 
which may be audio taped. 
• I understand that participation involves no foreseeable risks. 
• I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the 
University of Tasmania’s premises for five years from the publication of 
the study results, and will then be destroyed.  
• Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
• I understand that the researcher(s) will maintain confidentiality and that 
any information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the 
purposes of the research. 
• I agree to be identified as a participant in the publication of the study 
results.  
Yes   No   
• I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at 
any time without any effect.  
• If I so wish, I may request that any data I have supplied be withdrawn 
from the research until December 2013. 
 
Participant’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Participant’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Statement by Investigator 
 
 I have explained the project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and 
I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of 
participation. 
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them participating, the 
following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided 
so participants have had the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to participate in 
this project. 
 
Investigator’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Investigator’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Climate change adaptation in the South Pacific:  
responses to natural disasters in Fiji and Tonga 
 
Community interview/focus group participants 
 
• I agree to take part in the research study named above. 
• I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study. 
• The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
• I understand that the study involves an interview/focus group discussion 
that may be audio taped. 
• I understand that participation involves the risk(s) that I may become 
upset or distressed when discussing past experiences of tropical cyclones 
and that I may stop participating at any time should this occur. 
• I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the 
University of Tasmania’s premises for five years from the publication of 
the study results, and will then be destroyed.  
• Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
• I understand that the researcher(s) will maintain confidentiality and that 
any information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the 
purposes of the research. 
• I understand that the results of the study will be published so that I cannot 
be identified as a participant  
• I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at 
any time without any effect.  
• If I so wish, I may request that any data I have supplied be withdrawn 
from the research until August 2013 (or date when researcher leaves the 
research site). 
 
Participant’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Participant’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Statement by Investigator 
 
 I have explained the project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and 
I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of 
participation. 
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them participating, the 
following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided 
so participants have had the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to participate in 
this project. 
 
Investigator’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Investigator’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Appendix B – Selected publications 
 
 
This article has been removed for 
copyright or proprietary reasons.
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